St. John's Law Review
Volume 56, Winter 1982, Number 2

Article 2

Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts
Peter N. Cubita
Jeffrey S. Lichtman
Daniel D. Rubino

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

NOTE
AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

278
Common Fund Exception to the American Rule 280
281
Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule ....
Private Attorney General Doctrine ............ 284
286
II. PREVAILING PARTIES .................................
289
A. Attributes of PrevailingParties...............
1. Formal Success ..........................
292
Relationship
......................
293
2. Causal
294
3. Catalyst Doctrine ........................
299
4. Entitlement to Relief .....................
301
5. Prevailing Defendant .....................
303
B. Interim Awards .............................
1. Partial Success on the Merits ............. 303
308
C. Administrative Proceedings ..................
1. Federal and State Proceedings ............ 308
309
2. Title VII Action .........................
311
3. ADEA Action ............................
313
D. Intervenors .................................
317
E. Pro Se Litigants ............................
1. Unsettled Eligibility Under the FOIA ......
317
2. Middle-Ground Standard for Eligibility
Under the FOIA .........................
318
3. Ineligibility Under the Fees Awards Act ....
319
4. Ineligibility Under the Truth In Lending Act 319
III. STATUTORY FEE AWARDS: AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION 320
A. Discretion: A Question of Degree ............. 323
1. Liberal Civil Rights Standard ............. 324
2. Strict Standard in Context of Patents,
Trademarks, and Securities ...............
330
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................

A.
B.
C.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

3.
B.

IV.

Other Contexts ..........................

The Reasonable Attorney's Fee ...............
1. Johnson Factors .........................
2. Lindy Lodestar Test .....................

331
335
337
341

RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM GOVERNMENTAL

....
Fee Awards Against the United States ........
1. Equal Access to Justice Act ...............
B. Fee Awards Against the States ...............
C. Legislative and JudicialImmunity ............
CONCLUSION .....................................
ENTITIES AND OFFICERS: THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE

A.

V.

[Vol. 56:277

348
349
351
356
365

370

I. INTRODUCTION
Although legal fees have been recoverable by successful litigants in the English courts for centuries,1 the traditional rule in
the United States has disallowed such awards.2 This policy became
I Plaintiffs

first were allowed to recover costs in 1275 under the Statute of Gloucester.

1278, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 1. These costs were construed liberally to include fees paid to the court,
the solicitor, and counsel, as well as all other necessary expenses, including those paid to
expert witnesses. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 856-59 (1929). To discourage "the infinite number of small and trifling suits," a subsequent statute limited awards of costs if the
plaintiff recovered less than 40 shillings. See 43 Eliz., ch. 6 (1601). Defendants were first
given the right to costs recovery from plaintiffs in 1267. Statute of Marlborough, 1267, 52
Hen. 3, ch. 6. Although the statute of Mailborough applied only to cases involving malicious
challenge to a feoffment, see id., defendants' rights to recover costs were broadened considerably in later years to allow recovery in certain actions based upon trespass, case and contract, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 15 (1531), and in cases involving nonsuit, discontinuance and failure to
prosecute. 8 Eliz., ch. 2 (1565). Eventually, prevailing defendants were granted the right to
receive a costs award in all cases in which plaintiffs, had they prevailed, would have been
awarded costs. 4 Jac. 1, ch. 3 (1606).
A major revision of the general English rule was adopted in the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., ch. 66, and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 &
39 Vict., ch. 77. The 1875 Act provides that in a jury trial a judge may refuse to grant costs
to a prevailing party "for good cause," id., at sched. 1, order LV, thus making modem English attorney fee awards at least partially discretionary. Compare Stoebuck, Counsel Fees
Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLo. L. REv. 202, 204-05 (1966) and
Special Project, Recent Developments in Attorneys' Fees, 29 VAND. L. Rxv. 685, 720 n.238
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Special Project] (cost award unqualifiedly discretionary) with
Goodhart, supra, at 854 (deprivation of award for good cause only). For a discussion of
other western European nations' systems of allowing recovery of legal fees to prevailing parties, see Stoebuck, supra, at 206-07.
2 E.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
Under the American rule, attorney's fees generally are not recoverable from an opposing
party unless a contract or statute provides otherwise. Id. Initially, however, the English system of assigning costs to the defeated party was followed in the American colonies. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN.
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firmly entrenched in American law when the Supreme Court held
that a federal statute providing for the assessment of standardized
costs 3 was the exclusive vehicle for the recovery at law of attorney's
fees. 4 The federal courts, however, exercising their inherent equity
powers, have established two exceptions to the American rule
against recovery of legal fees.5
L. REV. 619, 620 (1931). For examples of pre-Revolutionary statutes permitting recovery of
costs, see id. at nn.6 & 7. After the Revolution and until 1853, the federal courts deferred to
state statutes providing for attorney's fee awards. See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 165 n.2 (1939); Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 284 U.S.
444, 445-46 (1932);'Special Project, supranote 1, at 720 n.241. See also note 3 and accompanying text infra.
The American rule denying a costs recovery, absent a statute providing otherwise, was
set out in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796), and, to date, consistently
has been followed. See, e.g., F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417
'U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497, 511 (1902); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S, 483, 490-91 (1879); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371-73 (1851).
See also 1 S. SPEISER, ATTORNEYS' FEES § 12:3, at 463-64 & n.26 (1973). It has been suggested that the American courts' rejection of the English rule arose from a colonial distrust
of lawyers and from the belief that the English rule prejudiced the poor and unjustifiedly
punished defeated parties. See Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d
Cir. 1960) (citing Goodhart, supra note 1, at 872-77). The difficulty in assessing a reasonable
fee also has been cited as part of a "solid foundation" for denying recovery of legal costs.
Oelrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 231 (1872). In addition, the practice of awarding
"attorney's fees to victorious litigants has been viewed as "an instrument of revenge." Farmer
v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 324 F.2d 359, 370 (2d Cir. 1963) (en banc) (Clark, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 379 U.S. 227 (1964).
' Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, 10 Stat. 161 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1923(a)
(1976)).
4See The Baltimore, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 377, 392 (1869); cf. Henkel v. Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Ry., 284 U.S. 444, 446-47 (1932) (costs for expert witnesses not recoverable absent express statutory provision). In The Baltimore,the Supreme Court noted that
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, which provided
for awards of costs, implicitly adopted the English rule. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 388. See also
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 (1939); In re Paschal, 77 U.S. (10 WalL)
483, 493-94 (1870). The Court concluded, however, that the 1853 Act effectively repealed
this endorsement by making its own provisions the exclusive means for compensation. 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) at 392.
5 See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530
(1962); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-65 & n.2 (1939); Dodge v. Tulleys,
144 U.S. 451, 457 (1892); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1882); 1 S. SPEaSR,
supra note 2, § 12:11. The equity jurisdiction of the federal courts originated in the English
Court of Chancery, which was empowered to fix costs at intervals in litigation and to allocate "the entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties as fair justice to the other
party will permit." Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. at 164-65 & n.1. See generally 1
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
ArERICA §§ 57-58 (14th ed. 1918).
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Common Fund Exception to the American Rule

Under the "common fund" exception," as first conceived, a
court could assess attorney's fees against funds that had been created, increased, or protected by successful litigation. Because this
doctrine was based upon the concept of unjust enrichment,8 legal
fees were awarded only when a representative plaintiff's action
produced an identifiable fund which permitted all members of a
class to share in the pecuniary benefit of recovery. Ultimately,
6 The common-fund doctrine originated in two Supreme Court decisions. See Central
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1885); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S.
527, 535-36 (1882). In Greenough, the plaintiff, representing a class of bondholders, brought
suit to prevent a trustee of a fund that had been pledged as security for the bonds from
committing waste. 105 U.S. at 528-29. The resulting judgment set aside the fraudulent conveyances and restored the fund. Id. at 529. The plaintiff then filed a petition to obtain funds
from the trust as reimbursement for litigation expenses. Id. In Central Railroad, several
unsecured creditors successfully brought a creditors' bill to reach the assets of a debtorrailroad. 113 U.S. at 118. Subsequently, the creditors' attorneys attempted to recover for the
services they rendered to the noncontracting parties named as class members in the creditor's bill. Id. at 120-21. Recognizing that those who obtain the benefit of a lawsuit without
contributing to its cost are unjustly enriched at the expense of the successful litigants, the
Supreme Court held that both the litigant in Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532, and the attorney
in Central Railroad had independent claims to reasonable attorney's fees from the common
fund. 113 U.S. at 127.
The common-fund doctrine is consistent with the American rule since it is not the losing party but the fund itself that is taxed with the victor's fees. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, O
444 U.S. 472, 481 (1980); see Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240,
257-58 (1975); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939). Indeed, one commentator has noted that the courts, when invoking the common-fund theory of recovery,
actually are imposing extracontractual obligations upon the nonclient, nonparty beneficiaries of the fund. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable'? 126 U.
PA. L. REv. 281, 298 (1977). See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney
Fees From Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597, 1653 (1974).
See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479-81 (1980); United States v.
Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738, 744 (1931); Harrison v. Peres, 168 U.S. 311, 325 (1897);
Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1885).
' Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). The common-fund doctrine reflects the notion that persons who
are benefited by a suit, without helping to defray its cost, are unjustly enriched at the expense of the prevailing litigant. Id.
I E.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 n.7 (1973); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 53637 (1882). The classic example of a common fund which confers pecuniary benefit upon
those who are charged with attorney's fees is an express trust. See United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738, 744-45 (1931); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532. The
courts, however, have expanded the scope of the common-fund theory to encompass a wide
range of civil litigation. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 479-81 (1980)
(money judgments); Harrison v. Perea, 168 U.S. 311, 325 (1897) (decedent's estates); Central
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1885) (creditor suits); City of Detroit v.
Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1974) (settlement funds); 1 S. SPEISER, supra
note 2, §§ 11:13 to 11:26, at 416-46.
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however, the doctrine was construed liberally and evolved into a
"common benefit" theory 0 pursuant to which neither an identifiable fund nor pecuniary recovery were necessary preconditions to
fees awards.' Currently, the doctrine encompasses litigation
"which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to
the rights and interests" of others. 12 Courts making an award
under this exception, however, must be able to exact the fees from
those who have benefited from the litigation.13
B. Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule
The second traditional equitable exception to the American
rule, the "bad faith" exception,1 4 is punitive in nature, 5 and en10See generally Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5-7 & n.7 (1973); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391-95 (1970); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 165-66 (1939);
Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957).
11 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). In Mills, the Supreme Court noted that although the early "common fund" cases involved pecuniary recovery, "nothing in these cases indicate[d] that the suit must actually bring money into the
court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement of expenses." Id. at 392
(footnote omitted).
12 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (quoting Bosch v. Meeker
Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 366-67, 101 N.W.2d 423, 427 (1960)). See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees: What Constitutes a "Benefit" Sufficient to Award Fees from
Third Party Beneficiaries, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 271, 273-81.
"' See, e.g., Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 52 ST. JOHN'S
L. RE V. 562, 568 (1978).
14 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975); F.D.
Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.4 (1968);
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Vaughan v.
Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). See generally Comment, Attorney's Fees and the
Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 319 (1977); Comment, Nemeroff v. Abelson,
Bad Faith, and Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 468 (1979). A fee award
pursuant to the bad faith exception is limited in several respects. Fees may be awarded only
for those legal services necessitated by the vexatious conduct of the defeated party. E.g.,
Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am. Local 7495, 530 F.2d 126, 133 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Wright v. Jackson, 522 F.2d 955, 957 (4th Cir. 1975);
Signal Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107, 68 F.R.D. 318,
322-23 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Additionally, because the bad faith exception is founded upon the
inherent equitable powers of the federal courts, see note 5 and accompanying text supra, a
court properly may refuse to award attorney's fees when the party requesting the award also
has been guilty of misconduct. E.g., In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543-44 (E.D. Va. 1972);
Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
"6Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Since the basic purpose of the bad faith exception
is punitive, "the essential element in triggering the award of fees is ... the existence of 'bad
faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." Id. In Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591
(3d Cir. 1976), however, the Third Circuit held that the punitive nature of this exception
may preclude its application in actions instituted under section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
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ables a court to assess attorney's fees against a losing party"6 who
has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons." 17 A court may premise its use of this exception upon either the acts giving rise to the plaintiff's claim' s or the conduct of a
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1981). 540 F.2d at 599. Noting that section 28(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976),
prohibits recovery of amounts which exceed the "actual damages on account of the act complained of," and observing that assessments of attorney's fees are equivalent to awards of
punitive damages in this context, the court concluded that recovery of fees is not permitted
when premised on the facts giving rise to the cause of action itself. 540 F.2d at 599. The
court noted, however, that counsel fees can be awarded when "an unfounded action or defense is brought or maintained in bad faith," id. at 600 (quoting 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.77, at 1709 (2d ed. 1976)), or when the wanton conduct occurred during, or just
before, the commencement of the litigation. 540 F.2d at 600; accord, Huddleston v. Herman
& MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir. 1981). But see Wright v. Heizer Corp., 503 F. Supp.
802, 812 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Straub rule too strict); Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees Under
Rule 10b-5, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 320, 337 (1977) (bad faith exception should be expanded
to permit successful litigants in 10b-5 actions to recover reasonable attorney's fees unless
special circumstances render such an award unjust). See generally Note, Securities Regulation-Scope of Due Diligence Defense and Permissibility of an Award of Attorney's Fees
Under the "Bad Faith"Exception to the American Rule in a Private10b-5 Action-Straub
v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976), 50 TEMP. L.Q. 124 (1976).
1" In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the Supreme Court extended
the equitable bad faith exception to permit federal courts to assess counsel fees against
attorneys who act in bad faith. Id. at 766-67. See generally Comment, Awards of Attorneys'
Fees Against Attorneys: Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 60 B.U.L. REv. 950 (1980). After
rejecting the defendant's contention that section 1927 of Title 28 autborized a fee award
against lawyers who abuse the "court's process," 447 U.S. at 763. But see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927
(West Supp. 1981) (subsequent amendment now permits such awards), the Roadway Express Court looked to the federal judiciary's inherent equitable powers. 447 U.S. at 765. In
examining the scope of these powers, the Court noted that the authority of federal courts to
levy sanctions to deter abusive litigation practices was "well-acknowledged." Id. (citing Link
v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962)). Moreover, the Court reasoned, since the bad
faith exception encompasses a party's litigation conduct, 447 U.S. at 766 (quoting Hall v.
Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)), and a court's power "over members of its bar is at least as great
as its authority over litigants," 447 U.S. at 766 (footnote omitted), it may levy counsel fees
against attorneys who intentionally abuse the judicial process. Id. For an analysis of the
appropriate scope of the bad faith exception's application to sanctions levied against attorneys, see Comment, supra, at 958-68 (intentional abuse standard is appropriate).
17 F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)
(citing Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962)); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973);
cf. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946) (attorney's fees may
be awarded when fraud is practiced upon tribunal).
18 See, e.g., Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am. Local 7495, 530 F.2d 126,
132-33 (8th Cir.) (labor union's breach of duty to represent non-member employee leading
to wrongful discharge), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
186 F.2d 473, 475, 481 (4th Cir. 1951) (dictum) (discriminatory contract between union and
employer substantially similar to contract previously declared illegal); Schlein v. Smith, 160
F.2d 22, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (defendants engaging in series of usurious transactions with
illiterate woman); Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (landlord refusing
to rent because of race); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Electronic Concepts, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1209,

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

party during the course of the litigation. 19 Ordinarily, the question

of whether the circumstances are sufficient to warrant invoking
this exception is left to the sound discretion of the court, and a
finding of bad faith will be reversed only if it lacks a reasonable
1219 (E.D. Va. 1970) (deliberate misuse of trade secrets and breach of confidential relationships), vacated on other grounds sub noma.Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-O, Inc., 447 F.2d 1387
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972). But see Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d
1223, 1233 (5th Cir. 1978) (no award for failure to perform contract for the sale of real
estate); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 599 (3d Cir. 1976) (no award where securities statute limits recovery to actual damages); Foley v. Devaney, 528 F.2d 888, 891-92 (3d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (no award against trustee who acted in defense of fund); Local 149,
UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir.) (doubt concerning interpretation of case justified litigation), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873 (1962).
Although not falling squarely within the scope of the bad faith exception, attorney's
fees also have been held to be recoverable as an element of compensatory damages in an
admiralty action in which the defendant shipowner refused to satisfy a seaman's meritorious
claim for maintenance and cure. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962). Similarly, awards of attorney's fees have been included in civil contempt penalties, Toledo Scale
Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426 (1923); Feldman v. American Palestine Line,
Inc., 18 F.2d 749, 750 (2d Cir. 1927), as well as in the damages recovered by plaintiffs injured as a result of wilful disobedience of a writ of mandamus. Branch v. Davis, 29 F. 888,
894-95 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1886).
'9 See, e.g., Ryan v. Hatfield, 578 F.2d 275, 277 (10th Cir. 1978) (award of attorney's
fees upheld after dismissal for failure to prosecute); In re Boston & Providence R.R., 501
F.2d 545, 549-50 (1st Cir. 1974) (vexatious motion to enjoin trustee's disbursement of
funds); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 441 F.2d 631, 636-37 & n.5 (5th Cir.)
(fraudulent allegation that defendant altered evidentiary exhibit), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941
(1971); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 466, 469-70 (6th Cir.) (beneficiary asserted "utterly unfounded" allegations of mismanagement and fraud against the
trustee), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); Nemeroff v. Abelson, 469 F. Supp. 630, 640-41
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (action instituted maliciously), modified, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980); Stratton Group, Ltd. v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (frivolous lawsuit);
Flora v. Moore, 461 F. Supp. 1104, 1120-22 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (bad faith pursuit of meritless
claim); EEOC v. Datapoint Corp., 457 F. Supp. 62, 67-69 (W.D. Tex. 1978); Scheriff v. Beck,
452 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-58 (D. Colo. 1978) (action instituted unreasonably); Southerland v.
County of Oakland, 77 F.R.D. 727, 734 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (fraud perpetrated upon the
court), aff'd sub nom. Southerland v. Irons, 628 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Texaco,
Inc., 418 F. Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (bad faith assertion of defense); United States v.
Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712-13 (D. Minn.) (subpoenaed reports concealed
solely for purpose of delay), aff'd, 543 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); Gazan v. Vadsco Sales
Corp., 6 F. Supp. 568, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (baseless action instituted solely for purpose of
harassing defendant). But see, e.g., Union Bank v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 528 F.2d 95, 99100 (9th Cir. 1975); Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 481 F.2d 682, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1144 (1974); Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 466
F.2d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1972); Walker v. CBS, 443 F.2d 33, 37-38 (7th Cir 1971); Burndy
Corp. v. Kearney-National, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 80, 92 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1286
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 82 (1981); Catanzaro v. Masco Corp., 423 F. Supp.
415, 445 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd per curiam sub noma. Catanzaro v. ITT, 575 F.2d 1085 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 989 (1978); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp.,
178 F. Supp. 899, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1960).
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basis.2 It is well settled, however, that the mere resolution of issues against a party will not demonstrate the requisite degree of
vexatiousness. 2 1 Indeed, fee shifting under the "bad faith" doctrine
is justified only in exceptional circumstances. 22
C. Private Attorney General Doctrine
Recognizing the limitations of the common-benefit and badfaith exceptions to the American rule,23 the federal courts, in the
early 1970's, employed their equitable powers to award fees to litigants who benefited the public by successfully vindicating congressional policies "of the highest order. '24 Notwithstanding its adop20 See, e.g., In re Boston & Providence R.R., 501 F.2d 545, 549-50 (1st Cir. 1974); Local
No. 4, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610, 615 (8th Cir.
1972); National Ass'n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Weinberger, 68 F.R.D. 387, 392 (D.D.C.
1975).
21 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 183 (1976). The Second Circuit has attempted to
guide the district courts by delineating the parameters of the bad faith exception. In Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977), for example,
the Second Circuit stated that a finding of pre-litigation bad faith requires clear evidence
that a claim is "entirely without color and has been asserted wantonly, for purposes of harrassment or delay, or for other improper reasons." Id. at 1088. In Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620
F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), the court, defining the concept of a colorable claim, observed thatA claim is colorable, for the purpose of the bad faith exception, when it has
some legal and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable beliefs of the
individual making the claim. The question is whether a reasonable attorney could
have concluded that facts supporting the claim might be established, not whether
such facts actually had been established.
Id. at 348 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit's views have not
only been applied by the district courts within the circuit, see, e.g., The Cambridge Fund,
Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc.,
439 F. Supp. 945, 958 n.5, (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979), but also
by the lower courts of other circuits, see, e.g., Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., 500 F. Supp.
174, 175 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F. Supp. 1132,
1149 (D. Minn. 1979).
22 See, e.g., Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939); National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 590 F.2d 1171, 1176-78 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
978 (1976); Richardson v. Communication Workers of Am. Local 7495, 530 F.2d 126, 132-33
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 824 (1976); Rolax v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 186 F.2d 473,
481 (4th Cir. 1951); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d 446, 469 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775 (1945); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corp.,
178 F. Supp. 899, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afl'd per curiam, 277 F.2d 462 (2d Cir. 1960).
23 See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 568.
24 Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972). The

genesis of this doctrine apparently occurred in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390
U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). In Newman, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff who
obtains an injunction enforcing compliance with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which proscribes racial discrimination in public accommodations, does so "not for himself
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tion by seven federal courts of appeals, 5 this "private attorney
general" doctrine2 6 ultimately was rejected by the Supreme Court
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.2 7 The Alyeska Court held that it was the province of Congress, not the judiciary, to determine which public policies were sufficiently important to merit the application of a fee-shifting remedy.2 8
Writing for the majority, Justice White observed that the general rule limiting attorney's fee awards to the nominal amounts
enumerated in the costs statute had not been altered by the enactment of various federal statutes which expressly authorized fee
shifting in certain circumstances.2 9 Although Congress had chosen
to employ the private attorney general rationale in some instances,3 0 the Court noted that congressional use of the doctrine
could not be construed as authorizing the courts to award attoralone but also as a 'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered
of the highest priority." Id. at 401-02 (footnote omitted); see notes 215-218 and accompanying text infra. Newman was interpreted by numerous lower federal courts as enunciating an
important new fee-shifting rationale and, therefore, enthusiastically was adopted. Note,
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "PrivateAttorney General".JudicialGreen Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 742-48 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Green Light]; see note 25 infra.
"2 See, e.g., Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137, 1138-39 (1st Cir. 1975), vacated, 423
U.S. 809 (1975); Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 982
(1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 145-46 (8th Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soc'y v.
Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 495 F.2d 219, 220-21 (1st Cir. 1974);
Cornist v. Richland Parish School Bd., 495 F.2d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974); Fairley v. Patterson, 493
F.2d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972) (per
curiam); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1971). But see
Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318, 329-31 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 416
U.S. 696 (1974).
26 See generally Derfner, One Giant Step: The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 441, 441-45 (1977); Green Light, supra note 24, at 733-34,
742-69; Note, supra note 13, at 569-70.
2' 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Prior to Alyeska, the Fourth Circuit refused to adopt the private
attorney general exception to the American rule. See Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318,
329-31 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Emphasizing the
difficulty in determining which public policies would warrant awards of attorney's fees
under the exception, the Bradley court concluded that Congress was better qualified to
make that determination. 472 F.2d at 329-31.
28 421 U.S. at 269.
29 Id. at 260; see, e.g., notes 34-37 infra.
20 421 U.S. at 263; see, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1972) (fee
shifting in connection with treble damages awards under the antitrust laws); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam) (fee shiftipg in connection
with provision precluding discrimination in places of public accommodation).
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ney's fees to a prevailing party whenever they "deem the public
policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant the award."' Moreover, the Court stated that awards made
under a private attorney general exception inevitably would conflict with a statutory provision barring the assessment of legal fee
awards against the federal government.2 The Alyeska Court concluded, therefore, that judicial adoption of the private attorney
general doctrine "would make major inroads on a policy matter
that Congress has reserved for itself."3
Because the Alyeska Court unequivocally rejected the private
attorney general rationale, express statutory fee authorization has
become the primary vehicle through which attorney's fees may be
awarded in the federal court system. This Note will examine the
operation and interpretation of such statutes. Since some degree of
victory generally is a prerequisite to a fee award, the Note first will
address the prevailing party concept. The standards which govern
the exercise of judicial discretion in awarding fees also will be examined. Thereafter, the Note will review the elusive "reasonableness" standard used to ascertain the size of a fee award. Finally,
the Note will consider the special problem of fee recovery against
governmental bodies and officials.
II.

PREVAILING PARTIES

Numerous federal statutes authorize awards of attorney's fees
31 421

U.S. at 263.
31 Id. at 265-67; see notes 322-325 and accompanying text infra. The Court noted that
section 2412 of Title 28 permits the taxation of costs "but not including the fees and expenses- of attorneys" against the United States in civil actions involving that entity or any
agency or official thereof. 421 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1976) as amended
by Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2327 (1980)). The Court observed that if a primary function
of a private attorney general was, as the plaintiffs maintained, to hold public officials accountable for their actions, then the logical implication should be that attorney's fees are
awardable against the government or its representatives. 421 U.S. at 267. The Court stated,
however, that section 2412 constitutes an absolute bar to fee awards against the United
States in the absence of an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 267-68.
3 421 U.S. at 269. One commentator has noted that Alyeska eliminated the private
attorney general doctrine only with regard to federal law and that it therefore is a potentially viable concept under state law. Comment, Theories of Recovering Attorneys' Fees:
Exceptions to the American Rule, 47 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 566, 576, 585 (1979). Another
commentator has suggested that the doctrine should be recognized in the areas of public
interest litigation and suits instituted in behalf of litigants of moderate financial means
which involve important congressional policies. Comment, Attorney Fees: Slipping From
The American Rule Strait Jacket, 40 MoNT. L. REV. 308, 313-14 (1979).
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to "prevailing parties."3

Perhaps the most significant of these

34 See, e.g., Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 205(g)(1), 5
U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (Supp.
IV 1980); Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 106(0, (g), 7 U.S.C. §
18(f), (g) (1976); Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, § 6(a), (c), 7 U.S.C. § 2305(a), (c)
(1976); Plant Variety Protection Act, § 125, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976); Consumer Product
Safety Commission Improvements Act of 1976, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976); Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act, § 105(d)(1)(C), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(C), (3) (Supp. IV 1980);
Copyrights Act, § 505, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Emergency School Aid Act,
§ 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. III 1979)); Jury
Systems Improvement Act of 1978, § 6(a)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 1875(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979); 28
U.S.C. § 1912 (1976); Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (Supp. H 1978); Patent Infringement
Act, § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976); Veterans' Benefits Act, § 784(g), 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976);
Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96481, 94 Stat. 2330 (1980); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, §
812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1976); 49 U.S.C. §
11708(c) (Supp. H 1978); cf. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(d) (authorizing award of costs to prevailing
party).
The legislative histories of the fee-shifting statutes indicate common congressional
goals. One objective of these statutes is to encourage lawsuits by private litigants of modest
means so that underlying substantive laws will be enforced effectively. The Senate Report
accompanying the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 is indicative of the
rationale behind the enactment of fee-shifting provisions in the civil rights area:
All of these civil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee
awards have proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws
contain.
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to
enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private
citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the
Nation's fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must
have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court.
S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
5908, 5910 [hereinafter cited as S. REP.No. 1011]. Congress has included fee-shifting provisions similar to the Fees Awards Act in every major piece of civil rights legislation enacted
since 1964. United States v. Board of Educ., 605 F.2d 573, 575 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing S. REP.
No. 1011, supra); see, e.g., Emergency School Aid Act, § 718, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 3205 (Supp. II 1978)); Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, §
402, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, § 2, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2330 (1980); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, § 204(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976); Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
By including these provisions, Congress clearly intended to facilitate the prosecution of meritorious suits by plaintiffs of limited means. 110 CONG. REc. 12724 (1964) (remarks by Senator Humphrey regarding the fee-shifting provisions contained in the Civil Rights Act of
1964). Because civil rights plaintiffs play such an essential part in the congressional enforcement scheme, the Supreme Court has indicated that they ordinarily should recover their
attorney's fees whenever they are successful in the prosecution of their suits. E.g., Albemarle
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statutes is the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
(the Fees Awards Act). 5 Enacted by Congress in response to the
Alyeska decision, the Fees Awards Act is applicable to some of the
most frequently litigated statutes in the civil rights area, and
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968) (per curiam).
Another legislative purpose behind the fee-shifting statutes is to deter wrongful conduct
which, otherwise, would be fostered by the knowledge that excessive litigation expenses
often prevent individuals from bringing suit to vindicate their rights. See, e.g., Grooms v.
Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 383-84 (N.D. Ind. 1979). Since the cost of litigating a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) case typically exceeds one thousand dollars, the statutory fee-shifting provision was deemed essential if there was to be effective judicial review of arbitrary
bureaucratic refusals to comply thoroughly with the disclosure requirements. S. REP. No.
854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1974). Thus, to some extent, a successful plaintiff benefits the
citizenry by securing government compliance with the disclosure policy embodied in the
FOIA. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
There is also a strong public policy which favors litigation by private citizens of limited
means as a method of eliminating discrimination in employment, e.g., Garner v. Giarrusso,
571 F.2d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1978); see Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 895 (D.C. Cir.
1980), and encouraging compliance with other civil rights laws, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No.
1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980), appealpending, 102 S. Ct. 384 (1981);
Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1980). The fee-shifting provisions of
these laws, therefore, also are designed to deter conduct which is at variance with statutory
policies. Davis v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 61, 63 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
3' The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2330 (1980). The
Revised Statutes include the following frequently litigated civil rights provisions: 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1976) (equal rights of citizens under the law); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) (property
rights of citizens); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (civil action for deprivation of rights).
Notably, the law review commentary dealing with significant prevailing party issues has
been devoted almost exclusively to the civil rights area. See, e.g., Brutocao, Attorneys Fees:
Who Prevails?, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 300, 302 (1980); Derfner, supra note 26, at 450; Heinsz,
Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VII Defendants: Toward a Workable Standard,8 U.
TOL. L. REv. 259, 259-82 (1977); Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through
the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. Rv. 346, 353-55 (1980); Note, Attorney's
Fees in Civil Rights Actions Against the Federal Government-NAACP v. Civiletti, 29 DE
PAUL L. REv. 1177, 1177 n.3 (1980); Note, Administrative Law: Recovery of Attorney's Fees
by Prevailing Plaintiffs in Title VII Actions, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 98, 99-101 (1980); Note,
Attorney's Fees-Recovery By PrevailingDefendants In Title VII Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 627, 632-39 (1977); Comment, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976: A View from the Second Circuit,29 BUFFALO L. Rav. 559, 564-66 (1980); Comment, 11
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 145, 151-52 (1979); Note, supra note 13, at 573-75; Survey, Flexibility and
Fairness-Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 623, 635-54 (1981).
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therefore has been the vehicle for a great number of the recent
leading attorney's fees decisions. Additionally, fee awards may be
made to "substantially prevailing parties" pursuant to such statutes as the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
7
197636 and the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).3
A. Attributes of PrevailingParties
The Senate Report accompanying the Fees Awards Act ex16 See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976 provides in part:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and
have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the
antitrust laws .. . when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by
courts of equity... and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for
an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable

loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue ....

In any

action under this section in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court
shall award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff.
15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976); see Alphin v. Henson, 552 F.2d 1033, 1034 (4th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). The plaintiffs in Alphin were denied an award of fees
under section 4 of the Sherman Act because they were unable to prove that they sustained
any damages as a consequence of an attempt to monopolize. 552 F.2d at 1034. Since they
succeeded in obtaining injunctive relief, however, they were eligible for an award of attorney's fees under the Antitrust Improvements Act. Id.; accord, City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320, 1345 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified, 616 F.2d 976 (7th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096 (1981).
In F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd on other grounds, 597 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1979), the District Court for the Southern
District of New York enunciated the standard to be followed when determining whether a
party has prevailed in antitrust litigation. Relying on cases construing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 and the FOIA fee-shifting provision, the court held that
the critical inquiry must be whether the litigation effected any change in the parties' situation as it existed immediately prior to the institution of the suit. Id. at 206 & n.3 (citing
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979); Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976)). The defendant in F. & M. Schaefer
Corp. had attempted to enter into a note purchase agreement which would enable it to
obtain 30% of its competitor's common stock. 476 F. Supp. at 207. As a result of a preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the agreement, the defendant assigned its rights
under the agreement to an entity not in competition with the plaintiff. Id. Consequently,
the court found that the plaintiff had substantially prevailed and rendered a fee award. Id.
37 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). The FOIA was amended in 1974 to allow courts
to "assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially
prevailed." Id. For a discussion of the discretionary nature of a fee award under the FOIA,
see notes 255-263 infra. For a discussion of the availability of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under the FOIA, see Comment, Pro Se Litigant'sEligibility for Attorney Fees Under
FOIA: Crooker v. United States Department of Justice, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 520 (1981);
notes 175-202 infra.
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pressly states that "for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be deemed to have prevailed when they vindicate rights
through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief."' 8 Relying upon this legislative history, the Supreme Court recently held that a litigant may qualify as a prevailing party under
the Act by settling his case.39 Consequently, it is clear that a party
"8S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5. In the Senate Report accompanying the Fees
Awards Act, Congress expressly endorsed certain judicial constructions of the "prevailing
party" term. Id.; see Kopet v. Esquire Realty Co., 523 F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1975);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970); Thomas v.
Honeybrook Mines, Inc., 428 F.2d 981, 985-86 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971); Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541, 542-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Richards v. Griffith Rubber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338, 341 (D. Or. 1969). Moreover, Congress intended that the standards which had evolved under other civil rights statutes would also
apply under the Fees Awards Act. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 3; H.R. REP.No.
1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1558]. Notably, in
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980), the Court indicated that the meaning of the
term "prevailing party" is identical under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e)
(1976), the Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94
Stat. 2330, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). 446 U.S. at 759 n.4; Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 351 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S.
754, 759 n.4 (1980)); see Bly v. McLeod, 605 F.2d 134, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1979) (Voting Rights
and Fees Awards Acts), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d
275, 278 n.2 (1st Cir. 1978) (Title VII and Fees Awards Act); cf. LeGare v. University of Pa.
Medical School, 448 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same standard under Title VII
and Fees Awards Act for prevailing defendants). Moreover, it has been held that the Fees
Awards Act and the fee-shifting provision in the Emergency School Aid Act, 20 U.S.C. §
3205 (Supp. H 1978), should be interpreted together. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1348 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal pending, 102 S.Ct. 384 (1981) (citing Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam)); Wheeler v. Durham City
Bd.of Educ., 585 F.2d 618, 621-22 (4th Cir. 1978)). Fee-shifting provisions generally are
interpreted in a similar fashion because they are phrased in virtually identical language.
Connor v. Winter, 519 F. Supp. 1337, 1339 (S.D. Miss. 1981) (Voting Rights and Fees
Awards Acts) (citing Riddel v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir.
1980)); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862, 868 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (standards
under Title VII and Fees Awards Act generally identical).
31 Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). But cf. Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542
F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1976) (entitlement to fee award dependent upon favorable judicial determination); Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 408 (7th Cir. 1974) (no
awards outside courtroom context). The federal courts of appeals have adopted a two-tier
inquiry for determining whether a party has prevailed in a case which resulted in settlement. See, e.g., Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 266-68 (7th Cir. 1981); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 345-48 (8th Cir. 1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d
275, 279-81 (1st Cir. 1978). Initially, the plaintiff must establish a causal connection between
his lawsuit and the relief which he has obtained. 656 F.2d at 266. After this factual determination is made, it then must be demonstrated that the defendant did not settle the case in a
wholly gratuitous manner. Id. This part of the test will be deemed satisfied if the claims
asserted were not groundless, frivolous, or unreasonable. Id. at 266-67. Some of the courts
also have looked to whethei the plaintiff has prevailed on the central issue of the case,
Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1979); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp.
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no longer must obtain a final judgment to qualify as a prevailing
party and, indeed may prevail through a settlement agreement 0 or
a consent decree. 4 1 Although the question concerning the procedural vehicle through which a party may succeed has been resolved,
the degree to which a litigant must be able to claim victory before
obtaining prevailing party status is not clearly defined.
1059, 1064 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Richardson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 420 F. Supp. 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Young v. Kenley,
641 F.2d 192, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1981) (achieved some objectives through compromise), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3084 (U.S. June 19, 1981) (No. 80-2153), and whether the
commencement of the action was necessary. Howard v. Phelps, 443 F. Supp. 374, 376 (E.D.
La. 1978); 420 F. Supp. at 67. See also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 101 S. Ct. 1146, 115557 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (offer of judgment under Rule 68 of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure includes an unspecified fee award in Title VII cases).
Successful FOIA plaintiffs also have been awarded attorney's fees after reaching out of
court settlements. See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Board of Governors,
410 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C. 1975). In Consumers Union, the court found that the plaintiffs
had substantially prevailed by entering into a settlement agreement under which the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was required to release interest rate information relating to certain categories of consumer installment loans. Id. Since the court believed that the settlement would not have occurred without the lawsuit, the plaintiffs were
awarded a reasonable attorney's fee. Id.
40 See, e.g., Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d
264, 266 (7th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1723 (1981); Chicano Police Officer's As'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127,
131 (10th Cir. 1980); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 345-47 (8th Cir.
1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978); Pace v. Califano, 15 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 704, 705 (D.D.C. 1977) (settlement at administrative level). But see
Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1976) (success in obtaining
favorable settlement through arbitration agreement does not give rise to prevailing party
status absent success in court action); Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 408
(7th Cir. 1974) (no awards outside courtroom context); Brown v. Boorstin, 471 F. Supp. 56,
58 (D.D.C. 1978) (plaintiff not prevailing party if court-approved settlement agreement does
not reflect or concede discrimination by the defendant).
41 See, e.g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (4th Cir. 1979) (Fees Awards Act);
Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1977) (Fees Awards Act); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. 1059, 1063 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d
320 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Title VII); Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Board of Educ., 65 F.R.D. 541, 54243 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Emergency School Aid Act). In a recent case, a court considered the
question whether attorney's fees may be awarded to a party who prevails in an arbitration
proceeding brought to enforce a consent decree obtained in a Title VII action. See Smith v.
La Cote Basque, 519 F. Supp. 663, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Finding no authority directly on
point, the court, relying on the traditionally liberal judicial construction accorded to the
Title VII fee provision, concluded that a fee award was appropriate in this situation. Id. at
666. Moreover, the court noted, a contrary interpretation would frustrate the congressional
policy which had "cast the Title VII plaintiff in the role of 'a private attorney general' vindicating a policy 'of the highest priority."' Id. (quoting New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63 (1980)).
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1. Formal Success
The federal courts of appeals appear to disagree concerning
the standard to be applied under the Fees Awards Act for ascertaining the circumstances in which a party will be deemed to have
prevailed. The Third, 42 Fifth,43 and Ninth 44 Circuits have espoused
a strict standard, requiring that a plaintiff be "successful on the
central issue. . . as exhibited by the fact that he has acquired the
primary relief sought. '45 A more liberal standard, adopted by the
First4 6 and Seventh Circuits,47 requires only that a party "succeed
42 See, e.g., Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 620 F.2d 33, 34 (3d Cir. 1980)
(per curiam); Bagby v. Beal, 607 F.2d 411, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1979).
43 See, e.g., Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1981); Coen v. Harrison County School Bd., 638 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), petition for cert.
filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3132 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1981) (No. 81-286); Watkins v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 632
F.2d 565, 567 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352,
353 (5th Cir. 1979). Because the fee-shifting provisions contained in the Voting Rights Act
and the Fees Awards Act are phrased in similar terms, one court has extended the Fifth
Circuit's standard to a voting rights case. See Conner v. Winter, 519 F. Supp. 1337, 1339-40
(S.D. Miss. 1981).
"' Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 101 S.
Ct. 1723 (1981); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046 (1980) (plaintiffs must succeed on a "significant issue in litigation which achieves ... the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit").
" Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations
omitted) (student association obtained immunity from state and university prerequisites to
demonstration); see, e.g., Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838, 845 (5th Cir. 1981) (awarded injunction against future elections under unconstitutional reapportionment plan); Keith v.
Volpe, 501 F. Supp. 403, 407-08 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (substantial civil rights claims, which court
did not address, were sufficiently related to successful environmental claims); Peeler v.
Longview Indep. School Dist., 485 F. Supp. 117, 121 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (manner and reasons
for nonrenewal of employment contract declared unconstitutional).
Under the "central issue" standard, if the plaintiff prevails on the entire case, the resulting fee award will encompass all of the claims involved in the litigation. Northcross v.
Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Bell v.
Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 916, 942 & n.25 (N.D. Ohio 1980). A plaintiff who partially
recovers on his claim against only some of the originally named parties nevertheless would
qualify for fee awards against those defendants. Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652,
654 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 580-81 (7th Cir. 1980); Dawson v.
Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78-79 (7th Cir. 1979)). Of course, the fee award would be limited to
the claim or claims upon which the plaintiff had prevailed. Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d at
580-81. Similarly, when multiple plaintiffs prevail against fewer than all of the named defendants, an award of attorney's fees cannot be assessed against those defendants whose
activities were held to be lawful. Bell v. Board of Educ., 491 F. Supp. at 942 & n.25.
"' Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978).
47 Bsche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th Cir. 1981). The Eighth Circuit has adopted
the same standard as the First and Seventh Circuits in the context of settlements only. See
United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 1980).
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on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the
benefit the parties sought in bringing suit."4
2.

Causal Relationship

Under either standard, it is apparent that the Fees Awards
Act requires a litigant to establish "some sort of clear, causal relationship between the litigation brought and the practical outcome
realized. '49 A similar element of causality has been adopted by the
courts in construing other fee-shifting statutes. In the context of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, one court
has stated that "to 'prevail' a party must establish . .. that the
litigation activities served to establish the existence of the right or
contributed to an enjoyment of the right. ' 50 Causality also is an
element of a two-tier test which the courts have applied in determining the eligibility of applicants for fee awards under the FOIA.
As enunciated by Judge Friendly in Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery,51 the successful FOIA plaintiff must
'8 Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978); see, e.g., Murphy v.
Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 1981) (unsuccessful on claim of false arrest asserted
against police officer, but successful in demonstrating unnecessary physical abuse); Entertainment Concepts, Inc., v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 505-07 (7th Cir. 1980) (theatre
owner succeeded in obtaining permanent injunction against enforcement of village zoning
ordinance but failed to obtain damages or declaratory judgment), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981). Coyote v. Roberts, 502 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (D.R.I. 1980) (overbroad state statute
prohibiting extramarital intercourse and "unnatural" methods of copulation was amended
after trial but prior to decision); Jordan v. Wokle, 464 F. Supp. 173, 174 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(award of injunctive relief on half of claims); M.C.I. Concord AdvisoryBd. v. Hall, 457 F.
Supp. 911, 913-14 (D. Mass. 1978) (injunctive relief awarded with respect to living conditions within some, but not all, areas of prison mentioned in plaintiffs' complaint).
4' American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis
in original).
50 Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 346 (4th Cir. 1980). The Smith court suggested that the minimum criterion for prevailing party status is "the establishment of a
right or the proscription of a wrong." Id. at 347. Under Title VII, the right established need
not relate directly to the primary claim of discrimination in employment. In Davis v. Bolger,
512 F. Supp. 61 (D.D.C. 1981), for example, the plaintiff lost on his claim that the Postal
Service had denied him a promotion because of his age, race and sex. Id. at 62. The plaintiff
prevailed, however, on the collateral issue of whether the Postal Service improperly permitted employees testifying on its behalf, but not those testifying against its interests, to claim
paid leave. Id. at 62-63. Reasoning that a fee award would deter governmental conduct
which unlawfully placed aggrieved plaintiffs at a disadvantage in Title VII litigation, the
Davis court awarded the plaintiff attorney's fees with respect to the issue of witness compensation. Id. at 63-64. The court also noted that federal employees were required to rely
more heavily on enforcement by "private attorneys general" since they cannot avail themselves of any public enforcement mechanism. Id.
51 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:277

demonstrate, at a minimum, that "the prosecution of the action
could reasonably have been regarded as necessary and that the action had substantial
causative effect on the delivery of the
52
information.

3. Catalyst Doctrine
In addition to the basic standard of formal success on a central or significant issue in litigation,5" the federal courts have
adopted a "catalyst" test which extends the prevailing party concept beyond the typical courtroom context. Pursuant to such "catalyst" doctrine, a plaintiff, although having failed in the litigation
of his claim, may nevertheless be deemed to have prevailed if his
lawsuit was a factor in the elimination of a challenged practice or
52 Id. at 513. After promulgating its standard, the Second Circuit concluded that the
Usery plaintiff met neither of the requirements. Id. Judge Friendly noted that the plaintiff
had received a telegram from the defendant requesting a meeting to establish a timetable
for compliance with the information request. Id. Thus, the court concluded that the litigation was unnecessary. Id. Moreover, the court observed that the lawsuit did not have a
causal effect upon the delivery of the requested information since the record indicated that
the defendant sincerely desired to comply with the FOIA and did so at the earliest opportunity. Id. at 514-15. Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff would have received the
requested information without resorting to the courts. Id.; cf. Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d
428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980) (change in government guidelines for disclosure of exempted materials resulted in release of information); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (release of information following commencement of suit insufficient, by itself, to establish that complainant substantially prevailed). But see Marschner v. Department of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D. Conn. 1979) (defendant failed to rebut inference
that suit had substantial causative effect on delivery of information requested); Goldstein v.
Levi, 415 F. Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976) (release of documents shortly after initiation of
court proceeding given significance in determining whether complainant substantially
prevailed).
Plaintiffs have failed to qualify as prevailing parties under the FOIA when the disclosure compelled was of minimal significance, see, e.g., Braintree Elec. Light Dep't v. Department of Energy, 494 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.D.C. 1980), and when there was an excusable
delay in producing the documents requested, see Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. National
Archives & Records Serv., 485 F. Supp. 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1978). Conversely, the courts have
recognized that a party may substantially prevail despite a defendant's voluntary compliance, e.g., Jones v. United States Secret Serv., 81 F.R.D. 700, 701 (D.D.C. 1979); Burke v.
Department of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 252 (D. Kan. 1976), af'd, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.
1977), and notwithstanding the government's success in exempting from disclosure some of
the information sought, see Katz v. Department of Justice, 498 F. Supp. 177, 185-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). One court has held that a plaintiff may substantially prevail by obtaining,
inter alia, a priority for her information request. Exner v. FBI, 443 F. Supp. 1349, 1353-54
(S.D. Cal. 1978), af'd, 612 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the Exner
decision, see note 67 infra.
53 See, e.g., Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978); notes 42-48 supra.
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procedure."4 Conceptually subsumed within this approach is the
established rule that a plaintiff may prevail even when his suit had
been mooted by a last-minute tender of the requested relief. 5 A
See, e.g., American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187-88 (9th Cir.
1981); Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1981); Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1980); Muscare v. Quinn, 614
F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1980); Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78-79 (7th Cir 1979); Ross v.
Horn, 598 F.2d 1312, 1321-22 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980); Fischer v.
Adams, 572 F.2d 406, 410 (1st Cir. 1978); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d
421, 429-30 (8th Cir. 1970); Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Conn. 1980); Ackerman v. Board of
Educ., 387 F. Supp. 76, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The catalyst theory first was enunciated in
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). Parham, a black youth,
had sought employment with the defendant company as a stockman. Id. at 422. Although no
such positions were available at the time, Parham underwent pre-employment testing for a
lineman position. Id. at 423. An investigation revealed, however, that he had been discharged for cause by two of his previous employers and had graduated in the bottom fifth of
his high school class. The defendant thereupon informed Parham that he lacked the necessary qualifications for employment. Id. Alleging racial discrimination, Parham instituted
proceedings before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. After the
EEOC acted favorably on his complaint, the defendant company offered the plaintiff a position as a lineman. Id. Since Parham was in college at the time, he declined the offer, choosing instead to commence a Title VII action in federal district court. Id. In his class action,
Parham, as the representative plaintiff, introduced employment statistics to support his allegation of racial discrimination. Id. at 424. The company defended by offering evidence of
its recently adopted affirmative action program. Id.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the employment statistics revealed a violation
of Title VII as a matter of law. Id. at 426. Parham's individual claim for back pay was
rejected, however, upon the ground that the company had refused to hire him because of the
poor recommendations it received from previous employers. Id. at 428. Notwithstanding his
failure to prove the individual claim, the court awarded Parham attorney's fees as a prevailing plaintiff, reasoning that his class action suit had triggered the company's implementation of nondiscriminatory employment policies. Id. at 429-30. Notably, the Parhamcase was
cited with approval in the Senate Report accompanying the Fees Awards Act. S. REP. No.
1011, supra note 34, at 5. Thus, it appears that the legislature has at least implicitly sanctioned the judiciary's employment of the catalyst doctrine.
55E.g., Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340, 342-43 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Nationwide Bldg.
Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 709-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FOIA case); Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp.
1059, 1063 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Note, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees on Mooted Claims, 63 CORNELL L. REv.
880, 905-11 (1978). In Foster, the leading case on the issue of mooted claims within the
context of civil rights litigation, a black bindery foreman employed by the Library of Congress alleged discrimination by two of his white supervisors who had bypassed him in promoting a less qualified applicant. 561 F.2d at 341. After the Equal Opportunity Office
(EOO) dismissed the complaint because of a failure to prosecute, the plaintiff unsuccessfully
appealed to the deputy librarian. Id. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff commenced a Title VII
action in federal district court. Id. As a result of this action, the deputy librarian rescinded
the decision of the EOO. Id. During a stay of the judicial proceedings, the EOO conducted a
further investigation into the employment discrimination claim. Id. The plaintiff finally received his promotion after the EOO had conducted a 4-day hearing on the matter. Id. Ob-
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difficult case arises, however, when the defendant claims to have
"adopted" a new practice after the commencement of the plaintiff's action and denies that the suit played any part in the decision
to provide such relief. In such cases, the courts have inquired into
the nature and extent of the causative role performed by the plaintiff's suit.58
A Fees Awards Act case decided by the Third Circuit is illustrative of the catalyst concept. In Ross v. Horn,57 the plaintiffs instituted a class action challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality
of procedures used by the New Jersey Department of Labor and
Industry to combat fraudulent claims for unemployment benefits.58
Shortly thereafter, the department adopted new practices which
provided claimants suspected of fraud with the opportunity to be
heard before their benefits were terminated.59 After concluding
serving that it had merely "received [the] plaintiff's discrimination complaint and stayed its
hand by consent of the parties," the district court held that the plaintiff was not a prevailing party within the meaning of the statute and denied the motion for attorney's fees. Id. at
342.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that a plaintiff
cannot be denied a fee award when the defendant moots the suit by voluntarily conferring
the requested relief after an action is commenced but prior to the entry of an order or
judgment. Id. Emphasizing that the congressional objective underlying the Title VII feeshifting provision was to facilitate suits by plaintiffs of limited means, the Foster court concluded that its holding was necessary to achieve that goal. Id. Additionally, the Fostercourt
noted that it had previously affirmed an award of attorney's fees in Parkerv. Matthews, a
case involving virtually identical facts. Id. at 343 (citing Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp.
1059 (D.D.C. 1976), afl'd sub noma.Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). Indeed, the court observed that the only factual distinction between the Foster and Parker
cases was that, in Parker,the plaintiff had prevailed through a formal settlement. 561 F.2d
at 343; see Parker v. Matthews, 411 F. Supp. at 1061; Note, supra, at 908. Finally, the
majority in Foster relied upon the reasoning employed in two previous decisions which had
construed the fee-shifting provision contained in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). 561 F.2d at 342 (citing Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
56 One court has stated that the inquiry in catalyst cases should be "whether as a quite
practical matter the outcome, in whatever form it is realized, is one to which the plaintiff['s]
... efforts contributed in a significant way, and which does involve an actual conferral of
benefit or relief from burden when measured against the benchmark condition." Bonnes v.
Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979). There must be a "clear, causal relationship"
between the lawsuit and the practical outcome. American Constitutional Party v. Munro,
650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir. 1981); see Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d
497, 507 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). Thus, at a minimum, the lawsuit
must be a material factor which results in the defendant's decison to eliminate the challenged practice or procedure. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
57 598 F.2d 1312 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 906 (1980).
"BId. at 1314-15.
59Id. at 1316.
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that the newly implemented procedures were constitutional, the
district court entered judgment for the defendants and denied attorney's fees to the plaintiffs.6 0
On appeal, a unanimous Third Circuit panel affirmed the
judgment against the plaintiffs.0 1 The plaintiffs maintained, however, that they were the prevailing parties because the new procedures were implemented as a direct result of their lawsuit.6 2 Judge
Higginbotham, writing for the court, agreed that the form of the
judgment should not be dispositive of the prevailing party issue.63
Rather, the Ross court held that plaintiffs may be deemed to have
prevailed should their suit result in the adoption of new practices.6 4 Observing that the chronology of events in the instant case
strongly suggested a causal relationship between the suit and the
implementation of the new procedures, Judge Higginbotham ordered the district court to determine whether the suit had acted as
the catalyst which led to the reforms."5
Various limitations have been placed upon the use of a catalyst analysis. Although the sequence of events is critical in any
such inquiry, the courts have warned against engaging in post hoc
ergo propter hoc reasoning. 6 A "mere chronology of events," for
example, will not suffice to confer prevailing party status when a
factor other than the lawsuit was the primary catalyst.67 Thus, fees
60Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.

at
at
at
at

1314-15.
1315, 1322.
1321-22.
1322.

s Id.
65 Id.

See, e.g., Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 514
(2d Cir. 1976); notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra;cf. Nadeau v. Helgemore, 581 F.2d
275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978) (chronological sequence of events important though not dispositive).
67 Ackerman v. Board of Educ., 387 F. Supp. 76, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see Nadeau v.
Helgemore, 581 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1978). In Ackerman, a male school teacher was denied child-care leave pursuant to a New York City Board of Education bylaw which was
used routinely to grant leave to female teachers. Id. at 77. Shortly after the plaintiff instituted his Title VII action, the Board of Education amended the bylaw to eliminate the
allegedly discriminatory sexual distinction, thereby mooting the demand for declaratory relief. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff's teaching license was terminated for reasons unrelated to
the suit, thus precluding an award of injunctive relief. Id. Moreover, because the plaintiff
failed to establish that he had suffered economic loss, the court found that he was not entitled to an award of back pay. Id. at 79.
In support of his claim for attorney's fees, the plaintiff argued that the amendment to
the bylaws was triggered either by the EEOC's determination that discrimination may have
occurred or by his lawsuit. Id. at 81-82. The court disagreed, reasoning that the most probable catalyst was a 1972 amendment to Title VII which brought the defendant within its
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have not been awarded when the desired result was achieved primarily as a result of circumstances extraneous to the suit. 8 An adpurview. Id. at 82-83. Distinguishing the Eighth Circuit's decision in Parham, see note 54
supra, the court held that the "mere chronology of events" in this case was not sufficient to
establish that the plaintiff had prevailed. 387 F. Supp. at 83.
Although not falling squarely within the catalyst concept, Exner v. FBI, 443 F. Supp.
1349 (S.D. Cal. 1978), af'd, 621 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1980) is illustrative of a similar method
of analysis. While testifying before a senate committee on intelligence activities, Judith Exner discovered that the FBI had been investigating her at various times during the previous
15 years. 443 F. Supp. at 1353. Throughout that period of time, the FBI compiled partially
inaccurate information concerning Exner's alleged relationships with several members of organized crime. Id. After this information was revealed to the media by the staff of the Senate committee, Exner requested access to all of the relevant information which the FBI had
accumulated. Id. at 1350. She was informed, however, that there would be a delay in
processing her FOIA request because of a backlog of information requests. Id. Unable to
obtain preferential treatment for her request and believing that the inaccurate nature of the
information exposed her to personal danger, Exner commenced an action to obtain the immediate release of the requested information. Id. at 1350, 1353.
The district court denied a motion by the defendant to stay the proceedings until it
could review the requested documents. Id. at 1351. Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit
refused to issue a stay of the district court's orders pending appeal, forcing the government
to produce the undisputed documents. Id. Although the government was granted summary
judgment with respect to portions of the document request, id., the district court granted
the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. Id. at 1353-54. The court found that the plaintiff
had commenced the action in order to obtain the preferential treatment which her request
required. Id. at 1353. Finding that the lawsuit had a substantial causative effect upon the
production of documents, the court observed that "[wlhen the information is delivered may
be as important as what information is delivered." Id. Since the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining the vast majority of the requested material, and was able to ensure that her request
was accorded preferential treatment, the court found that she had substantially prevailed in
the litigation. Id. at 1353-54. Moreover, the court observed that the complainant's lawsuit
had vindicated an important public policy by establishing the principle that the government
must accord priority to FOIA requests in exceptional cases. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 854, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974)).
E.g., Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6, 8-9 (D. Conn. 1980); see American
Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir. 1981). In order to prevail under
the Fees Awards Act there must be a causal relationship between the institution of the
action and the relief ultimately received. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). To prevent a defendant from taking refuge behind
a fictitious motivation when multiple causes are involved, the plaintiff's suit must be a "material factor" in bringing about the desired result. Id. In American Constitutional Party v.
Munro, 650 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1981), for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that the litigation
must "sufficiently" influence the defendant's act. Id. at 188. In Munro, the plaintiff's action
was mooted when a challenged statute was amended to repeal the objectionable provision.
Id. at 185-86. One year after the amendment, a legislator stated in an affidavit that the
plaintiff's suit had been "an important factor" leading to the repeal of the provision. Id. at
186. The court denied an award of attorney's fees, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to
show that their role in the legislative process had been "sufficiently influential." Id. at 188.
In support of its holding, the court noted that although the affidavit stated that the suit had
been discussed by the legislators, there was no indication that it had been the causative
agent leading to the enactment of the amendment. Id.
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ditional limitation, in the class action context, prohibits the use of
the catalyst doctrine when the representative plaintiff has failed on
all of his class claims. 9 The doctrine may be invoked, however,
when the representative plaintiff loses on his individual cause of
action but succeeds on the class claim. 0
The catalyst test ensures that a defendant may not avoid liability for attorney's fees by concealing his true motivation behind a
facially plausible alternative justification.71 Cases involving moot
issues vividly demonstrate the importance of this function.7 2 Indeed, absent the catalyst doctrine, fees would be unavailable to a
plaintiff whose meritorious claim prompted his adversary to abandon a challenged practice prior to trial. To require a formal adjudication or a settlement agreement in such a situation would be to
exalt form over substance. The attraction of the catalyst approach
is its insistent refusal to do so.
4. Entitlement to Relief
In addition to the elements of causation embodied in the "central or significant issue" standards and in the catalyst approach,
Similarly, in Marci v. City of New Haven, 503 F. Supp. 6 (D. Conn. 1980), a plaintiff's
request for fees was denied in part because causation was not sufficiently demonstrated. The
plaintiff in Marci sought, inter alia, to continue working for a local Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Id. at 7. A stipulated agreement between the parties enabled the
plaintiff to retain his position while he pursued administrative remedies. Id. While the
plaintiff was seeking such relief, a new mayor was elected for the City of New Haven. Id.
The mayor appointed the plaintiff to the position of ETA Administrator, mooting the case.
Id. The Marci court denied the plaintiff's fee request with respect to this portion of his
claim, concluding that the desired result was obtained not because of the catalytic effect of
the plaintiff's suit but by virtue of his relationship with the mayor. Id. at 8-9.
6, Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 273 (10th Cir. 1975). The Taylor court
distinguished Parham because it involved a plaintiff who had prevailed on his class action
claim. Id.; see note 54 supra. Because Taylor involved a nonprevailing class representative,
the court noted that the plaintiff could not recover attorney's fees in his representative
capacity even if he could demonstrate that the lawsuit was the catalyst for a change in the
challenged employment practices. 524 F.2d at 273. Notably, however, the plaintiff was
awarded attorney's fees for his successfully litigated individual claims. Id. at 268.
70 Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1198 n.53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976); Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975); Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970); see Reed v. Arlington Hotel
Co., 476 F.2d 721, 722, 725-26 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Saracini v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 431 F. Supp. 389, 398 (E.D. Ark. 1977); Clark v. American Marine Corp.,
320 F. Supp. 709, 710 (E.D. La. 1970), afl'd, 437 F.2d 959, 960 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 881, 884 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1977).
7' Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 671 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102
(1981).
72 See note 55 supra.
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the Sixth Circuit has held that the plaintiff must have been entitled to some form of relief at the time he commenced the suit in
order to be deemed a prevailing party. In Harringtonv. VandaliaButler Board of Education," the plaintiff, a physical education
teacher, commenced an action alleging sexual discrimination by
her employer.74 Prior to filing suit, Mrs. Harrington voluntarily retired on disability and never attempted to re-enter the VandaliaButler school system. 7 5 The district court found that the facilities
made available to her were inferior to those provided for male
physical education teachers and, accordingly, awarded her compensatory damages and attorney's fees. 6
On appeal, a unanimous Sixth Circuit panel reversed the district court's award in both respects, adopting the view espoused by
a clear majority of the federal courts that compensatory damages
are not recoverable under Title VII.77 Although it conceded that

the plaintiff had obtained a judicial determination that her employer maintained discriminatory working conditions,7 8 the court
concluded that such a "determination, standing alone, does not
'7
suffice" to establish the plaintiff's status as a "prevailing party.

Upon further observing that Title VII's statutory scheme does not
provide for compensatory relief, the Sixth Circuit held that a fee
award in the present case would be unwarranted. 0
Although the standard enunciated in Harringtonmay have validity when a plaintiff formally succeeds in obtaining only a
favorable determination that a wrong has occurred, it is suggested
73 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979).
71 585 F.2d at 193.
75 Id. at 194.
71 Id. at 193-94, 197.
77 Id. at 197; see, e.g., Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1151 (10th Cir.

1976); Presseisen v. Swarthmore College, 71 F.R.D. 34, 45 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Whitney v.
Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1369-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
78 585 F.2d at 197-98.
7 Id. at 197. But see Jones v. Glitsch, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 990, 996 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
Noting that the plaintiff in Harringtonhad not prevailed on her discriminatory discharge
claim, the Jones court reasoned that the case was distinguishable. Id.
80 585 F.2d at 197-98. For an analysis of the issues presented in Harrington,see 28
EMORY L.J. 859 (1979). The Harringtoncourt distinguished Marr v. Rife, 545 F.2d 554 (6th
Cir. 1976), in which the plaintiffs were awarded fees after obtaining one dollar in nominal
damages, id. at 555. 585 F.2d at 198. Marr was distinguished upon the ground that it had
been brought under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976), which expressly authorizes compensatory damages. 585 F.2d at 198. Moreover, the Harringtoncourt noted that
the plaintiffs in Marr had received the nominal amount because they had been unable to
establish the actual value of their damages. Id.
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that the entitlement requirement should not be extended to cases
involving the catalyst approach. In catalyst cases, a favorable determination does not "stand alone" since fee awards are made only
to those plaintiffs whose suits successfully eliminated, not merely
exposed, the defendant's illegal activities."' Moreover, it is submitted that a refusal to award fees in these circumstances unnecessarily would undermine the congressional intention to ehcourage
suits by private attorneys general. In order to effectuate this underlying legislative goal, therefore, it seems that the Harrington
rule should not be applied in the catalyst context.
5. Prevailing Defendant
The final question to be addressed in the context of prevailing
parties involves the degree to which the courts may stray from the
legislative intention of facilitating the activities of private attorneys general. Although this congressional purpose has led to the
belief that a civil rights plaintiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust,"8 2 it has been unclear whether different criteria
should govern fee awards to a prevailing defendant.8 3 Whatever
8,

See notes 54-72 and accompanying text supra. One commentator has suggested that
the plaintiff in Harringtoncould have been awarded attorney's fees had her suit been "the
catalyst which spurred the defendant to end its discriminatory practices." 28 EMORY L.J.
859, 892 & n.219 (1979). Unlike the plaintiff in Parham,see note 54 supra, the Harrington
plaintiff succeeded in establishing unlawful employment discrimination. 28 EMORY L.J. 859,
892 n.219 (1979). Nevertheless, her action was arguably "fruitless" because it merely exposed a set of discriminatory practices. See 585 F.2d at 198. If the plaintiff had been able to
demonstrate that her lawsuit caused the defendant to eliminate the challenged practices,
however, it seems that the court would have been unable to characterize her suit as "fruitless." Cf. EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 389 n.2 (D. Minn.
1980) (Harringtondistinguishable when plaintiffs suit achieves benefits for others who are
similarly situated).
82 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); accord,
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412
U.S. 427, 427-28 (1973) (per curiam).
83 Compare Bolton v. Murray Envelope Corp., 553 F.2d 881, 884 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977);
EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d 949, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 434 U.S.
412 (1978); Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ.,
535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976); Wright v. Stone Container Corp., 524 F.2d 1058, 1063-64
(8th Cir. 1975) and United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d Cir.
1975) (action must be unfounded, meritless, frivolous or vexatious) with EEOC v. Bailey
Co., 563 F.2d 439, 456 (6th Cir. 1977) (bad faith need not be shown to award attorneys'
fees), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915 (1978). See generally Heinsz, supra note 35, at 275-83;
Comment, Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964: Standards for Award of Attorney's Fees to
PrevailingDefendants, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 207, 209-18.
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doubt may have existed was removed, however, by the decision in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,8 in which the Supreme
Court held that a separate standard must govern the decision to
award fees to a prevailing defendant.
Justice Stewart, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the
policy considerations underlying fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs
are inapplicable when the prevailing party is a defendant.8 5 Justice
Stewart observed that, unlike a victorious plaintiff, a prevailing defendant has not cast himself in the role of a private attorney general and is not awarded his fees against a party who has transgressed federal law. 6 The Court therefore refused to hold that
prevailing defendants should recover their fees absent special circumstances. 8 7 Nevertheless, the Court also declined to adopt a
standard of subjective bad faith, reasoning that statutory implementation of such a standard would have been unnecessary in view
of the antecedent bad faith exception to the common-law American rule against fee shifting. 8 Accordingly, Justice Stewart concluded that the plaintiff's lawsuit must be "frivolous, unreasonable
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad
faith" in order for a prevailing defendant to recover his attorney's
fees.89 Although Christiansburgwas decided under Title VII,90 its
- 434 U.S. 412 (1978). In Christiansburg,the EEOC brought suit against the defendant
after Title VII was amended to permit the Commission to bring actions to prosecute charges
pending before it. Id. at 414. Because the charge at issue was not pending before the EEOC
on the effective date of the amendments, the district court entered summary judgment for
the defendant. Id. Nevertheless, because the EEOC had not acted unreasonably in bringing
the action, the district court denied the defendant's request for attorney's fees. Id. at 415.
85 Id. at 418.
86 Id. at 418-19.
87

Id. at 421-22.

88 Id. at 419. The ChristiansburgCourt qualifiedly approved of the bad faith standard
employed by the Second Circuit in Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 553 F.2d 722, 727-28 (2d Cir.
1976), and the Third Circuit in United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359,
364 (3d Cir. 1975). 434 U.S. at 421. The Court made clear, however, that such approach "in
no way implies that the plaintiff's subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee
award against him." Id. Indeed, Justice Stewart warned the district courts to avoid "the
understandable temptation" to conclude that plaintiffs who do not prevail have acted frivolously in bringing suit. Id. at 421-22.
Both the Carrion and United States Steel cases were cited with approval in the House
and Senate Reports accompanying the Fees Awards Act. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supranote 38,
at 7; S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5. One commentator has suggested that these
citations in the legislative reports clearly indicate a congressional intention to codify and
apply the traditional standard of subjective bad faith under the Fees Awards Act. Note,
supra note 13, at 586-87 & nn.139-42.
88 434 U.S. at 421. When an action previously had been dismissed as frivolous under the
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standard has been applied under both the Fees Awards Act
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.92
B.

Interim Awards

1.

Partial Success on the Merits

1

and

The propriety of a fee award pendente lite, that is, an award
made during the pendency of litigation, has been considered almost exclusively in the field of civil rights, primarily in the context
ChristiansburgGarment standard, a subsequent reversal of the dismissal by a federal court
of appeals apparently also would require reversal of the attorney's fee award. Dike v. School
Bd., 650 F.2d 783, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fees Awards Act); EEOC v. First Nat'l Bank, 614
F.2d 1004, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title VII), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1361 (1981).
90 434 U.S. at 417-18; see, e.g., Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 564 (10th
Cir. 1981) (no fee award when factual issues were presented which only could be resolved
through a trial); Shah v. Mount Zion Hosp. & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 270 n.2 (9th
Cir. 1981) (no fee award even though appeal bordered on the frivolous); Nilsen v. City of
Moss Point, 621 F.2d 117, 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1980) (no fee award when plaintiff merely failed
to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional time limits); Durant v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 517 F.
Supp. 710, 726 (E.D. La. 1980) (no fee award when most claims were reasonable and plaintiff attempted to withdraw one claim after it had become unreasonable), aif'd, 656 F.2d 89
(5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Chandelle Club, 506 F. Supp. 75, 77 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (no fee
award when plaintiff was unaware that defendant merely had purchased building in which
employer club operated and did not operate club himself); Davis v. Braniff Airways, Inc.,
468 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (fee awarded when plaintiff continued to litigate
after receiving an indication that he had released defendant from liability).
91 See, e.g., Anthony v. Marion County Gen. Hosp., 617 F.2d 1164, 1170 & n.10 (5th Cir.
1980) (no fee award when plaintiff guilty of failure to prosecute); Lopez v. Arkansas County
Indep. School Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978); Nash v. Reedel, 86 F.R.D. 16, 18 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (fees awarded when section 1983 suit lacked a factual basis and defendant clearly
had not been acting under color of state law); LeGare v. University of Pa. Medical School,
488 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no award despite fact that complaint was "riddled
with elementary legal errors"); Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324, 350 (D. Vt.
1979); Keown v. Storti, 456 F. Supp. 232, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aif'd mem., 601 F.2d 575 (3d
Cir. 1979) (no fee award when evidence enabled jury to decide the claim either way); Bryant
v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 174, 176 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (prevailing taxpayers may be
awarded fees when government's suit is "frivolous, vexatious, unfounded, harassing or instituted in bad faith"); Milburn v. Girard, 455 F. Supp. 283, 285-86 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (no fee
award even though jury took less than a half hour to return a verdict against plaintiff);
Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1257-58 (D. Colo. 1978) (fees awarded when plaintiff
intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon defendant); Vogel v. Torrance Bd. of Educ.,
447 F. Supp. 258, 266 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (no fee award even though action was barred on
numerous grounds).
12 See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). In
Nemeroff, the Second Circuit held that the Christiansburgstandard represents the minimum standard for an award of fees against a plaintiff under section 9(e) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). 620 F.2d at 350. Since the court concluded
that the action has at least some foundation, it had no occasion to consider whether bad
faith also would be necessary to sustain a fee award under section 9(e). Id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:277

of the Fees Awards Act and Title VII. 93 In Hanrahan v.Hampton, 4 the Supreme Court enunciated the appropriate standard for
granting interim awards of attorney's fees under the Fees Awards

Act.
In Hanrahan, the plaintiffs brought an action under various
civil rights statutes, alleging that their constitutional rights had
been violated by federal and state law enforcement officials.9 5 The
district court rendered a directed verdict for the defendants and
the plaintiffs appealed.9 6 Upon reversing the district court's decision, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had prevailed for
purposes of the Fees Awards Act to the extent of counsel fees incurred on appeal.9 7 Noting that if the plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, attorney's fees incurred at the trial level also would be recoverable, the court requested an affidavit supporting the claim for
appellate costs so that an award could be made. 8
A divided Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney's
fees, holding that Congress intended to permit interim fee awards
"only when a party has prevailed on the merits of at least some of
his claims."99 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court analyzed the
legislative history of the Fees Awards Act, placing great weight
upon the citation therein of two Supreme Court cases.1 00 The
Court observed that although final judgments had not been en3 The availability of interim fee awards also has been discussed in the context of section 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA), 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), section 7(b) of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) and
section 14(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976). See, e.g., Hickey
v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 624 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (ADEA); Bly v. McLeod,
605 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1979) (Voting Rights Act), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978) (Voting
Rights Act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Arthur v. Nyquist, 426 F. Supp. 194, 197
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (ESAA); Armstrong v. O'Connell, 416 F. Supp. 1325, 1335 (E.D. Wis. 1976)
(ESAA).
, 446 U.S. 754 (1980) (per curiam).
Id. at 755. The plaintiffs had brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986,
and under various constitutional provisions. 446 U.S. at 755 n.1. Alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated, the plaintiffs sought to recover money damages. Id. at 755.
446 U.S. at 755.
Id. at 755 & n.3. Because the plaintiffs had not yet "prevailed" at trial, the Seventh
Circuit limited the award of counsel fees to those incurred in the course of the appeal. Id.
OsHanrahan v. Hampton, 600 F.2d 600, 643 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)
(per curiam).
09

446 U.S. at 758.

o Id. at 757; see Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); S.REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5; H.R. REP. No.
1558, supra note 38, at 7-8.
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tered in either of these cases, the liability of the opposing party
had been established by the party to whom fees were awarded. 10 1
Moreover, the Court noted, the House Committee Report expressly
approved the view enunciated in one of these cases that "the entry
of any order that determines substantial rights of the parties may
be an appropriate occasion [to consider the propriety of a fee
award]. 10 2 The Court emphasized, however, that the plaintiffs had
not prevailed on the merits of any of their claims.10 3 Indeed, the
Court observed that the plaintiffs' success on appeal was no more a
substantive victory than a denial of the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict would have been, since the jury remained free to
rule against them on the merits of their claims. 10 Finally, the
Court concluded that other interlocutory dispositions in the case
"which affected only the extent of discovery" were not matters
which would give rise to prevailing party status within the meaning
of the Act even though they could affect the ultimate determination on the merits.10 5
Perhaps the most interesting of the post-Hanrahanadjudications concerning the propriety of interim fee awards 1 is Smith v.
101446 U.S. at 757.
102 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 38, at 8). The Senate Report explained
that a fee award pendente lite would be "'especially appropriate where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not
prevail in all issues."' 446 U.S. at 757 (quoting S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5 (emphasis added)). Noting that the Fees Awards Act was patterned upon the fee-shifting provisions contained in earlier civil rights statutes, the HanrahanCourt found further support, in
the cases construing those provisions, for its holding that only parties who have prevailed on
the merits of their claims may obtain fee awards. 446 U.S. at 758 n.4 (citing Bly v. McLeod,
605 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1979) (Voting Rights Act), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
Chinese for Affirmative Action v. Leguennec, 580 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1978) (Voting
Rights Act), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Gribbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d 973, 975-76 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (Title VII); Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 485 (3d Cir. 1975) (Title VII),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
103 446 U.S. at 758.
10 Id.
at 758-59.
105 Id. at 759.
108 Cases interpreting Hanrahanhave arisen under a number of different statutes. See,
e.g., Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (Fees Awards Act),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1723 (1981); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 624 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (ADEA); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Bd., 507 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 n.4
(E.D. Mich. 1981); Oshiver v. Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Court Adm., 497 F.
Supp. 416, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1723 (1981), for example, the Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs, having obtained a preliminary injunction against certain police investigative procedures, were prevailing parties under the Fees Awards Act. Id. at 847. The court reasoned
that by obtaining the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs had succeeded on a significant
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University of North Carolina,10 7 decided in the context of Title
VII. 10 8 In Smith, the defendant university declined to promote or
reappoint the plaintiff, a female assistant professor.1 0 9 She filed
suit against the university and individual faculty members, alleging
discrimination on the basis of age and sex.110 During the trial, and
pending a decision on the merits, the Fourth Circuit granted a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring
the university to, inter alia, continue the plaintiff's employment.,,
Although the plaintiff ultimately lost on the merits, the district
court award permitted her to recoup the attorney's fees which she
had incurred in obtaining the preliminary injunction.1 2 2 The university appealed, asserting that the plaintiff was not a prevailing
party within the meaning of Title VII and therefore was ineligible
for a fee award.11 3
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that in Title VII cases an interim fee award is available only when
"a party . . . prevail[s] on the merits of at least some of his
claims.""' The court rejected the plaintiff's reliance upon a line of
cases favoring fee awards for interlocutory motions or appeals
which are "sufficiently significant and discrete to be treated as a
issue in the litigation and had achieved the benefit they sought. Id. at 847-48.
In Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 624 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), the Fifth
Circuit extended the Hanrahan standard to the ADEA. Id. at 36. The Hickey court held
that the fee-shifting provision of this statute does not permit an interim fee award to a
party who prevails on appeal only to the extent of obtaining reinstatement of his improperly
dismissed discrimination suit. Id. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit discerned no congressional
purpose germane to the interpretation of the ADEA which would mandate a different result
from that reached pursuant to the Hanrahan Court's construction of the Fees Awards Act.
Id.
107 632 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1980).
:08 Id. at 350-51.
109 Id. at 324-25.
110 Smith alleged violations of various federal and state constitutional and statutory
rights. Id. at 321. The issues on appeal concerned age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
"' 632 F.2d at 321-22. In addition to being ordered to maintain the plaintiff on its
payroll, the university was required to refrain from hiring a replacement, to maintain the
plaintiff's teaching position, to pay the plaintiff as before, and to refrain from spreading
information harmful to the plaintiffs business or personal reputation. Id. at 322.
1I Id. at 322. The trial court awarded Smith $8,300 in attorney's fees under Title VII
and $302.06 in related litigation expenses, incurred in securing the injunctive relief. Id.
113

Id.

114 Id. at 352-53.
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separate unit." 115 Although conceding that other forums had permitted fee awards upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction
under this standard, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that in each of
these cases there also had been a ruling on the merits of at least
one of the claims involved. 116 Accordingly, the Smith court stated
that it would be erroneous to assume that counsel fees are recover'117
able whenever "the label 'preliminary injunction' attache[s].
Attempting to arrive at an appropriate standard for an interim
fee award under Title VII, the Smith court noted that the general
criteria for the recovery of counsel fees under this statute are identical to those developed under the Fee's Awards Act.", The Smith
court therefore derived additional support from Hanrahan and
other Fees Awards Acts cases involving interim awards. The court
observed that the Hanrahan opinion cited with approval Bly v.
McLeod,"" a Fourth Circuit case holding that an interim award is
appropriate only upon a showing that a party has prevailed on the
1'5 Id. at 348 (quoting Smith v. University of N.C., 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)

1735, 1736 (M.D.N.C. 1979) which quoted Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 503 F.2d 1131,
1133 (9th Cir. 1974)). In Van Hoomissen, a Title VII case, the plaintiff contended that he
was discharged from his employment because of his efforts to recruit minority workers. 503
F.2d at 1132. The EEOC sought to intervene on the plaintiff's behalf to challenge both the
dismissal and the hiring practices of the employer. The district court permitted intervention, but only as to the issue of retaliation. Id. An interlocutory appeal of the partial denial
of intervention was dismissed by the Ninth Circuit and the employer, asserting that this
rendered it a prevailing party, petitioned the court for an award of attorney's fees. Id. at
1132. While acknowledging that litigation should not be "dissected" to permit recovery of
attorney's fees by the losing party in connection with every procedural motion on which it
succeeded, the court held that this appeal was "sufficiently significant and discrete to be
treated as a separate unit." Id. at 1133. Accordingly, the court concluded that the employer
qualified as a prevailing party and could be awarded an interim fee award. Id.
I's 632 F.2d at 348-50 (citing Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419 (9th Cir.
1978) (finding of unlawful retaliation and grant of injunction against union effectively terminated action); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Assoc., 574 F.2d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1978)
(injunction was "part of a final, appealable order which terminated the controversy"); Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971) (injunction was issued after finding of
discrimination)).
1
632 F.2d at 349. The district court, attempting to apply the Van Hoomissen rule,
see note 115 and accompanying text supra, had held that "a preliminary injunction is a
sufficiently significant and discrete proceeding that a party who prevails on the motion can
be considered a 'prevailing party' eligible for attorney's fees under [Title VII]." 632 F.2d at
348. The Fourth Circuit, however, noted that Van Hoomissen should be given a more narrow interpretation so that fees are awarded only when an interlocutory proceeding "results
in a final resolution of a separable dispute." Id. at 349 (quoting Grubbs v. Butz, 548 F.2d
973, 974-75 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
I8 632 F.2d at 350; see notes 100-102 and accompanying text supra.
119 605 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
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merits of a claim. 120 Indeed, the Smith court found that "all the
cases" decided in this context demonstrate the necessity of victory
on the merits of at least one claim before an interim award can be
made. "' Noting that Smith clearly had failed to prevail
on any
1 22
claim, the court reversed the lower court's fee award.
The Smith case seems to indicate that the impact of Hanrahan will be felt far beyond the confines of the Fees Awards Act.
Notably, the Hanrahanand Smith courts observed that the Act
was patterned upon the fee provisions of other antidiscrimination
and voting rights enforcement statutes.2

3

Moreover, the Hanrahan

a0 number

of cases decided under these
court cited with approval
statutes which had held that interim fee awards can only be made
1 24
It is sugto parties who prevail on the merits of their claims.

gested that the message behind the Supreme Court's endorsement
of this standard in such a variety of contexts will not be lost upon
the federal courts of appeals. Consequently, absent some policy
considerations unique to a particular statute which militate against
the application of such a standard, the federal courts most probably will adopt the Hanrahantest as the minimum criterion for fee
awards pendente lite.
C. Administrative Proceedings
1. Federal and State Proceedings
It is well-settled that attorney's fees may be awarded for legal
services rendered in connection with federal administrative proceedings 25 which are instituted as a prerequisite to the filing of a
suit alleging a violation of Title VII.' 26 The question of the availa120

446 U.S. at 758 n.4; see 605 F.2d at 137. The Bly court held that although the plain-

tiffs had obtained a temporary injunction, a clarification of the record, and the empaneling
of a three judge district court, they were not prevailing parties eligible for an interim fee
award. The court reasoned that such victories were procedural in nature and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any success on the merits. 605 F.2d at 137.
121 632 F.2d at 352.
122 Id.
at 352-53.
122 See 446 U.S. at 758 n.4; 632 F.2d at 350; note 102 supra.
124

2'

446 U.S. at 758 n.4.
See, e.g., Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 638 (8th Cir. 1978); Fischer v. Adams, 572

F.2d 406, 409 (1st Cir. 1978); Foster v. Boorstin, 561 F.2d 340, 342-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Parker v. Califano, 561 F.2d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Johnson v. United States, 554 F.2d
632, 633 (4th Cir. 1977). See generally Note, Administrative Law: Recovery of Attorney's
Fees by Prevailing Plaintiffs in Title VII Actions, 33 OKLA. L. REV. 98, 102-05 (1980).
12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(d) (1976). Title VII requires that, prior to filing a civil action
in federal court, an employee first must exhaust his available administrative remedies. Civil
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bility of fee awards in state administrative proceedings, however,
only recently has been addressed by the federal judiciary. 127 A
comparison of two recent cases decided under Title VII and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)12 8 indi-

cates that the availability of an award depends upon the context in
which the state proceeding arose.
2. Title VII Action
In New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey,1 29 the Supreme

Court held that attorney's fees may be awarded in a federal court
action for legal services performed for a prevailing complainant in
state administrative proceedings mandated by Title VII.130 The
plaintiff in Gaslight Club filed a complaint alleging that she had
been denied a position as a cocktail waitress on account of her
race.13 ' A New York state administrative agency determined that
Rights Act of 1964, §§ 706(f), 717(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), 2000e-16(c) (1976). Congress
envisioned that Title VII's procedures and remedies would mesh coherently with state and
city legislation. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 63-64 (1980). Accordingly, the statute requires that an individual alleging a Title VII violation first must commence proceedings with the state or local equal opportunity agency empowered to grant or
seek relief from employment practices prohibited by law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(d) (1976).
The statute further prescribes a 60-day deferral period, during which the EEOC will refrain
from exercising jurisdiction over an allegation of discrimination in deference to the available
state administrative proceedings. Id. Upon termination of the state proceedings or after the
60-day deferral period expires, whichever occurs first, the EEOC will assume jurisdiction
and determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the complainant's charge is
true. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)-(c) (1976). At any time during the following 30 days, the EEOC
may bring a civil action in which the complainant has a right to intervene. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). If the EEOC neither commences its own action nor enters into a conciliation agreement within this 30-day period, it must issue a "right to sue" letter to the complainant. Id. Thereafter, the complainant has 90 days within which to commence a Title VII
action in federal district court. Id.
127 See, e.g., New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 61-66 (1980); cf. Porter
v. District of Columbia, 502 F. Supp. 271, 273-75 (D.D.C. 1980) (District of Columbia administrative proceedings). The Portercourt held that fees incurred in Title VII administrative proceedings, instituted to resolve a claim of discrimination by the government of the
District of Columbia, were recoverable. Id. at 275. In addition to the rationale relied upon
by the Gaslight Club Court regarding state proceedings, see notes 137-141 and accompanying text infra, the Portercourt reasoned that a contrary conclusion would substantially diminish any incentive to pursue an administrative disposition of the claim. 502 F. Supp. at
274. Moreover, the court observed that officials responsible for the administrative resolution
of such claims probably are more familiar with the surrounding factual context than are
federal judges. Id.
12s 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
129 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
120Id. at 71.

,3, Id. at 56. The EEOC referred the plaintiff's complaint to the New York State Divi-
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the plaintiff had indeed been the victim of racial discrimination."3 2
Following the issuance of a "right to sue" letter by the EEOC, 133
the plaintiff filed suit in federal district court in order to preserve
her Title VII remedies.1 3 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of attorney's fees,135 and
the Supreme Court, on a writ of certiorari, affirmed the holding of
the Second Circuit.138
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, initially noted that
the disjunctive nature of the statutory language conferring jurisdiction to award attorney's fees "[iln any action or proceeding"
signified a congressional intent to permit fee awards for expenses
incurred in administrative proceedings.13 7 In addition, the Court
sion of Human Rights (Division). Id. at 57. The Division determined that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty of an illegal discriminatory practice. Id.
When efforts at conciliation proved fruitless, a state administrative hearing was conducted.

Id.

132 Id. The hearing examiner ordered the defendants to offer the plaintiff the position
that she had sought and to pay her back wages. Id. The Division's order subsequently was
affirmed by the New York State Human Rights Appeal Board and by the Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York State Supreme Court. Id. at 58.
133 Id. After having reassumed jurisdiction over the discrimination charge at the request of the complainant, the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe
that the defendants had violated Title VII. Id.
See note 126 supra.
134

447 U.S. 54, 60 (1980).
136 Id. at 71.
135

,1"Id. at 61 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized the importance of the language
of Title VII by contrasting it with that of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a to 2000a-6. Id. Section 204(b) of Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b),-does not contain
the language "or proceeding." 447 U.S. at 61. The Court found this omission understandable
since the enforcement of Title II depends solely upon court actions. Id. Futhermore, the
Court noted that an interpretation of the word "proceeding" could not rationally be confined to the context of federal agencies since the term is used to refer to "all of the different
types of proceedings in which the statute is enforced, state and federal, administrative and
judicial." Id. at 61-62 & n.3; see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(f(1), (i), 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1), (i).
Several other courts have interpreted the phrase "action or proceeding" in the Fees
Awards Act for the purpose of determining the availability of attorney's fees for work performed in connection with taxpayer's suits against the government. Toner v. Commissioner,
629 F.2d 899, 900-02 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1358 (1981); Kipperman v.
Commissioner, 622 F.2d 431, 432-33 (9th Cir. 1980); Key Buick Co. v. Commissioner, 613
F.2d 1306, 1307-09 (5th Cir. 1980). The Toner case involved a suit brought by a taxpayer
contesting tax deficiencies. 629 F.2d at 900. After the taxpayer prevailed, she filed a motion
for attorney's fees pursuant to the Fees Awards Act, which authorizes such an award "'in
any action or proceedings, [sic] by or on behalf of the United States ... to enforce, or
charging a violation of a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). The plaintiff taxpayer asserted that the government initiated a
civil "proceeding" within the meaning of the Fees Awards Act when it sent her a deficiency
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emphasized that the clear congressional policy behind Title VII
was to facilitate the prosecution of discrimination complaints.1 3 8 A
denial of attorney's fees to one in the plaintiff's position, the Court
observed, would force the complainant to bear the costs of
mandatory state proceedings, thus deterring the enforcement of
meritorious complaints. 189 Moreover, it was clear to the Court that
Congress intended the EEOC and federal proceedings merely to
constitute supplementary relief when the mandatory state and local remedies were inadequate. 14 0 The Court concluded, therefore,
that authorization of fee awards in state administrative proceedings was an essential step to ensure the meaningful integration of
state procedures with the Title VII enforcement scheme.
3.

ADEA Action

In contrast, the district court for the District of Columbia
held, in Kennedy v. Whitehurst,142 that the ADEA did not authorize the court to award attorney's fees for services performed at the
administrative level.143 The plaintiff in Kennedy filed a complaint
of age discrimination alleging a denial of employment opportunities.14 4 As a result of this complaint, the EEOC negotiated a settlement agreement with the defendant which provided for a retroactive promotion and an award of back pay to the plaintiff.14 5 The
letter. 629 F.2d at 901. The court denied the motion, quoting passages from the legislative
history which indicated that Congress intended fee awards to be available in this context
only when suit is brought by the United States. Id.; see, e.g., 122 CONG. Rc. 33,311 (1976)
(remarks of Sen. Allen); id. at 33,312-13 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy); id. at 35,122 (remarks
of Rep. Drinan). Moreover, the court emphasized that acceptance of the plaintiff's argument
would mean that every time the government took administrative action it would be subject
to potential liability for the plaintiff's attorney's fees. 629 F.2d at 902. If Congress had intended to create such a broad waiver of the government's traditional sovereign immunity
from fee awards, the court concluded, it surely would have done so expressly. Id.
13 447 U.S. at 63.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 65; cf. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 452 (N.D. Ind. 1981)
(attorney's fees are not recoverable for proceedings which are collateral to and not mandated by pursuit of a Title VII cause of action even when they have the same goal and are
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's success).
141 447 U.S. at 65. The Court emphasized the fact that it would be "anomalous to award
fees to the complainant who is unsuccessful ... in obtaining state or local remedies, but to
deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress' plan that federal
policies be vindicated at the state or local level." Id. at 66.
142 509 F. Supp. 226 (D.D.C. 1981).
143 Id. at 231.
14 Id. at 227.

245

Id.
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settlement, however, did not include an award of attorney's fees
and the plaintiff brought suit in federal district court to recover
costs incurred at the administrative level.14
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, District Judge Gasch noted
147
that in contrast to the language of the Title VII fee provision,
the ADEA refers only to an "action."14 Moreover, the court found
that a comparison of the remedial schemes contemplated by the
two statutes buttressed its conclusion.1 4 The court observed that

Title VII required the plaintiff in Gaslight Club to resort to state
administrative proceedings before filing suit in federal court. 150 Additionally, the court observed that the adversarial nature of these
proceedings necessitated representation by competent counsel in
order to preserve the complainant's rights. 51 The court emphasized, however, that the ADEA does not implicate the same concerns since the statute contains no parallel requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted.1 52 Finally, the court concluded
that it is the responsibility of Congress, not the judiciary, to act
upon the concern that the unavailability of attorney's fees in
ADEA cases would deter claimants from pursuing administrative
14 Id. at 226.

See note 137 supra.
18 509 F. Supp. at 230. The section governing fee awards under the ADEA, which sec-

117

tion 7(b) of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976), incorporates by reference, is section 16 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976), which provides in part:
[An] [a]ction . .. may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction. . . .The court in
such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of
the action.
Id. § 216(b).
The Kennedy court suggested that the words "judgment" and "plaintiff" clearly envisage a court action, not an administrative proceeding. 509 F. Supp. at 230. The court made
one final linguistic point, indicating that the language of the ADEA fee provision was semantically closer to that of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b),
than to that of Title VII. 509 F. Supp. at 230. This was significant, the court noted, because
the Supreme Court in Gaslight Club had expressly distinguished the Title II language. Id.;
see note 137 supra.
149 509 F. Supp. at 230.
150 Id.
at 231; see note 126 supra.
11 509 F. Supp. at 231. The court observed that, unlike Title VII cases, the first adversarial step demanded in an ADEA case is the filing of a complaint in the district court. Id.
152 Id. at 230. The only administrative prerequisite to the filing of an ADEA action is
that the putative plaintiff must furnish notice of his intention to sue to the appropriate
federal official. Id. The court felt that such a requirement could be satisfied by a layman or
inexpensively performed by counsel. Id. at 231.
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resolution of their claims."' 3

D. Intervenors
The nature of the role played by the intervenor in litigation is
often difficult to assess. He may appear as a party'M or may be
denied intervention altogether,"8 5 and, like a prompter, make his
' or negligicontribution from the wings. His role may be pivotal 56
1 57
ble to the result. Consequently, there are no definitive rules dictating when intervenors properly may be awarded fees. Rather, the
criteria governing fee awards vary with the circumstances of each
case. Nevertheless, since intervenors frequently do appear, it is
necessary to seek guidance from the sparse case law that has addressed this subject.
Perhaps the most interesting of the recent cases involving intervenors is Baker v. City of Detroit,1 5 a Fees Awards Act case
involving a challenge to the affirmative action program of the Detroit Police Department.15 e After granting a motion for interven1 See id.
"5 E.g., Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1981); Seattle School Dist. No. 1
v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D. Minn. 1980). Although the issue clearly does not arise in the
context of the prevailing intervenor, there have been cases in which the party seeking intervention must pay attorney's fees to his adversary. See, e.g., Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d
1193, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981) (attorney's fees assessed under Fees Awards Act against nonparty
county treasurer for section 1983 violations despite denial of opportunity to intervene);
Haycraft v. Hollenbach, 606 F.2d 128, 131-33 (6th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (because defendant intervenor's proposed alternative school desegregation plan imposed substantial barrier
to full realization of constitutional rights of prevailing parties, award of attorney's fees
under ESAA was not abuse of discretion); Moten v. Bricklayers, Mason & Plasterers Int'l
Union, 543 F.2d 224, 239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Title VII fee award appropriate
against nonparty defendant whose appeal forced plaintiffs to incur additional attorney's fees
to defend settlement agreement); Greater St. Louis Health Sys. Agency v. Teasdale, 506 F.
Supp. 23, 42 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (fee award not appropriate under Fees Awards Act against
defendant intervenors who were required by state law to engage in conduct challenged in
civil rights suits); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 70 F.R.D. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (intervenor acting as amicus curiae in ESAA suit not subject to liability for fee award).
"I"E.g., United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Thomas,
649 F.2d 1193, 1202 (5th Cir. 1981); Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 683-84 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 70 F.R.D. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 13 FAiR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. (BNA) 738, 741-42 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
I" E.g., Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 13 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. (BNA) 738, 742
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
157 E.g., Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1981).
158 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1980).

19 Id. at 843. The affirmative action program related to promotions from sergeant to
lieutenant. Id. at 843 & n.1.
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tion by a group of black police officers who had benefited or would
benefit from the program,'160 the district court issued an extensive
16

opinion upholding the department's plan for affirmative action. 1
In response to the intervenors' claim for attorney's fees, the plaintiffs' 62 asserted that, under the Christiansburg standard,""3 an
award could be made to defendants only if the suit was "frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.'

64

Notwithstanding the in-

tervenors' technical status as defendants, however, the court declined to apply the Christiansburg standard and awarded them
110
Id. at 848. The intervenors consisted of the Guardians of Michigan, a voluntary association of black police officers, and seven named individuals, who moved to intervene as
defendants on May 18, 1978. Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 938 (E.D. Mich.
1979). In an order dated July 6, 1978, the court permitted them to proceed as defendants.
Id.
161483 F. Supp. at 1000-03.

162 The plaintiffs consisted of several named individuals and the Detroit Police Lieutenant's and Sergeant's Associations (LSA). See 504 F. Supp. at 849. The LSA funded the
litigation through an assessment imposed upon its membership. Id. Counsel for the intervenors made it clear that the request for attorney's fees was directed only against the union,
not the individually named plaintiffs. Id. at 849 n.8.
..
s See notes 84-92 and accompanying text supra.
16 504 F. Supp. at 850; see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421
(1978). The applicability of the Christiansburgstandard, in the context of fee awards to
intervenors, also has been discussed with regard to the "taxpayer suit" provision of the Fees
Awards Act. See United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth
Circuit in Ford upheld the district court's denial of a fee award to a taxpayer whose motion
to intervene in a third-party Internal Revenue Service summons enforcement proceeding
was refused. Id. at 1144. Concluding that the Fees Awards Act was not meant to "reimburse
volunteers for expenses incurred in aiding named parties or ... in their [own] attempts to
become parties," the court reasoned that the statute required a taxpayer to be "cast in the
role of a defendant" in order to recover attorney's fees. Id. In reaching its conclusion, however, the court declined to determine whether the district court erred in denying leave to
intervene. Id. at 1143. It is suggested that there are a number of troublesome aspects to the
Ford decision. It seems that by declining to address the district court's denial of intervention, the Ninth Circuit automatically relegated the intervenors to a nonparty status. Additionally, if the Ninth Circuit had reviewed the district court's denial of intervention, held it
to be error and accordingly treated the putative intervenors as parties for purposes of a fee
award, their roles in the litigation would have been that of defendants. See id. at 1142.
Thus, the intervenors arguably would have been able to satisfy the Ninth Circuit prerequisite for eligibility for attorney's fees under the Fees Awards Act. Indeed, there was evidence
that if they had satisfied the requirement of being "cast in the role" of defendants, they
might have been able to satisfy the Christiansburgcriterion of bad faith. Id. Finally, it is
submitted that the Ford court's expansive dictum that the Fees Awards Act "is not meant
to reimburse volunteers," id. at 1144, suggests a general distaste for allowing intervention in
any Fees Awards Act taxpayer suit, without regard to whether the intervenor may be attempting to vindicate his rights. Indeed, the Ford opinion did not address this issue, nor did
it address the nature and extent of the intervenor's stake in the litigation. If a court were
not to consider these issues and were to apply the Ford standard, it is difficult to see how an
intervenor in such a suit ever could be a prevailing party.
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resonable attorney's fees.16 5
The court initially noted that at the time the motion was
granted, intervention appeared to be an essential step from the
perspective of the court166 and of the intervenors. 67 Moreover, the
court observed that the presence of counsel for the intervenors had
proven to be useful and necessary at the trial itself.1 8 Finally, the
Christiansburgstandard was found to be inapplicable because "the
procedural posture of the case should not be dispositive." 6 9 The
court supported this proposition by observing that the legislative
history of the Fees Awards Act emphasized not the procedure posture of a party as a criterion for prevailing party status, but rather,
the importance of facilitating civil rights litigation. 7 0 The court
concluded that since the intervenors had vindicated their civil
rights in the case at bar, application of the restrictive Christiansburg rule would contravene congressional intent.' 7 '
There appear to be at least two points of analytical interest in
the Baker decision which may have broad application in intervention cases. One point of interest is, of course, the court's holding
that regardless of his technical role in litigation, an intervenor who
is engaged in the vindication of his civil rights may be awarded
1 504 F. Supp. at 851. The court urged counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the
intervenors to agree upon a reasonable fee award. Id.
166 Id.
at 849. The court noted that, in a reverse discrimination suit, intervention by
parties who have an incentive to introduce evidence of past discrimination often resolves the
dilemma of an employer having to demonstrate its own past discrimination in order to justify its affirmative action program. Id.
167 Id. at 848. The intervenors in Baker explained that they felt an acute need to protect their own interests because a judge sitting in the Eastern District of Michigan had
determined that an affirmative action program involving the promotion of blacks from patrolmen to sergeants was unconstitutional. Id.
168Id. at 851. The court noted that the intervenors' counsel had aided his clients in
vindicating their rights, id., and had presented useful evidence which tended to demonstrate
that the affirmative action program was a necessary response to past discrimination, id. at
849.
legId. at 850.
170 Id. The Senate Report relating to the Fees Awards Act provides in part
In the large majority of cases the party or parties seeking to enforce such
[civil] rights will be the plaintiffs and/or plaintiff-intervenors. However, in the
procedural posture of some cases, the parties seeking to enforce such rights may
be the defendants and/or defendant-intervenors.
S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 4 n.4 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). See
also Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 46 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978) (dictum) ("[i]t may well be that
defendants may on occasion be characterized as 'private attorneys general' who are entitled
to the more favorable Supreme Court standard").
" 504 F. Supp. at 850-51.
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attorney's fees. 7 2 Also important is the court's indication that the
eligibility of intervenors for attorney's fees is dependent upon
whether, at the time of the intervention motion, intervention appeared to be a necessary step.17 3 Notably, at least one court has
suggested that to retroactively deny attorney's fees when an intervenor's presence is found to have been unnecessary "would have
the effect of discouraging the intervention of what in future cases
1
may be essential parties. 11

171

See, e.g., Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Fees

Awards Act); EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D. Minn.
1980) (Title VII). It appears that an intervenor's procedural posture is not a dispositive
factor in assessing whether he is eligible for a fee award. Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F.
Supp. 841, 850 (E.D. Mich. 1980); accord, Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 683 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 13 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 738, 742 (N.D.
Cal. 1976). But see United States v._Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1981). In Stenson,
the court held that attorney's fees are available for denials of intervenor motions when a
plaintiff's success in obtaining class action certification has made intervention unnecessary
because the proposed intervenor is included in the class. 512 F. Supp. at 683. The court
reasoned that although the intervention movant had not prevailed in a technical sense, a fee
award was appropriate because the desired result had been achieved. Id. at 683-84.
The district court in Alaniz held in a Title VII suit that putative intervenors were
"parties" within the meaning of the statute, notwithstanding that official intervenor status
was denied. 13 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) at 742. The court noted that in this factual
situation, the "intervenors" were given discovery rights, presented evidence at the hearings,
conducted cross-examination and, in practical terms, participated in the proceedings to the
same extent as an "official" party. Id.; accord, Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S. 14, 20-21 (1877)
(persons who have been denied formal leave to intervene, but who have acted or been
treated as parties in the proceedings, may acquire status of parties to a suit). The Alaniz
court also observed that since the objections of the intervenors to a proposed settlement
significantly improved the eventual settlement for class members, thus securing substantial
benefits for the class, they were prevailing parties. 13 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAS. (BNA) at 742.
173 See notes 166-167 and accompanying text supra.
174 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 633 F.2d 1338, 1349 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal pending, 102 S. Ct. 384 (1981). But see Lipscomb v. Wise, 643 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.
1981) (per curiam). In Seattle School District, three school districts operating a series of
voluntary and mandatory desegregation programs challenged a state anti-busing statute. 633
F.2d at 1341. Various civic and civil rights groups intervened, claiming that even if the statute survived challenge, the districts operated unconstitutional systems. Id. Because it invalidated the statutory provision, the district court found it unnecessary to reach the intervenors' claims, and accordingly denied their motion for fees. Id. at 1342. The Ninth Circuit
reversed the denial of fees, noting that if the challenged statute had been upheld, which
seemed likely when the suit was commenced, the "considerable burden" of litigating the
question whether the school districts were illegally segregated would have been left to the
intervenors. Id. at 1350. Notwithstanding that the intervenors played a de minimis role in
the litigation, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a fee award was essential "to effectuate the
congressional purpose of encouraging future constitutional litigation in similar circumstances." Id.
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E. Pro Se Litigants
1. Unsettled Eligibility under the FOIA
A question that has arisen with increasing frequency in recent
years is the recoverability of attorney's fees by litigants appearing
pro se. This issue has been addressed by the courts in the context
of several federal statutes, most notably in suits brought under the
FOIA, the Fees Awards Act, and the Truth in Lending Act of
1968.1'1 The FOIA has generated the greatest controversy in this
area. Indeed, although the First 17 8 and the Tenth17 7 Circuits have

held that pro se litigants are ineligible for fee awards under the
FOIA, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has held
that such litigants are eligible for fee awards. 78 The Second Cir179
cuit, moreover, has adopted a flexible middle-ground approach.
In Crooker v. United States Department of Justice,8 0 the
First Circuit noted that the purpose of the FOIA attorney's fees
provision was to abolish administrative resistance to disclosure requests when such recalcitrance was premised upon the knowledge
that a plaintiff lacked the financial resources or economic incentives to vindicate his statutory rights."8' Such a purpose, the court
.7f 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976), as amended by Truth in Lending Simplification and
Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 168-185.
171 Crooker v. Department of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980); see notes 180184 and accompanying text infra. For a comprehensive discussion of Crooker and the considerations militating in favor of and against recovery of attorney's fees by pro se litigants in
the context of the FOIA, see Comment, supra note 37.
171 Burke v. Department of Justice, 559 F.2d 1182, 1182 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g mem. 432
F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1976). One district court in the Fifth Circuit, in dictum, also has
suggested that pro se litigants are ineligible for an award of attorney's fees under the FOIA.
Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1980). The Maxwell
court reasoned that the legislative history of the FOIA reflected a desire to reimburse plaintiffs only for expenses actually incurred. Id. at 256 & n.2. Moreover, the court was influenced by the statute's failure expressly to provide for fee awards to pro se plaintiffs, particularly in light of the doctrine of restrictive construction of waivers of sovereign immunity. Id.
"7
Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, No. 80-1412 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980) (per
curiam); Cox v. Department of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Jones v. United
States Secret Serv., 81 F.R.D. 700, 701-02 (D.D.C. 1979); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 11516 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd mem. sub noma. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See
also Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (attorney appearing in
propriapersona may recover attorney's fees).
179 See Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980); notes
185-188 and accompanying text infra; cf. Marschner v. Department of State, 470 F. Supp.
196, 201 (D. Conn. 1979) (awarding attorney's fees to pro se litigant without establishing
limiting criteria).
180 632 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1980).
181 Id. at 920 (citing Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711
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reasoned, was not furthered by granting attorney's fees when none
were incurred, and such a recovery would constitute an undesirable
windfall to the pro se plaintiff."8 2 Thus, the court concluded that
the economic barriers facing the pro se plaintiff were adequately
overcome by awarding litigation costs actually incurred.' 3 In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit has reasoned that since a
pro se plaintiff functions as an attorney, he should not be deemed
ineligible for a fee award merely because he did not incur the ex18 4
pense of hiring counsel.
2.

Middle-Ground Standard for Eligibility Under the FOIA

The Second Circuit, in Crooker v. United States Department
18 5
adopted a middle-ground approach, permitting
of the Treasury,
pro se litigants to recover attorney's fees upon demonstrating that
the prosecution of their lawsuits created a reduction in income.'
The Crooker court derived this eligibility criterion from the legislative history of the FOLA, which refers to the attorney's fee provision as removing "barriers" to suits by the average citizen.'8 7 The
court noted that such a barrier would not be presented should the
litigant neither pay an attorney nor forego regular income in order
to prepare and pursue a pro se suit.1 88
(D.C. Cir. 1977)).
182

632 F.2d at 920-21.

183 Id. at 921.
8
Crooker v. Department of the Treasury, No. 80-1412 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1980) (per
curiam).
185 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980).
188 Id. at 49.

167 Id.; see S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974).
18 See 634 F.2d at 49. The Crooker rationale clearly comports with the congressional
goal of facilitating access to the courts by litigants seeking to vindicate their statutory
rights. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 532-34 (5th Cir. 1978); Nationwide Bldg.
Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1365 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Of course, the FOIA also was intended to deter arbitrary
administrative resistance to disclosure requests. See Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 437
(5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559
F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Lovell, Judge Clarke, after highlighting the importance of
attorney's fee awards as a useful means to deter unfounded resistance to disclosure requests
by pro se plaintiffs, advanced three other arguments favoring recovery. First, he noted that
since the pro se complainant's time is valuable, he should be compensated accordingly. 630
F.2d at 437 (Clark, J., dissenting). Second, he observed that such a litigant should be encouraged to enforce his statutory rights. Id. (Clark, J., dissenting). Finally, Judge Clark
could perceive no valid reason for permitting recovery to the attorney who represents himself, see Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977), while denying recovery to
the lay person who proceeds pro se. 630 F.2d at 438 (Clark, J., dissenting). But cf. White v.
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3. Ineligibility Under the Fees Awards Act
Although the circuits are divided over the availability of attorney's fees to pro se litigants under the FOIA, those courts that
have addressed this issue in the context of the Fees Awards Act are
in accord. The First,189 Fifth, 190 and Eighth1 91 Circuits, and one
district court in the Third Circuit,

92

all have held that pro se liti-

gants are ineligible for an award of attorney's fees under the Fees
Awards Act. The reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Cofield v. City of
Atlanta"" is typical of these decisions. Recognizing that the central purpose of the Act was to "enable and encourage a wronged
person to retain a lawyer,"1 9 the Cofield court distinguished those
cases which had granted attorney's fees to pro se complainants
under the FOIA,1 9 5 noting that "[t]he history, language, and purpose of the [FOIA] differ significantly from those of the civil rights
statutes." 1 8
4. Ineligibility Under the Truth In Lending Act
The issue of eligibility of pro se litigants for fee awards also
has been addressed in the context of the Truth In Lending Act of
1968 (the TILA). 97 The Fourth Circuit, confronted with this issue
Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
923 (1980) (under Truth In Lending Act, attorneys who represent themselves may not recover fees); notes 198-202 and accompanying text infra.
,89 Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1981).
190 Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628
F.2d 297, 300 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'g in part 477 F. Supp. 897, 928-29 (N.D. Tex. 1979),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1392 (1981) (award of pro se attorney's fees would be startling new
remedy not comtemplated by Congress in enacting the Fees Awards Act). See also Gore v.
Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977) (existence of attorney-client relationship is required to recover under the Fees Awards Act).
191 Davis v. Paratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
192 Owens-El v. Robinson, 498 F. Supp. 877, 880 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
193 648 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1981).
194 Id. at 988.
195

Id.; see note 178 supra.

1" 648 F.2d at 988. The Cofield court noted that actions brought under the FOIA are
likely to be brought by pro se complainants. Id. at 988 n.4. Since the relief sought generally
is the mere release of information, damages generally are not in issue. Id. Moreover, the
court observed that section 552(a)(4)(F) of the FOIA may indicate a punitive purpose which
has no counterpart in the Fees Awards Act or in its legislative history. Id.; see note 188 and
accompanying text supra.
19
15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); see White v. Arlen Realty & Dev.
Corp., 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1981); Hannon
v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1976). In Hannon, the Ninth Circuit denied
recovery to a recent law school graduate, not yet admitted to the bar and appearing pro se,
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in White v. Arlen Realty & Development Corp.,198 denied recovery
of attorney's fees to a plaintiff-attorney appearing in propriapersona.' 1 Reversing the district court's fee award, the White court
noted that the legislative history of the statute's attorney's fee provision clearly indicated that it was intended to create an incentive
for lawyers to handle TILA cases.2 00 The court reasoned, however,
that extension of this rationale to cases wherein attorneys had represented themselves as plaintiffs would "raise the specter of fee
generation."2 0 1 Moreover, noting that self-representation does not
serve the goals of the TILA, the court concluded that Congress did
not intend that defendant creditors would be forced "to subsidize
the personal crusades of consumers who are attorneys. "202
III.

STATUTORY FEE AWARDS: AN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

2 0 substantially prevailed,2
A party who has prevailed,
° or otherwise satisfied the threshold requirements of a statutory fee provision 2 is not necessarily entitled to a fee award. Although some

reasoning that "[h]ad Congress wished to compensate non-attorneys for 'services' rendered
on their own behalf in pressing their individual claims, it certainly could have done so." 537
F.2d at 329. The Hannon court's reasoning subsequently was applied by the district court in
Barrett v. United States Customs Serv., 482 F. Supp. 779, 780 (E.D. La. 1980). The district
judge in Barrett, however, was construing the attorney's fee provision of the Privacy Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(3)(B) (1976), which contains language identical to the analogous
provision of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976). 482 F. Supp. at 779.
20 614 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980).
20 614 F.2d at 389.
200 Id. at 388.
201 Id.
202 Id.
22 See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
204 See notes 36-37 and accompanying text supra.
200 Under some fee-shifting statutes, a party is not required to succeed on the merits of
a claim to be entitled to attorney's fees. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973,
§ 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (1976) (ESA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976) (ERISA); Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976) (FWPCAA); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (Supp. III 1979); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, § 23(a)(5), 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. 1m 1979) (OSLCA). The "citizen-suit" provision of the Clean Air
Act, for example, provides that "[fin any judicial proceeding under this Section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney.., fees) whenever the court
determines that such award is appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) (Supp. II 1979). See generally Comment, Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington: Awarding Attorneys'
Fees in Citizens Suits to Enforce the Clean Air Act, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1402 (1977). This
broad discretionary provision has been interpreted broadly by the District of Columbia Circuit. See Metropolitan Wash. Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). In Washington Coalition, the court stated that the central
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statutes expressly mandate that awards be made to prevailing parties, leaving federal judges no discretion to deny such relief,",
inquiry in Clean Air Act cases is "whether the suit was of the type that Congress intended
to encourage when it enacted the citizen-suit provision." Id. at 804. Since the purpose of the
legislation was to aid enforcement of the Act, the court noted that the judiciary is empowered to grant attorney's fees "without regard to the outcome of the litigation," id. (quoting
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1970), "whenever such an award is deemed to be
in the public interest." 639 F.2d at 804 (quoting S. REP. No. 1196, supra, at 65). The public
interest will be furthered by an award, the court suggested, when the suit can be characterized as a "prudent and desirable effort to achieve an unfulfilled objective of the Act." 639
F.2d at 804. Thus, the court concluded, it would be inappropriate to allow fee awards to
turn upon the outcome of litigation in this context. Id.
The Washington Coalition standard has been applied to the citizen-suit provisions of
the ESA and OCSLA, which are identical to those of the Clean Air Act. See North Slope
Borough v. Andrus, 507 F. Supp. 106, 107 (D.D.C. 1981). In construing these provisions, the
North Slope court held that suits implicating environmental concerns pivotal to the legislative purposes of the two Acts would be appropriate for fee awards. Id. at 108; cf. Carpenter
v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 (D. Del. 1980) (notwithstanding victory on merits, plaintiff held not entitled to fee award because suit did not contribute to congressional goal of
conservation). But cf. Montgomery Envt'l Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 595, 596-97 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (under FWPCAA, awards are not authorized for litigants seeking judicial review
even if the "same litigation could arguably have been framed as a citizen suit").
-00 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, § 106, 7 U.S.C. §
18(0, (g) (1976); Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, § 309, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f) (1976); Clayton Act, § 164, 15 U.S.C. § 1526c (1976), as amended by Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 302(3), 90 Stat. 1396; Consumer Leasing Act
of 1976, § 183, 15 U.S.C. § 1667b(a) (1976); Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act, §§ 108, 409, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1918, 1989(a)(2) (1976); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978, § 122, 16 U.S.C. § 2632(a)(I) (Supp. 1II 1979); Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1977, § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (Supp. 1I 1979); Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976); Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, § 105, 30
U.S.C. § 815(c)(3) (Supp. 11 1979); Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, § 428,
30 U.S.C. § 938(c) (1976); Veterans' Benefits Act, § 784(g), 38 U.S.C. § 784(g) (1976); Safe
Drinking- Water Act, § 1450, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B)(ii) (1976); Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1976, § 20, 43 U.S.C. § 1619 (1976); Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, § 217(c), 45 U.S.C. § 854(g) (1976); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 153(p) (1976), as amended by Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1934, ch. 691, § 3(p), 48
Stat. 1192; Communications Act of 1934, §§ 206, 407, 47 U.S.C. §§ 206, 407 (1976); Revised
Interstate Commerce Act, §§ 11705(d)(3), 11710(a)(3)(b), 49 U.S.C. §§ 17705(d)(3), 11710
(a)(3)(b) (Supp. I1 1979).
The compulsory character of mandatory fee awards is not a frequently litigated issue.
Recently, however, in Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 860 (7th Cir. 1981), the
defendants in an antitrust action argued that section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C § 15
(1976), did not mandate a fee award when the prevailing party was a state represented by
its attorney general. 657 F.2d at 858. This section states that "[a]ny person who shall be
injured ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). The Sangamo court conceded
that the courts uniformly have construed this language to mandate the award of attorney's
fees and costs to successful plaintiffs. 657 F.2d at 858 (citing Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett,
Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 531 n.2 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1979)). Nevertheless, the court was unper-
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most fee-shifting provisions employ permissive terms. 0 7 By enacting these discretionary statutes, therefore, Congress not only has
determined which of a broad spectrum of public policies merit imposition of the fee-shifting remedy, but also has delegated to the
federal courts the power to decide whether a particular set of circumstances warrants an award of attorney's fees. Moreover, after
concluding that fee shifting is appropriate in a given case,20 a
suaded by the contention that awarding attorney's fees to a state represented by its attorney
general would be inconsistent with the purposes and policy behind a section 4 fee award.
The court highlighted the main purposes of such a fee award as:
1) to encourage private enforcement of the antitrust laws; 2) to insure that the
cost of doing so does not diminish the treble damages award, and 3) to deter violations of the antitrust laws by requiring the 'payment of that fee by a losing defendant as part of his penalty for having violated the antitrust laws.'
657 F.2d at 859-60 (quoting Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61,
90 (1st Cir. 1969)). The Sangamo court also rejected the argument that the attorney general's statutory obligation to prosecute all actions in favor of Illinois was a sufficient incentive to induce him to bring antitrust actions on behalf of the state. 657 F.2d at 860. Rather,
the court observed that political, legal or fiscal considerations might lead to a decision not to
prosecute a viable antitrust action. Id. The court also noted that the burden of other legal
responsibilties "may all but preclude an aggressive antitrust enforcement program." Id. The
fact that a fee award would pass not to the attorney general's office, but rather, to the
Illinois general fund, did not convince the court that a fee award would fail to provide an
incentive for the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Id. The Sangamo court apparently was
persuaded by the amici curiae brief filed on behalf of 43 states, which extolled the effectiveness of past state antitrust enforcement efforts, as measured in large part by pecuniary recoveries, including attorney's fees, and which asserted that these prior successes would play
a significant role in the decision as to appropriations for future antitrust enforcement efforts. Id.
207 See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976); Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, §§ 230(b)(1)(A)(ii), 205(g)(1), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5596(b)(1)(a)(ii),
7701(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, § 6(a), (c), 7 U.S.C. §
2305(a), (c) (1976); Plant Variety Protection Act, § 125, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976); Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, § 8(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (1976); Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, §§ 1117(a)(4), 1118, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3417(a)(4), 3418 (Supp. II 1979);
Securities Act of 1933, § 206(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§§ 9(e), 18(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(a) (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, §§
6(c)(4)(A), 19(d), 20(c)(2), 21(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c)(4)(A), 2618(d), 2619(c)(2),
2620(b)(4)(C) (1976); Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 11(g)(4), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)
(1976); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)
(1976), as amended by Act of Sept. 26, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1295; Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 520(d), 525(e), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1270(d), (f),
1275(e) (Supp. III 1979); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 154, 42 U.S.C. § 2184 (1976); Fair
Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976); Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, § 335(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d) (1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. §
6972(e) (Supp. II 1978).
208 Before a court can conclude that fee shifting is appropriate, an application for a fee
award must be made. There is a conflict among the federal circuit courts of appeals as to
whether, should the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees not be raised by a prevailing
party prior to judgment on the merits, the application must be made within the 10-day
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court again must exercise its discretion in performing the subjective task of determining
what constitutes a "reasonable" award of
20 s
legal costs.
Increased reliance upon fee-shifting statutes as a means of
financing successful efforts to vindicate civil, commercial, environmental, and other rights of "the highest priority"'2 10 has demonstrated the need to define the nature of judicial discretion exercised in fee awards litigation. This section of the Note will examine
and compare the various statutes authorizing discretionary awards
of attorney's fees. It will be suggested that the judiciary's discretionary power must be tempered by the underlying purposes of the
fee-shifting statute involved in a given case, even if such power has
not expressly been circumscribed by the statutory language or legislative history of the relevant fee-shifting provision. Thereafter,
the Note will outline the factors governing the judiciary's exercise
of discretion in determining the size of a reasonable fee award.
A.

Discretion:A Question of Degree

A prevailing party will find that his prospects for recovering
attorney's fees under a discretionary fee-shifting provision are tied
period required by rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P.
59(e). Some courts have held that, to be timely, such a motion must be made within that 10day period, which governs motions to alter or amend a judgment. See, e.g., Glass v. Pfeffer,
657 F.2d 252, 255 (10th Cir. 1981); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 629
F.2d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 2313 (1981); Hirschkop v. Snead, 475 F.
Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. Va. 1979), aff'd, 646 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1981). The prevalent view, however, appears to be that the rule 59(e) 10-day period does not apply to a postjudgment
motion for an award of attorney's fees. See Obin v. Machinists & Aerospace Dist. No. 9, 651
F.2d 574, 584 (8th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Snyder, 639 F.2d 316, 317 (6th Cir. 1981); Bond v.
Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488, 497 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. dismissed, 451 U.S. 935 (1981); Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797-98
(5th Cir. 1980); Whiten v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 1174, 1176 (M.D. La. 1981).
The circuits appear to have adopted a uniform approach to the analogous question
whether a district court's adjudication of liability, without addressing the issue of attorney's
fees, constitutes a final appealable judgment. Courts have refused to deem such an order a
final judgment, reasoning that an order is final only if it addresses all claims for relief. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 (1976); Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248
(4th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 786-87 (10th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d 828, 830 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Richerson v. Jones, 551
F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1977). In the context of both Title VII and the Fees Awards Act,
attorney's fees have been deemed to be an integral part of the remedies necessary to secure
compliance with the civil rights laws. See, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d at 248 (Fees
Awards Act); Johnson v. University of Bridgeport, 629 F.2d at 830 (Title VII).
209 See notes 267-319 and accompanying text infra.
210 Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam).
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to the type of statute forming the basis of his claim. Discretionary
statutes fall into three basic categories. The most liberal, from the
prevailing party's perspective, favors fee awards absent "special
circumstances" and constitutes the touchstone for recovery in the
civil rights sphere. 2 11 The most stringent standard, which pervades
the patent, trademark, and securities fields, permits fee awards
only upon a finding by the court that the losing party's position
was meritless. 212 In the middle of this spectrum fall those statutes
which contain no standard favoring or militating against fee
213
recoveries.
1.

Liberal Civil Rights Standard

The liberal civil rights standard for discretionary fee awards,
favoring recovery in all but special circumstances, first arose in the
context of injunctive actions brought to secure compliance with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.214 In Newman v. Piggie Park
Enterprises, Inc.,215 the Supreme Court noted that since Title H
plaintiffs can only obtain injunctive relief, they act not for their
own gain, but rather, to promote the public interest as private attorneys general. 216 The Court reasoned that the legislative policy of
encouraging Title II suits would be frustrated should such plaintiffs be "routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees.'m
Thus, fee awards were held to be appropriate in such cases absent
special circumstances. 218 The Court later applied the same standard to the counsel fee provisions of the Emergency School Aid
211 See notes 214-245 and accompanying text infra.
212 See notes 246-249 and accompanying text infra.
212 See notes 251-266 and accompanying text infra.
214 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-3 (1976). The counsel fee provision of Title II provides
that in an action seeking to enforce that title's proscription of discrimination in the provision of public accommodations, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .
Id. §
2000a-3(b) (1976).
215 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
2'0Id. at 401-02.
217

Id. at 402.

28 Id. The Newman Court was persuaded by the fact that absent fee shifting

few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by
invoking the injunctive powers of the federal court. Congress therefore enacted
the provision for counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately
advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly, to encourage
individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title VII.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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2 20 The simiAct (ESAA) 219 in Northcross v. Board of Education.

larity of language and common purposes of Title II and the ESAA
were cited in support of the Court's extention of Newman.221 The
"Newman-Northcross Rule ' 22 2 has been adopted in litigation
brought pursuant to Title VII 223 and other statutes. 224 Moreover,

this standard gained the endorsement of Congress in the context of
the Fees Awards Act, and thus has been held applicable to cases
involving that statute.225

220

20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976) (repealed 1979).
412 U.S. 427 (1973) (per curiam).

221

Id. at 428.

222

The principle that successful civil rights plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover an at-

219

torney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust," 390 U.S. at
402, often has been called the "Newman-Northcross Rule." See, e.g., Zarcone v. Perry, 581
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ.,
535 F.2d 722, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976).
22 See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). See generally 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976). In Albemarle, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
what standard must be used by the federal courts in determining whether to award back
pay to a prevailing plaintiff in a Title VII action. The Fourth Circuit had cited Newman for
the proposition that back pay should be awarded "unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust." Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.
1973), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (footnote omitted) (citing Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). The Supreme Court noted that Newman was not "in point" and that a standard for back pay awards would have to be formed
elsewhere. The Court stated, however, that "[tihere is, of course, an equally strong public
interest in having injunctive actions brought under Title VII, to eradicate existing discriminatory employment practices. But this interest can be vindicated by applying the [Newman]
standard to the attorneys' fees provision of Title VII .... " 422 U.S. at 415 (emphasis in
original).
1
See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1980)
(construing Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 505(b), 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (Supp. III 1979)); cf.
Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 57 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (awarding
fees under Rehabilitation Act without discussing appropriate standard); Tatro v. Texas, 516
F. Supp. 968, 985 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (fee awarded under Rehabilitation Act without addressing standard for discretion).
225 See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam);
Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 130 (10th Cir. 1980); Skehan v. Board
of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 496 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Sargeant v.
Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978). The legislative history accompanying the Fees
Awards Act indicates that Congress intended that the Newman-Northcross rule would apply to fee awards under the Act. The House Report, for example, states:
A key feature of the bill is its mandate that fees are only to be allowed in the
discretion of the court. Congress has passed many statutes requiring that fees be
awarded to a prevailing party. Again the Committee adopted a more moderate
approach here by leaving the matter to the discretion of the judge, guided of
course by the case law interpreting similar attorney's fee provisions .... The
Committee intends that, at a minimum, existing judicial standards, to which ample reference is made in this report, should guide the courts in construing [the
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The Newman-Northcross rule has generated considerable litigation concerning the factual situations which will give rise to a
finding of special circumstances sufficient to justify the denial of a
fee award.226 It is well-settled that a prevailing plaintiff's ability to

pay his own legal costs is not a sufficiently special circumstance to
deny recovery. 227 Conversely, a defendant cannot escape fee shifting by claiming a lack of resources.2 2 Moreover, the fact that a
prevailing plaintiff has been represented by a publicly funded orAct].
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 38, at 8 (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). The Newman-Northcross rule represented the prevalent "existing judicial standard" in the civil
rights context at that time. See Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). Moreover, the Senate Report explicitly endorsed the Newman
standard:
It is intended that the standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under
the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the
rights protected by the statutes covered by S. 2278, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust." [Newman, 390 U.S. at 402].
S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 4 (footnote omitted).
22I See notes 227-232 and accompanying text infra.
227 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Collins, 609 F.2d 151, 151 (5th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Bunn v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 488 (3d Cir. 1978); Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159,
163-64 (5th Cir. 1977); Witherspoon v. Sielaff, 507 F. Supp. 667, 670 (N.D. IlM.1981). In
Gore, the Fifth Circuit observed that "[t]he existence of an attorney-client relationship, a
status that exists wholly independently of compensation, is all that is required [for fee shifting]." 563 F.2d at 164. Notably, the Fair Housing Act contains an express exception to the
general rule that the ability to pay will not be considered in determining whether a fee
award should be granted. Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 812(c), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1976).
This provision allows fee recovery only to prevailing parties who are unable to pay their own
counsel. Id. This section's importance diminished after the enactment of the Fees Awards
Act, however, because plaintiffs alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act frequently can
sue under the broad antidiscrimination provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). Section 1982 expressly prohibits discrimination in the context of real
property conveyances and has been construed broadly to proscribe all racial discrimination
whether public or private, in the sale or rental of real estate. E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). It has been held, therefore, that plaintiffs who prevail under
both the Housing Act and section 1982 are entitled to recover fees under the liberal standard of the Fees Awards Act. Dillon v. AFBIC Dev. Corp., 597 F.2d 556, 563 (5th Cir. 1979);
Bunn v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
228 See, e.g., Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497, 507 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). The courts uniformly have refused to deny a fee
award on the ground that, when the money is paid from a public treasury, the financial
impact will fall upon innocent taxpayers. Aware Woman Clinic, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach,
629 F.2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Witherspoon v. Sielaff, 507 F. Supp. 667,
670 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d at 507;
Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 684
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5.
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ganization or an attorney working on a pro bono basis will not preclude an award.2 29 In addition, a defendant's good faith, standing
alone, will not constitute a special circumstance under the Newman-Northcross doctrine.2 30 In contradistinction, the cases in
which fees have been denied because of special circumstances primarily have involved a prevailing plaintiff's reprehensible conduct
in instituting or conducting the lawsuit. 31 Indeed, it has been
noted that, because fee awards are denied so infrequently, fee
shifting occurs almost as a matter of course under the NewmanNorthcross rule.2 32
It appears, therefore, that although the Newman-Northcross
standard is viewed as a liberal one from the prevailing civil rights
plaintiff's perspective, it can be characterized as a very conservative approach to the exercise of discretion involved under fee-shifting provisions. This is not to say, however, that discretion is no
longer an important element governing fee awards in civil rights
229

See Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1980); Palmigiano v. Garrahy,

616 F.2d 598, 600-03 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Dennis v. Chang, 611
F.2d 1302, 1304-07 (9th Cir. 1980); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 54 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979); Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 1978); cf. Collins v.
Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 322
(1981) (status as parent-litigant, bringing a 1983 suit on behalf of student offspring, not
special circumstance); Hernus v. City of Hickory Hills, 517 F. Supp. 592, 593 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (fact that defendant in civil rights action was defended by insurance company not
special circumstance); Schwabenbauer v. Board of Educ., 515 F. Supp. 33,.35 (W.D.N.Y.
1981) (union whose salaried staff attorney represented female teacher in successful Title VII
action entitled to fee award).
230 Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Bond v.
Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.
1980); Love v. Mayor of Cheyenne, 620 F.2d 235, 236 (10th Cir. 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 605
F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581
F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1978); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1977). But see
Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir. 1976) (fact that defendants'
actions were required of them by their constituting authority and that they acted in good
faith is relevant to determination that it would be unjust to hold them liable for plaintiffs'
attorney's fees).
231 See Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980) (outrageously excessive
claim for billable hours denied in order to encourage prompt maintenance of adequate billing records and submission of reasonable, carefully calculated counsel fees); Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975) (fee award denied because, inter
alia, identity of real property in interest was concealed, thereby engendering potentially
significant impact upon defendant's litigation strategy); Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254,
1260 (D. Colo. 1978) (fee award denied where, inter alia, civil rights violation was precipitated by deliberate scheme to involve defendant in some type of litigation); Castleberry v.
Langford, 428 F. Supp. 676, 685 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (fee award denied because of plaintiff's
conduct).
232 See, e.g., E. LARsON, FEDERAL COURT AwARDs oF ATrORNEY'S FEms 51 (1981).
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cases. Indeed, the Second and Ninth Circuits have restricted the
scope of the Newman-Northcross rule in Fees Awards Act cases
which do not involve demands for injunctive relief.233 In Zarcone v.

Perry,23 4 the Second Circuit held that in actions for damages, if the

prospects for recovery are such that a competent attorney is willing
to represent the plaintiff on a contingent fee basis, the NewmanNorthcross rule is inapplicable since no financial disincentive exists which would affect the enforcement of civil rights.23 In such
cases, the court stated, a trial judge must weigh various factors
concerning "the nature and extent of the rights and interests at
stake" in deciding whether a fee award is appropriate23 The court
noted that if the plaintiff can be characterized as a private attor"I Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1979); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d
1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979); Calkins v. Blum, 511 F.
Supp. 1073, 1102-03 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Kirkland v. Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 487 F. Supp. 760,
774 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 464 F. Supp. 718,
725 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), af'd, 605 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).
234 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979). In Zarcone, a judge
expressed his dissatisfaction with the coffee sold by the plaintiff coffee vendor by having
him handcuffed and led through a crowded courthouse to the judge's chambers. 581 F.2d at
1040. The plaintiff was then reprimanded and threatened with legal action. Id. As a result,
the plaintiff allegedly "suffered from anxiety, persistent headaches and stuttering, required
treatment in a hospital, experienced marital difficulties, and was unable to work." Id. Retaining counsel under a contingent fee agreement, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action
against the judge, and was awarded compensatory and punitive damages in excess of
$140,000. Id. The plaintiff's request for a fee award was denied, id., however, and the Second Circuit affirmed, id. at 1045.
2S5 581 F.2d at 1044. The Second Circuit, in Zarcone, derived its interpretation of the
Newman-Northcross rule from the Supreme Court's holding in Christiansburg Garment Co.
v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). In that case, the Zarcone court noted that the Supreme Court
viewed the Newman-Northcross rule as a "reflection of an attempt to reduce the financial
barriers to suits by private attorneys general." Id. at 1044 (citing Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. at 415-24).
236 581 F.2d at 1044. The factors mentioned by the Zarcone court have been restated as
follows:
[1] whether a person in the plaintiff's position would have been deterred or inhibited from seeking to enforce civil rights without an assurance that his attorneys'
fees would be paid if he were successful ...
[2] the nature and extent of the right and interests at stake...
[3] the size of the benefits conferred by the suit on the public or on others;
[4] the amount of any fund created by the litigation (and its adequacy to cover the
plaintiffs' costs and compensate him for actual damages);
[5] the presence or absence of any bad faith or obdurate conduct on the part of
either party; and
[61 any unjust hardship that a grant or denial of fee-shifting might impose.
Calkins v. Blum, 511 F. Supp. 1073, 1102 (N.D.N.Y. 1981) (citing Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d
at 1044).
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ney general, he will recover fees.2 37 Otherwise, concluded the Zarcone court, if the plaintiff has redressed only a private injury, and
if his suit does not implicate issues or concerns "imbued with the
public interest," fees will be denied.238
It appears that under the Second Circuit's approach in Zarcone, judges are accorded more discretion to deny fee awards when
injunctive relief is not requested. 23 9 It is suggested, however, that

nothing in the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act suggests
that Congress intended actions for injunctive relief to have such
talismanic significance.24 0 Indeed, it appears that Congress was
concerned not only with enforcement of the civil rights of the general public through equitable relief, but also with the vindication
of individual plaintiffs' rights through actions for damages. 24 1 Ad-

ditionally, the legislative history of the Act indicates no congressional intention to treat a plaintiff's "bright prospects" for damage
recovery as a means to deny fee awards.

24 2

Moreover, since the

courts uniformly have held that a party's ability to pay his counsel
is irrelevant to fee shifting,24 3 it seems anomalous to consider the
likelihood that such resources will become available through a
237

581 F.2d at 1043-44.

238 Id. at 1044 & n.6.
239

See notes 235-38 and accompanying text supra. The Zarcone court indicated that

when the concerns underlying the Newman-Northcross rule are inapplicable, see note 235
and accompanying text supra, it may be appropriate, in a suit for damages, for a district
court judge to engage in a discretionary balancing inquiry focusing upon the nature and
extent of the benefit conferred upon the public. 581 F.2d at 1044; see note 236 and accompanying text supra. It is arguable that the court subsequently contradicted itself by suggesting
that "where an individual suit for damages can be characterized as a test case, involves legal
issues of recurrent public importance, or is otherwise imbued with the public interest, the
concerns underlying the Newman-Northcross rule appear applicable." 581 F.2d at 1044 n.6.
240 See, e.g., Valcourt v. Hyland, 503 F. Supp. 630, 640-41 (D. Mass. 1980). The Senate
Report accompanying the Fees Awards Act recognized that Newman arose in the context of
injunctions sought under Title II. See S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 3. Nevertheless,
the Report expressly adopted the Newman standard without making a distinction between
actions for damages and those for equitable relief. Id. at 4:
241 Even the Zarcone court expressly acknowledged that "[t]he Act's legislative history
is clear that in authorizing awards of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in civil rights actions Congress was concerned with enforcement not only of the civil rights of the public at large and
of identifiable groups but also with the rights of individual plaintiffs." 581 F.2d at 1042.
242 See Valcourt v. Hyland, 503 F. Supp. 630, 640-41 (D. Mass. 1980). The Valcourt
court indicated that any distinction which purports to establish different standards for injunctive and for damages actions and which allegedly is premised upon the Newman-Northcross rule "is at odds with the spirit if not the precise holdings of decisions by the Courts of
Appeals for the First Circuit." Id. at 641; see, e.g., Perez v. University of P.R., 600 F.2d 1, 2
(1st Cir. 1979) (attorney's fee may be awarded in context of award of nominal damages).
2,2 See note 210 and accompanying text supra.
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money judgment as a factor in denying an award. Finally, it is suggested that the Zarcone analysis placed insufficient emphasis upon
the fact that damage actions designed "to redress an essentially
private injury ' 244 may have a significant deterrent effect upon the
behavior of a class of defendants.2 4 5 Indeed, because such deterrence is of benefit to the public, it seems fitting to characterize the
plaintiff in a damages action as a "private attorney general" and to
award him attorney's fees.
2.

Strict Standard in Context of Patents, Trademarks, and
Securities

The statutes governing fee awards in patent, trademark, and
securities cases, like the Newman-Northcross rule, permit only a
minimal exercise of judicial discretion. Unlike the Newman-Northcross standard, however, fee-shifting provisions in these fields severely limit the circumstances in which an award can be made. Indeed, these statutes
typically authorize fee shifting only in
"exceptional cases '"246 or when "the court believes the suit or the
defense to have been without merit. '24 7 Under the trademark and
patent provisions, a prevailing party seeking a fee award must
demonstrate that exceptional circumstances, such as fraud, malice,
bad faith, or vexatiousness, make it inequitable for him to bear the
2' Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d at 1044.
245

See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978); Witherspoon v. Sielaff, 507

F. Supp. 667, 669 (N.D. Ill.
1981). There appears to be an undesirable element of subjectivity in characterizing an action as either "essentially private" or as one likely to benefit the
public because of its deterrent effect upon potential wrongdoers. In Zarcone, for example,
the court noted that although "the defendant's conduct was intolerable from the standpoint
of the public interest, it is unlikely to recur . . . ." 581 F.2d at 1044. In Milwe v. Cavuoto,
653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981), however, the Second Circuit observed that a private action for
damages "is often the only tool reasonably available to vindicate society's interest in ensuring that those who enforce the law also abide by it." Id. at 84. Finding that the Milwe
plaintiff's action against police officers, predicated upon their misconduct, conferred an
"overall benefit to society," the court held that a fee award was appropriate. Id. Significantly, neither the Zarcone nor Milwe opinions explained why one suit furthered the public
interest while the other did not.
24 See, e.g., Plant Variety Protection Act, § 145, 7 U.S.C. § 2565 (1976); Trademark
Act, § 323, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976); Patent Infringement Act, § 1, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).
217 See Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77K(e) (1976). Notably, the Trust
Indenture Act, § 315(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(e) (1976), authorizes an award of fees against any
party litigant "having due regard to the merits and good faith of the claims or defenses
made by such party litigant." See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560
F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977).
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burden of paying his own counsel fees.2 4 Under the securities laws,
a claim or defense will be found to "lack merit" when it borders
upon frivolity or is interposed in bad faith.2 49
3.

Other Contexts

Both the Newman-Northcross rule and the standards for fee
shifting embodied in the patent, trademark, and securities laws circumscribe the judiciary's discretionary power. In addition, the legislative history and statutory language in these contexts have

guided the courts in the exercise of their limited discretion by indicating the importance that Congress attached to private enforcement in particular spheres.2 50 Surprisingly little legislative gui248 See Arbrook, Inc. v. American Hsp. Supply Corp., 645 F.2d 273, 279 (5th Cir.
1981); Campbell v. Spectrum Automation Co., 601 F.2d 246, 251-53 (6th Cir. 1979); Maurice
A. Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 546 F.2d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955
(1977); Stillman v. Edmund Scientific Co., 522 F.2d 798, 800-01 (4th Cir. 1975); Deyerle v.
Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45, 54-55 (6th Cir. 1974); Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co., 434
F.2d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1970); Bowmar Instrument Corp. v. Continental Micro. Inc., 497
F. Supp. 947, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1220-21
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd, 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979); Amana Soc'y v. Gemeinde Brau, Inc., 417
F. Supp. 310, 311-12 (N.D. Iowa 1976), aif'd per curiam, 557 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 967 (1977); Steak & Brew, Inc. v. Beef & Brew Rest., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1030,

1038 (S.D. Ill.
1974).
249 See Aid Auto Stores, Inc. v. Cannon, 525 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir. 1975); Klein v.
Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972); Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d
371, 374 (10th Cir. 1964); Stadia Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269, 277 (10th Cir.
1957); Driscoll v. Oppenheimer & Co., 500 F. Supp. 174, 175 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)(I) (1976), authorizes discretionary fee awards for
violations of the Act's proscriptions against the manipulation of a security's price. Nemeroff
v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 349 (2d Cir. 1980). In Nemeroff, the court held that the minimum
standard for a fee award to prevailing defendants under the statute requires a showing that
the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not
brought in subjective bad faith." Id. at 349 (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). In arriving at its conclusion, the Nemeroff court found persuasive
the ChristiansburgCourt's rationale that "to require less would defeat Congressional efforts
to promote vigorous enforcement of the statute, but to require more would be unnecessary,
in view of the long-standing equitable power to award fees upon a finding of bad faith." Id.
at 349-50 (quoting 434 U.S. at 419-22).
250 It is suggested that Congress, in the legislative history of the Fees Awards Act, embraced the- Newman-Northcross standard largely in recognition of the success of equally
liberal fee-shifting provisions "in enabling vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights legislation, while at the same time limiting the growth of the enforcement bureaucracy." S. REP.
No. 1011, supra note 35, at 14. In contrast, the stringent standards that prevail in the patent, trademark, and securities fields seem to signify a reluctance on the part of Congress to
encourage private enforcement. Such reticence may well stem from a congressional perception that the appropriate role of private enforcement in the patent, trademark, and securities fields is to supplement the extensive and vigorous governmental enforcement effort con-
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dance is available, however, to assist the courts in interpreting a
third category of statutory fee provisions, namely those which
grant the judiciary almost unfettered discretionary power. 251 Although most of these statutes state merely that a court "may"
award a fee in its discretion, 252 others require that fee requests be
evaluated in terms of their appropriateness, 2 3 while still others
mandate an assessment of whether an award is warranted in the
interests of justice.2 54
One of these statutes, section 552(a)(4)(E) of the FOIA,255 is
known for its "unusually complete" legislative history.2 56 The section provides that a court "may assess against the United States
reasonable attorney fees . . . in any case . . . in which the complainant has substantially prevailed. 2

57

The legislative history ac-

companying this statute contemplates a reasoned exercise of the
court's discretion in accordance with four factors: (1) "the benefit
to the public, if any, deriving from the case";258 (2) "the commerducted in these fields by such traditionally active public watchdogs as the SEC.
'5' A plausible explanation for Congress' failure to provide express guidance concerning
judicial discretion is that most of the discretionary fee-shifting provisions were enacted prior
to Alyeska, when the lower courts awarded fees under the private attorney general rationale.
See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra. It appears that if Congress bad been aware of
the impact of Alyeska, it might have provided the courts with more guidance concerning the

exercise of discretion under these statutes.

252 See note 207 and accompanying text supra.
253 See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (Supp. I

1977); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1976); Outer Continental Shelf Lands

Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5) (Supp. III 1979).
254 See Consumer Product Safety Act §§ 23, 24, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2073 (1976).
255 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
256 Vermont Low Income Advocacy

Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir.

1976).

5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
854]. The Senate Report accompanying the Act illustrated the public benefit criterion by
noting that a fee award ordinarily would be appropriate when a newsman sought information for use in a publication or when a public interest group sought information in furtherance of a project designed to benefit the public. Id. The Report stated, however, that an
award ordinarily would be inappropriate when a business entity sought to use the FOIA as a
means to obtain information about a competitor. Id.
When the public benefit is merely of secondary concern, satisfaction of this criterion
will not suffice to trigger an award of fees. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533-34
(5th Cir. 1978); Sabalos v. Regan, 520 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (E.D. Va. 1981). In Blue, for
example, the court observed that:
[I]t is doubtless true . . . that the successful FOIA plaintiff always acts in some
257
255

degree for the benefit of the public .

.

. . Yet the Senate Report's discussion of

this criterion referred repeatedly to disclosure to the press and to public interest
organizations, thus strongly suggesting that in weighing this factor a court should
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cial benefit to the complainant";2 59 (3) "the nature of" the complainant's "interest in the records sought"; 26 0 and (4) "whether the
government's withholding of the records sought had a reasonable
basis in law. '26 1 Although these four criteria appeared in the original Senate bill, they subsequently were eliminated because decisional law indicated that courts already had been considering such
factors.26 2 It is suggested, however, that if Congress had been forewarned of the Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska, wherein the
Court mandated specific statutory authorization for fee awards, a
take into account the degree of dissemination and likely public impact that might
be expected from a particular disclosure. . . . Thus the factor of 'public benefit'
does not particularly favor attorneys' fees where the award would merely subsidize
a matter of private concern ....
570 F.2d at 533-34. The Blue court emphasized that the public interest criterion should be
reserved for those situations in which the complainant's victory is likely to "add to the fund
of information that citizens may use in making vital political choices." Id. at 534. Moreover,
in cases in which the purpose of the FOIA litigation was to augment civil discovery, the
courts have echoed the views expressed in the Senate Report and have rejected claims for
attorney's fees. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1007 (4th Cir. 1978); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. NLRB, 497 F. Supp. 82, 85 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
209 See S. REP. No. 854, supra note 258, at 19. The Senate Judiciary Committee noted
that a court should favor fee awards to indigents or nonprofit interests rather than to large
corporate enterprises. Id. The Committee elaborated upon the rationale behind this principle, observing that
there will seldom be an award of attorney's fees when the suit is to advance the
private commercial interests of the complainant. In these cases there is usually no
need to award attorney's fees to insure that the action will be brought. The private self-interest motive of, and often pecuniary benefit to, the complainant will
be sufficient to insure the vindication of the rights given in the FOIA.
Id.; accord, Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553
F.2d 1360, 1367-68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
20 See S. REP. No. 854, supra note 258, at 19. The Senate Report suggested that a
court ordinarily should award fees when the complainant's interest in the records was
"scholarly or journalistic or public interest oriented but would not do so if his interest was
of a frivolous or purely commercial nature." Id.
26 Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir.
1976) (quoting S. REP. No. 854, supra note 258, at 19). Under the final criterion, the Senate
Report stated that a court should award fees when the government's inaction was designed
merely "to avoid embarrassment or to frustrate the requester," not when it had a "colorable
basis in law." S. REP. No. 854, supra note 258, at 19. The Report also stated that a court
may consider whether the case involved a second attempt by the same plaintiff to obtain
judicial production of the same or similar documents. Id. Notably, the courts have adhered
to the language of the Senate Report in their interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable
basis in law. See, e.g., Education/Instruction, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 649 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1981); Lasalle Extension Univ. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 486
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Cuneo v.
Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2162H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6267, 6288.
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bill might have been approved incorporating these criteria. In any
event, the judiciary consistently has applied these factors in determining whether fee awards should be made pursuant to the

FOIA.265
Since the legislative history of the FOIA stands alone as a
guide to the exercise of discretion, it seems that the task of the
lower courts in determining whether to award fees under other discretionary statutes is exceedingly difficult. To alleviate this burden, it appears that the federal courts of appeals will be required
to formulate criteria governing the interpretation of each discretionary statute.2 " It is suggested, therefore, that after examining
283

See, e.g., Croaker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980);

Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Polynesian Cultural Center, Inc. v.
NLRB, 600 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1979); Chamberlain v. Kurtz, 589 F.2d 827, 842 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979); Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th
Cir. 1978); Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir.
1976). One court has suggested that the four criteria outlined in the Senate Report can be
condensed into alternative conditions for granting fee awards:
The first condition is that the plaintiff had an insufficient private or pecuniary
interest to justify bringing the suit without an award of fees. This requirement
encompasses the first three criteria traditionally used by the courts. The second
condition is that the government has no reasonable legal basis for withholding the
requested information. If an FOIA suit meets either of these two conditions, the
court should award attorney's fees to the plaintiff.
Sabalos v. Regan, 520 F. Supp. 1069, 1072 (E.D. Va. 1981).
2 The Tenth Circuit has furnished detailed criteria for the construction of the feeshifting provision of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), §
502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976). See Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 465 (10th Cir. 1978).
Section 502(g) of ERISA provides that "[i]n any action under this subchapter by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's
fee . . . to either party." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1976). The Tenth Circuit deemed the following factors relevant to a determination of whether to award fees:
(1) The degree of the offending parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the degree of
the ability of the offending parties to personally satisfy an award of attorneys fees;
(3) whether or not an award of attorneys fees against the offending parties would
deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit
conferred on members of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits
of the parties' position.
Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 465 (10th Cir. 1978). This standard has been adopted by many
federal courts construing the ERISA fee provision. Marquardt v. North American Car Corp.,
50 U.S.L.W. 2036 (7th Cir. July 21, 1981); Hummel v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446, 453
(9th Cir. 1980); Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980);
Frary v. Shorr Paper Prods., Inc., 494 F. Supp. 565, 570 (N.D. IlM.1980); Baeten v. Van Ess,
474 F. Supp. 1324, 1332 (E.D. Wis. 1979). Notably, the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that
although these factors are "the nuclei of concerns" that a court should address, no one of
them is necessarily decisive. Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1980). Indeed, the Iron Workers court identified an additional factor, namely, "whether
those parties [plaintiff-fiduciaries] would have violated their fiduciary duties by not bringing

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

the language and legislative history of a statute to ascertain the
degree of discretion conferred on the judiciary, the courts should
inquire into the objectives and policies Congress sought to further
by enacting a particular fee-shifting provision. Indeed, this appears
to be the method used by the Supreme Court in arriving at the
Newman-Northcross rule in the context of Title II.265 If this approach cannot produce a standard susceptible of uniform and objective application, it is submitted that the courts should examine
other statutes having common legislative goals and should determine whether the criteria governing the exercise of discretion
under such other statutes can be applied to the fee-shifting provision at issue. A similar approach has been used by the judiciary in
arriving at a definition of the prevailing party concept under various statutes.26 6
B. The Reasonable Attorney's Fee
Although the statutes authorizing fee awards often differ with
respect to the standards governing prevailing party concepts and
the discretion possessed by the courts to determine whether fee
shifting is appropriate, 6 7 they contain identical language describing the amount of the award. Indeed, virtually all of the federal
fee-shifting statutes provide for a reasonable attorney's fee. 26 8 Few
suit." Id. But see Mullins v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 642 F.2d 1302, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (being
required by ERISA to bring an action is not synonymous with enforcing the statute and
therefore does not militate in favor of fee award). Although the factors relevant to the decision concerning whether to make a fee award are fairly clear and uniformly applied, courts
have differed with respect to the degree to which fee awards are favored by the statute. Cf.
Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1980) (Newman-Northcross rule inappropriate because ERISA policies less imperative than those underlying civil rights and statutory language significantly different); Central States Southeast
v. Hitchings Trucking, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 906, 909-10 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (Newman-Northcross rule may be applied in ERISA action); Bonar v. Barnett Bank, 488 F. Supp. 365, 370
(M.D. Fla. 1980) (fee award inappropriate because resolution of case turned upon question
of law upon which reasonable minds could differ and because of traditional policy against
awarding attorney's fees except in limited circumstances).
2'5 See notes 216-218 and accompanying text supra.
26 See note 43 supra.
217 See notes 214-266 and accompanying text supra.
266 There is some disagreement over whether a reasonable attorney's fee under the Fees
Awards Act may include compensation not only for an attorney's time but for associated
costs. The legislative history of the Fees Awards Act contains a statement by a member of
the Committee on the Judiciary that "the phrase 'attorney's fee' would include the value of
the legal services provided by counsel, including all necessary expenses incurred in furnishing effective and competent representation." 122 CONG. REC. H12, 160 (daily ed. Oct. 1,
1976). Accordingly, some courts have held that a reasonable fee award includes such costs
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of these provisions, however, purport to define what is meant by
the term "reasonable. 216 9 Since trial judges are best equipped to
weigh the numerous factors that bear upon the calculation of a
reasonable fee award, they are accorded broad discretion in performing this task.
In the past, however, the lower courts freand disbursements as travel expenses, lodging expenses, and long-distance telephone calls.
See, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606 n.11 (5th Cir. 1974); Dunten v.
Kibler, 518 F. Supp 1146, 1152 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F.
Supp. 442, 454-55 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Population Servs. Int'l v. Carey, 476 F. Supp. 4, 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F. Supp. 1201, 1205 (E.D. La. 1974); James
v. Beaufort County Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 711, 720 (E.D.N.C. 1971), aff'd, 465 F.2d 477
(4th Cir. 1972); cf. McPherson v. School Dist. No. 1986, 465 F. Supp. 749, 758 (S.D. Ill.
1978) (commuting time compensable at two-thirds of approved hourly rate); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 439 F. Supp. 393, 409 (D. Colo. 1979) (commuting time of half hourly rate
permitted). Contra, NAACP v. Bell, 448 F. Supp. 1164, 1168 (D.D.C. 1978) ("[h]ourly compensation for travel hours, above and beyond expenses is inappropriate"), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. NAACP v. Civilletti, 609 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
922 (1980); cf. Entertainment Concepts, III, Inc., v. Maciejewski, 514 F. Supp. 1378, 1381-82
(commuting time compensable at reduced rate, but hotel expenses, air travel, air freight,
parking, and long-distance telephone calls not compensable).
1'9Three statutes attempt to guide the court in its calculation of a reasonable attorney's fee. See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2059(e)(4) (1976); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1619 (1976); Natural
Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1976). The Consumer Product Safety Act
provides:
[A] reasonable attorney's fee is a fee (A) which is based upon (i) the actual time
expended by an attorney in providing advice and other legal services in connection
with representing a person in an action brought under this subsection, and (ii)
such reasonable expenses as may be incurred by the attorney in the provision of
such services, and (B) which is computed at the rate prevailing for the provision of
similar services with respect to actions brought in the court which is awarding
such fee.
15 U.S.C. 2059(e)(4) (1976). The Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act contains a provision which
is substantially the same. 49 U.S.C. § 1686(e) (1976). Similarly, the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act provides:
The amount allowed for services shall be based on the nature of the service rendered, the time and labor required, the need for providing the service, whether the
service was intended to be a voluntary public service or compensable, the existence of a bona fide attorney-client relationship with an identified client, and the
relationship of the service rendered to the enactment of proposed legislation. The
amount allowed shall not be controlled by an hourly charge customarily charged
by the claimant.
43 U.S.C. § 1619(d)(2) (1976).
270 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716-17 (5th Cir.
1974). The standard for review of lower court fee awards is whether the district court
abused its discretion. See, e.g., O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 370 (9th Cir.
1981); Gluck v. American Protection Indus., Inc., 619 F.2d 30, 32 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974).
There is considerable disagreement whether a district court must hold an evidentiary

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

quently failed to articulate how they ascertained the amount of
fees they awarded.27 1 Consequently, to foster uniformity and permit rational appellate inspection of such judicial discretion, several
courts of appeals have enunciated standards to aid trial courts in

their calculations.272
1.

Johnson Factors

In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,2 73 the Fifth Circuit enunciated twelve factors to be considered in calculating a fee
award: 274 (1) time and labor necessitated; (2) novelty and difficulty
hearing to determine a reasonable attorney's fee, and the fee application hearing has been
characterized by one court as "an informational aid to the court," rather than "an adversarial process." Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 n.16 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Thus, some courts
have adopted the view that when the facts contained in the affidavits and briefs are sufficiently detailed to provide a basis for a fee award, no evidentiary hearing is required. See
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 652 F.2d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1981); Lipscomb v. Wise, 643
F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981); Murphy v. Kolovitz, 635 F.2d 662, 664 (7th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). Other courts, however, have
held that when there is evidence of a factual dispute, an evidentiary hearing is mandated.
See, e.g., King v. McCord, 621 F.2d 205, 206 (5th Cir. 1980); In re First Colonial Corp. of
Am., 544 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); Imprisoned Citizens
Union v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp. 1017, 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Still other courts have held that
when a motion for fees is opposed, a hearing ordinarily should be held. See, e.g., Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970) (fee award under Clayton Act should "as a general rule" be fixed "after hearing evidence"); Kargman v. Sullivan, 589 F.2d 63, 67 (1st Cir.
1978); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448, 473-74 (2d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 1973); Ross v. Saltmarsh, 500 F. Supp.
935, 948 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also Iranian Students Ass'n v. Sawyer, 639 F.2d 1160,
1163-64 (5th Cir. 1981) (following mooting of suit because of tender of relief sought, it was
error to deny defendants a hearing on the merits in order to determine which party was
prevailing party for purposes of fee award).
271 O'Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1981); Altman v. Central
of Georgia Ry., 580 F.2d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526
F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d
106, 111 (5th Cir. 1975); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473-74 (2d Cir.
1974); see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
170 (3d Cir. 1973); see, e.g., Bunn v. Central Realty, 592 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1300-01 (5th Cir. 1978).
'2 See notes 338-356, 313-319 and accompanying text infra.
273 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
2174Id. at 717-19. In Johnson, the district court had awarded the prevailing plaintiffs
less than one-half of the attorney's fees requested. Expressing no opinion as to the validity
of the award, id. at 720, the Fifth Circuit held that the lower court's failure to set forth its
reasons for awarding a reduced fee effectively precluded meaningful appellate review of the
adequacy of the fee, and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. Instructing the district
court to reexamine its fee award, the court listed twelve factors to be considered in making
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of the case; (3) quality of the legal representation; (4) counsel's inability to take on other employment; (5) comparable fees for similar work; (6) the presence of a fixed or contingency fee arrangement measuring counsel's fee expectations; (7) time restrictions;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) experience,
reputation, and ability of counsel; (10) undesirability of the litigation; (11) nature and length of counsel's professional relationship
with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.2 7 5 Although the
Johnson case arose under the fee-shifting provisions of Title VII,
its twelve factor test has been applied in a variety of contexts"' in
2
every federal circuit.
such determination. Id. at 716-19. Notably, the twelve Johnson factors appear to be derived
from and are virtually identical to the guidelines of the American Bar Association, which are
set out in Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See In re
Permian Anchor Servs., Inc., 649 F.2d 763, 768 (10th Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d
577, 579 (7th Cir. 1980) (ABA guidelines are the pertinent factors to be considered in determining a reasonable attorney's fee under Fees Awards Act). For a detailed analysis of the
Johnson factors as applied in civil rights litigation, see Comment, Calculationof a Reasonable Award of Attorneys' Fees Under the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 13 J. MAP.
L. REv. 331, 346-76 (1980).
27 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974). The first Johnson factor-time and labor required-has been held to contemplate several types of activity. Indeed, the Johnson Court
itself distinguished between three categories of labor: (1) legal activity, including research,
writing, and court appearances; (2) activities related to legal practice, including conferences
and telephone calls; and (3) routine administrative activities unrelated to the law, including
travel time, lerical work, and the compilation of statistics. Id. at 717. Accordingly, the
courts have held that the cost of paralegal assistance may be included in a fee award. See,
e.g., Dietrich Corp. v. King Resources Co., 596 F.2d 422, 426-27 (10th Cir. 1979); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 545 F.2d 1176, 1182
(9th Cir. 1976). Other litigation expenses, such as secretarial costs, copying, and telephone
bills, may also be included in an award. See Wheeler v. Durham City Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d
618, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1978); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 607 n.17 (5th Cir. 1974).
278 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1980) (Fees Awards
Act); Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappij Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1281 n.10 (5th Cir.
1978) (Longshoreman's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1976));
Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721, 725 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (Motor Vehicle
Information & Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1989 (1976)); Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577
F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978) (Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640(a)(3) (1976)); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 501(b) (1976)); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. 507, 511-12 (W.D. Mo. 1978)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976)); Computer Statistics, Inc. v. -Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1349 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976)).
277 See, e.g., Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 509 (8th Cir. 1980); Allen v. United
States, 606 F.2d 432, 435-36 (4th Cir. 1979); Hampton v. Hanarahan, 600 F.2d 600, 643 (7th
Cir. 1979), modified, 446 U.S. 754 (1980); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 782 (10th Cir.
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Even the Johnson court conceded, however, that its list of
criteria could not "reduce the calculation of a reasonable fee to
mathematical precision." 278 Indeed, it has been noted that the
extreme amount of discretion and subjectivity permitted by this
approach renders it an impracticable means of ensuring uniform
fee awards.27 9 Nevertheless, the First,28 0 Fourth, 28 1 Fifth,28

2

and

1979); Prate v. Freedman, 583 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1978); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645,
647 (1st Cir. 1978); Fountila v. Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Sheraton
Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Snyder, 470 F. Supp. 972, 974
(N.D. Ohio. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981); White v. Beal, 447 F. Supp. 788, 796
(E.D. Pa. 1978).
278 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1974).
279 Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1981); see Copeland v. Marshall, 641
F.2d 880, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 642-43 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470 (2d
Cir. 1974); Berger, supra note 6, at 286-87; Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in
Public Interest Litigation, 88 H-Rv. L. REv. 849, 927 & n.327 (1975); Note, Promoting the
Vindication of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, supra note 35, at
372-73 & nn.164-69. Commonly articulated criticisms are that the twelve factors overlap
considerably, see, e.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d at 642, that they are imprecise, see, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d at 890, and that they are difficult to quantify,
see, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d at 249. Moreover, scholars have commented upon the
failure of the Johnson approach to further rational and consistent fee adjudications. For
example, one commentator has observed:
The fundamental problems with an approach that does no more than assure
the lower courts will consider a plethora of conflicting and at least partially redundant factors is that it provides no analytical framework for their application. It
offers no guidance on the relative importance of each factor, whether they are to
be applied differently in different contexts, or, indeed, how they are to be applied
at all.
Berger, supra note 6, at 286-87; accord, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470
(2d Cir. 1974) (listing of factors constitutes "a conceptual amalgam... so extensive and
ponderous that it is probably not employed in any precise way by those courts espousing
adherence to it").
The Fifth Circuit has attempted in recent years to furnish more guidance for the application of its Johnson factors. In In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977), the court suggested that a trial judge first should
ascertain from a statement of hours worked "the nature and extent of the services supplied
by the attorney." Id. at 1299. Thereafter, according to the Fifth Circuit, the trial court
should determine the customary hourly rate of compensation and multiply the number of
hours reasonably expended by the normal hourly rate to ascertain an initial sum of reasonable compensation. See id. at 1300. The above steps encompass the first and fifth Johnson
factors. Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 249 (4th Cir. 1981). Finally, the Fifth Circuit has
indicated that the trial court should adjust the fee on the basis of the remaining Johnson
factors, and should explain the role of each such factor. 544 F.2d at 1300. See generally
Johnson & Blackburn, First Colonial: The Fifth Circuit Makes a Definitive Statement on
the Award of Attorneys' Fees in Bankruptcy, 24 Loy. L. Rav. 189 (1978); see also Cooper
Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 624 F.2d 575, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit also
has directed the district courts to pay particular attention to the eighth Johnson factor-the amount involved and the results obtained-and the ninth Johnson factor-the ex-
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Tenth2 8 3 Circuits continue to apply the bare Johnson guidelines,
although several of such circuits also have held that the failure of a
trial court to discuss each element of these guidelines constitutes
an abuse of discretion.2 84 Recognizing the problems posed by the
lack of a cohesive analytical method for application of the Johnson
factors, other courts have searched for a standard to serve as a
framework for structuring the deliberations of trial courts.2 8 5
perience, reputation and ability of counsel. 624 F.2d at 583. In addition, the circuit court has
stated that lawyers who accept civil rights cases on a contingency fee basis "are entitled to
be paid more when successful than those who are assured of compensation regardless of
result." Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
280 See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598, 600-01 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 839 (1980); Reynolds v. Coomey, 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978); King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-28 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
281 See, e.g., Anderson v. Morris, 658 F.2d 246, 248-49 (4th Cir. 1981); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978). The Anderson
court held that it was impermissible for the district court to reduce a fee award because of
the attractiveness of the case and the publicity that it had received. 658 F.2d at 248. The
court observed that such an approach not only would be inconsistent with the Johnson
guidelines but would fail to satisfy the mandate of the Fees Awards Act that lawyers are to
be paid "as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, 'for all time
reasonably expended on a matter.'" Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
6, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5908, 5913).
282 See, e.g., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 643
F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Holmes v. Oxford Chems., Inc., 510 F. Supp.
915, 919 (M.D. Ala. 1981); Engle v. A.C. Ellis Corp., 509 F. Supp. 630, 637-39 (S.D. Tex.
1980).
283 See, e.g., Matter of Permian Anchor Servs., Inc., 649 F.2d 763, 768 (10th Cir. 1981);
Salone v. United States, 645 F.2d 875, 879 (10th Cir. 1981); Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d
251, 258 (10th Cir. 1980).
284 See, e.g., Bustamante v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d 360, 365 (5th Cir.
1980); McGowan v. King, Inc., 616 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1980); Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v.
Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980); Allen v. United States, 606 F.2d 432, 435-36
(4th Cir. 1979); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 934 (1978); In re Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1298-99 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977); Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 188 (D.C. Cir.
1974). Although the circuit courts typically reverse and remand a case with appropriate instructions when the trial court has abused its discretion by failing to apply the Johnson
guidelines, see, e.g., O'Neill v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1981), the
appellate courts have, on occasion, fixed the fee themselves in order to avoid further litigation and concomitant fee awards, see, e.g., Morrow v. Finch, 642 F.2d 823, 824-25 (5th Cir.
1981).
28 See notes 286-291, 313-319 and accompanying text infra. A novel approach to fee
calculation, combining a cost-plus-profit formula with the Johnson factors, enjoyed a brief
tenure in the D.C. Circuit, following its creation in Copeland v. Marshall, 594 F.2d 244, 251
(D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated, No. 77-1351, slip op. (June 29, 1979). On rehearing en banc, however, the Copeland court rejected the cost-plus-profit formula in favor of a "lodestar" approach. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 908 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); see notes 286291 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the lodestar approach.
The cost-plus-profit standard had favored "a principle of reimbursement to a firm for
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Lindy Lodestar Test

In an effort to provide a clear and objective method for calculating reasonable attorney's fees, the Third Circuit, in Lindy Bros.
Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 2 86 espoused a two-step analysis. Under this approach, the
trial court first must calculate the number of compensable hours
that reasonably were spent by counsel to produce the successful
litigation.2 8 7 The number of hours is then multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate for the .attorney's services in order to generate a

"lodestar" figure. 88 After this objective foundation has been laid,
the court may adjust the "lodestar" figure 28 9 to reflect two subjective factors: the contingent nature of success, 290 and the quality of
its costs, plus a reasonable and controllable margin for profit." 594 F.2d at 251 (emphasis
added). This formula required a court to determine, at the outset, the salary, overhead
costs, and return of profit to both partners and associates. Id. at 251-52. Because they reflected the "usual" compensation that a firm would receive from its commercial clients,
these figures were adjusted in accordance with the Johnson factors to determine what a firm
"should" receive in civil rights litigation. Id. 250-51.
The cost-plus-profit approach was rejected by the en bane Copeland court for several
reasons. First, the court observed that the test posed considerable administrative difficulties.
641 F.2d at 896. The problems associated with allocation of overhead costs, calculation of
costs associated with "imputed salaries" of firm partners, and the determination of a "reasonable" profit raised "the specter of a monumental inquiry on an issue wholly ancillary to
the substance of the lawsuit." Id. Second, the court reasoned that the cost-plus-profit standard was "fundamentally inconsistent" with the congressional purpose behind statutory feeshifting, id. at 897, and observed that Congress, in passing the Fees Awards Act, had understood and noted with approval that in the Title VII contest the appropriate standard was a
"market value" approach. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 6). Finally, the
court noted that there was no evidence in the earlier panel opinions explaining why, in the
typical case, rates established by market pressures would in fact differ from those achieved
through the cost-plus-profit computation. Id. at 898.
'8 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lindy I); see 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lindy II).
2 487 F.2d at 167; see notes 292-307 and accompanying text infra. The Lindy court
stated that, in arriving at the number of compensable hours, the trial court must distinguish
between different kinds of legal activities, such as pretrial discovery or settlement negotiations, and between the different classes of attorneys, such as senior partners or junior associates. 487 F.2d at 167.
'8s487 F.2d at 167-68. In determining the hourly rate, the Lindy court suggested using
the attorney's normal billing rate since it is indicative of his legal reputation and statuA. Id.
at 167.
289 See, e.g., International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d
1255, 1276 (8th Cir.) (multiplier of 1.5, based upon the contingency nature and quality of
the work, held excessive), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1063 (1980); Walker v. Robbins Hose Co.
No. 1., 622 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir. 1980) (no increase on lodestar figure based upon contingency nature of case because attorneys undertook cause of action on a pro bono 'basis);
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 966 JE.D. Pa. 1980) (20% increase in
lodestar figure in recognition of excellent quality of attorney's services).
200 The Lindy court provided detailed guidance for evaluating whether the contingent
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the attorney's work.291
Unfortunately, the calculation of "reasonable number of compensable hours" and "reasonable hourly rate," the components of
the lodestar figure, cannot perfunctorily be performed. Rather, numerous factors must be assessed in divining both figures. One such
factor, impacting upon the determination of compensable hours,
involves the means whereby the amount of time devoted by an attorney to his client's case may be ascertained. For instance, in
cases involving attorneys who have not maintained contemporaneous hourly records, the courts generally have sanctioned the reconstruction of such records.292 Frequently, however, a penalty is imnature of success warrants an increase in the lodestar figure. In this regard, the court indicated that the trial court should evaluate the plaintiff's burden, the risks assumed by the
attorney in developing the case, and the delay in receipt of payment for services rendered.
540 F.2d at 117. The Lindy court further noted that an adequate analysis of the plaintiff's
burden would, in turn, necessitate consideration of the legal and factual complexity of the
case, the probability of the defendant's liability, taking into account the novelty of the
claims asserted, and the likelihood of establishing the damages claimed. Id.
An adequate analysis of the attorney's risks, observed the court, would entail consideration of the number of attorney hours risked without guarantee of recompense, the amount
of out-of-pocket expenses advanced for litigation costs, and the development of any prior
special legal expertise in the type of litigation involved in the instant case. Id. The Lindy
court contended that the last of these considerations is important because it may assist the
court in "efficient conduct of the litigation, or. . . in articulating legal precepts and implementing sound public policy." Id.
291 The quality of an attorney's representation, declared the Lindy court, may be considered in the nature of "a bonus or penalty," the entitlement to which must be established
by the movant, with any increase or decrease in fees reflecting an unusual degree of skill or
lack thereof. Id at 118. More particularly, the court observed, the professionalism of the
legal techniques employed by counsel should be evaluated; efficiency should be rewarded;
and dilatoriness penalized. Id. In addition, the Lindy court suggested that the district court
consider the result obtained in the litigation in terms of the potential relief available at the
outset. Id. Finally, the court stated that the numerous considerations involved in the assessment of a fee award must be fully explained by the district court so as to permit meaningful
appellate review. Id. at 117-18.
Interestingly, a strong argument can be made for the proposition that the Johnson approach, as it has developed in subsequent Fifth Circuit opinions, is really not far removed
from the Lindy standard. See Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 521 F. Supp. 297, 302-03 (M.D.
Fla. 1981); note 279 supra. It is interesting that Dowdell, which applied the Third Circuit's
lodestar approach, was decided in Florida, previously part of the Fifth Circuit, but since
October 1, 1981, now subsumed within the newly created Eleventh Circuit. Dowdell appears
to be a departure from existing Fifth Circuit law, which perhaps sub silentio, see note 279
and accompanying text supra, but certainly never expressly, had adopted the lodestar approach. Thus, it may perhaps be viewed as an example of prompt judicial muscle-flexing
designed to gauge the temper of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit regarding the
appropriate standard for calculating a reasonable fee award.
292 See, e.g., Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 761-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Vaughn v.
Trotter, 516 F. Supp. 902, 903-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
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posed for this omission, presumably to encourage the legal
profession to maintain accurate and complete contemporaneous
time records. 9 3
Even when an attorney has complete contemporaneous
records, the computation of "compensable hours" may nevertheless
be complicated by the number of parties participating in the litigation. Instances of multiparty litigation are numerous, and, because
each such situation is factually unique, the courts appear to have
confronted them on a sui generis basis. Thus, when multiple defendants are involved in a case, a court may prorate the fee award to
distribute equitably the number of hours spent litigating the
claims against each defendant. In Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Center, Inc.,2 94 for example, the court held that a nonsettling
defendant is liable for an equitable portion of the plaintiff's legal
fees incurred from commencement of the suit until settlement.29 51
In addition, the court held that the nonsettling defendant should
bear all attorney's fees incurred as a result of the trial in which he
was the sole defendant.29 6 In another case in which the court was
unable to allocate the time spent on legal issues involving multiple
defendants because of the complexity of the issues, it held that it
could, in its discretion, impose fees upon fewer than all of the defendants.29 7 In still other cases involving multiple attorneys, the
district courts generally have held that they may, in their discretion, reduce the number of compensable hours to compensate for
overstaffing or for the unnecessary duplication of counsels' efforts. 298 Notably, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a novel approach
293 See, e.g., Ross v. Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (10% penalty for
total reconstruction); Heigler v. Gatter, 463 F. Supp. 802, 803-04 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (20% penalty imposed); Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(10% penalty imposed), aff'd mem., 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978).
291 482 F. Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
295 Id. at 928.
296

Id.

Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir.
1974); Steinberg v. Carey, 470 F. Supp. 471, 478-79 & n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Stanford Daily
v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); cf.
Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 225-26 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (triple-billing for appearances at
deposition and at preliminary injunction hearing duplicative and requires fee reduction of
297

298

billable hours); Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 518 F. Supp. 1, 5-6 (N.D. Ind.
1980) (duplication of attorney effort evident when case was not complex and involved no
novel legal issues or extensive trial work, but rather simple motion practice). But see Ross v.
Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (when alleged duplication of attorney time

was necessitated by division of responsibility for substantive legal tasks, fee award reduction
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for dealing with the problem of duplication of attorney services. In
9 the circuit court stated that
Northcross v. Board of Education,1
"[iln complicated cases, involving many lawyers, we have approved
the arbitrary but essentially fair approach of simply deducting a
small percentage of the total hours to eliminate duplication of services." 30 0 Such an approach, suggested Senior Judge Peck, was
preferable to "pick[ing] out, here and there, the hours which were
duplicative. 0 1
There are, of course, many other factors and rules to be considered in computing compensable hours. In not all instances,
moreover, are the courts in accord. On the one hand, the courts
generally agree that attorney's fees may be granted to successful
litigants for services rendered on appeal.320 Moreover, the time
spent in litigating entitlement to a fee award and expended in
preparation of the fee application typically is deemed to be compensable when fees are statutorily authorized. 0 3 On the other
would be inappropriate); Stenson v. Blum, 512 F. Supp. 680, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
290 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980).
300 611 F.2d at 636-37.
301 Id.
at 637; accord, Hickman v. Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 513 F. Supp.
659, 663 (S.D. Ohio 1981). Interestingly, in the narrow context of the counsel fee provision
of the Truth In Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1976), which provides for an award
of attorney's fees "to enforce the foregoing liability," the Fifth Circuit has held that attorney time spent in defending against a compulsory counterclaim is not compensable. Lacy v.
General Finance Corp., 651 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1981). In Lacy, the Fifth Circuit
gave a relatively narrow reading to the term "foregoing liability." The court reasoned that
since that term refers to claims established by the TILA, and since a plaintiff is not enforcing a TILA liability when defending against a state law compulsory counterclaim on the
underlying debt, Congress did not intend to compensate time expended in defending against
compulsory counterclaims. Id. at 1029.
302 See, e.g., Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir.
1981) (Fees Awards Act); Ford v. New York Cent. Teamsters Pension Fund, 642 F.2d 664,
665 (2d Cir. 1981) (ERISA); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 1981); Suzuki
v. Yuen, 507 F. Supp. 819, 824 (D. Hawaii 1981); Richerson v. Jones, 506 F. Supp. 1259,
1263-64 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Title VII); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1273
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (Clayton Act).
303 See, e.g., Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 802-03 (7th Cir. 1981); Bagby v. Beal, 606
F.2d 411, 416 (3d Cir. 1979); Weisenberger v. Huecker, 593 F.2d 49, 53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 880 (1979); Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1978); Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978); Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st
Cir. 1977); Bradford v. Blum, 507 F. Supp. 526, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Bolden v. Pennsylvania
State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1980). But see Boe v. Colello, 447 F. Supp. 607,
610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Kulkarni v. Nyquist, 446 F. Supp. 1274, 1281 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). See
generally The Second Circuit Review-1978-79 Term, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act: Expansion and Contraction,46 BROoKLYN L. REv. 865, 870-71 n.26 (1980). In
Prandini,the court explained the policy considerations favoring compensation for time
spent preparing a fee application as follows:
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hand, there is a split of authority in the circuits concerning the
extent to which hours expended on unsuccessful claims should be
compensated in the fee award. Under one view, a prevailing party
may recover fees only for the preparation and presentaton of those
claims upon which he had prevailed .3" Another view, however,
posits that, absent assertion of a frivolous claim, a plaintiff who
had prevailed on the case as a whole is entitled to recover fees for
all time reasonably expended by his attorney 05 This liberal approach is premised, at least in part, upon a desire to encourage
attorneys to take, in good faith, the most advantageous position
possible on their clients' behalf.30 6 Interestingly, there is yet a third
view concerning whether and to what extent hours devoted to litigating unsuccessful claims may be compensated. Such approach

holds that a fee reduction for unsuccessful claims is not appropriate when the claims were "part and parcel" of one matter, but is
' 30 7
appropriate when the claims asserted "are truly fractionable.
Of course, once the number of compensable hours has been
determined, the second component of the lodestar figure-the reaIf an attorney is required to expend time litigating his fee claim, yet may not be
compensated for that time, the attorney's effective rate for all the hours expended
on the case will be correspondingly decreased. Recognizing this fact, attorneys
may become wary about taking Title VII cases, civil rights cases, or other cases for
which attorneys' fees are statutorily authorized. Such a result would not comport
with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, viz., the encouragement of attorneys to represent indigent clients and to act as private attorneys
general in vindicating congressional policies.
585 F.2d at 530.
11 Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509, 522 (7th Cir. 1981); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577,
580 (7th Cir. 1980); Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 487 (3d Cir. 1978); Skomorucha v.
Wilmington Hous. Auth., 518 F. Supp. 657, 658-59 (D. Del. 1981); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n v. Commonwealth of Pa., 508 F. Supp. 567, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Greater St. Louis
Health Sys. Agency v. Teasdale, 506 F. Supp. 23, 42 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
-15Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 911 (1980); accord, Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 655 F.2d 848, 872 (8th Cir.
1981); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 508 F. Supp. 171, 172 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Suzuki v.
Yuen, 507 F. Supp. 819, 824 (D. Hawaii 1981); Mader v. Crowell, 506 F. Supp. 484, 487
(M.D. Tenn. 1981); Croushorn v. Board of Trustees, 518 F. Supp. 9, 44 (M.D. Tenn. 1980);
Brady v. Washington County, 509 F. Supp. 538, 542-43 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
"0I Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d at 636.
307 Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F. 2d 880, 892 n.18; (D.C. Cir. 1980); Church of
Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1291 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364, 1382 (5th Cir. 1981) (court must consider relationship of claims that resulted in judgment with claims that were rejected and contribution, if any, made to success by investigation and prosecution of entire case); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 610 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir.
1979); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 521 F. Supp. 297, 300-02 (M.D. Fla. 1981); Blake v. Hoston, 513 F. Supp. 663, 664-66 (D.D.C. 1981).
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sonable hourly rate-must be assessed. Again, as with the determination of compensable hours, the specifics involved in ascertaining
a reasonable hourly rate are the subject of some controversy. Generally, in calculating a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney's services, the courts use an "historic," or contemporaneous time figure,
which compensates the attorney at a rate that would have been
reasonable at the time his services were rendered.30 8 Nevertheless,
in an effort to take into account delay in payment in cases in which
services had been rendered over a long period of time, several
courts have inserted "current" rates into the hourly rate equation.309 Still other courts continue to use the historic rate, but have
increased the contingency multiplier to compensate for inflation.310
The determination of a reasonable hourly rate for attorney
compensation also is dependent upon the status of the person
whose time is being charged to the plaintiff. Thus, the courts have
held that the work product of secretaries, paralegals, and law student interns does not warrant the same rate of compensation as
that of an attorney." The courts also have recognized a difference
between in-court and out-of-court time, and have compensated the
former at a higher rate than the latter. 12
301 See, e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 964 (E.D. Pa. 1980);
Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 481 F. Supp. 776, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
309 See, e.g., Van Germert v. Boeing Co., 516 F. Supp. 412, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 457-58 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Mader v. Crowell, 506 F.
Supp. 484, 487 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). In Mader, the plaintiffs argued that the fee award not
only should be calculated using "current" rates, but should also be adjusted upward to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of current dollars paid for prior work. Id. The
district court rejected that argument, observing that the inflation increase was implicit in
plaintiffs' counsel's current billing rates. Id. Indeed, the court held that to permit a fee
award reflecting more than the attorney's current hourly rate would result in a windfall to
plaintiff's counsel. Id.
310 See, e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 117 (3d Cir. 1976); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 465 F. Supp. 548, 552-53
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Equity Funding Corp of Am. Sec., 438 F. Supp. 1301, 1331 (C.D. Cal.
1977). For a general discussion of the different approaches and relative policy considerations
at issue, see Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
31 See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnel Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 473 (2d Cir. 1974); Ross v.
Saltmarsh, 521 F. Supp. 753, 762-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, Inc., 439
F. Supp. 1054, 1055-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afJ'd, 578 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1978); Blank v. Talley
Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
312 See, e.g., Corpus v. Estelle, 605 F.2d 175, 180 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 919 (1980); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 756 (5th Cir. 1977); Dunten v. Kibler, 518 F.
Supp. 1146, 1152 & n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Langdon v. Drew Mun. Separate School Dist., 512
F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (N.D. Miss. 1981). The Langdon court relied in part upon the fact that
Congress, in the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976), had seen fit to
compensate in-court time at $30 an hour, one-third more than the $20 an hour awarded for

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

Irrespective of the difficulties inherent in applying the Lindy
lodestar test, and although the test was developed in the context of
common fund cases, the Lindy standard has been deemed useful in
determining fee awards pursuant to several federal statutes.3 13 Indeed, the need for a coherent framework within which to evaluate
reasonable fee awards is such that the Third Circuit's lodestar approach has been seized upon and applied to federal statutory fee
provisions by courts in the Second,31 4 Seventh,3 15 Eighth,3 6
Ninth, 31 7 and District of Columbia Circuits.3 1 8 Notably, some deciout-of-court time. See 512 F. Supp. at 1139. The CJA governs fee awards to attorneys of
indigent criminal defendants. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1976). It has been held to be an abuse
of discretion for a district court to consider the CJA rates when determining a reasonable
attorney's fee under the Fees Awards Act. See Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 793 (10th Cir.
1980).
"' See, e.g., Walker v. Robbins Hose Co. No. 1., Inc., 622 F.2d 692, 693 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)); Prandini v.
National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir. 1978) (Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(k), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976)); Pitchford Scientific Instruments Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F.
Supp. 1175, 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), aff'd, 582 F.2d
1275, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979); Keca Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F.
Supp. 72, 74 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976)).
M4 The Lindy standard was adopted by the Second Circuit in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 470-73 (2d Cir. 1974) (Grinnell I) and City of Detroit v. Grinnell
Corp., 560 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir. 1977) (Grinnell II). It has since consistently been applied by lower courts in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Northeastern Tel. Co. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 497 F. Supp. 230, 251 (D. Conn. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 651 F.2d 76 (2d
Cir. 1981); Beech Cinema, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 480 F. Supp. 1195,
1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 1106 (2d Cir. 1980). Moreover, the Second Circuit has
supplemented the Lindy standard by urging trial judges to consider the relative wealth of
the parties and, in the case of a potential fee award to a defendant, the vindictiveness or
good faith of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action. See, e.g., Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of
Police Comm'rs., 638 F.2d 496, 505 (2d Cir. 1980); Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d
1025, 1028 (2d Cir. 1979); Thomas v. Board of Educ., 505 F. Supp. 102, 104 (N.D.N.Y. 1981);
Fisher v. Fashion Inst. of Technology, 491 F. Supp. 879, 888 (S.D.N.Y 1980).
3,1 To date the Seventh Circuit has not adopted any uniform approach to fee awards.
Nevertheless, several district courts within that circuit have used the Lindy standard. See,
e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 442, 450 (N.D. Ind. 1981); Boggess v. Hogan,
410 F. Supp. 443, 445 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 63 F.R.D.
684, 690-91 (N.D. IM.1974). See also In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 84 F.R.D.
245, 255-63 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (comprehensive summary of the law and history of attorney's fee
awards in the Seventh Circuit).
311 The Eighth Circuit has applied the Lindy standard to fee awards in antitrust cases.
See, e.g., International Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1274
(8th Cir. 1980); Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975). Interestingly, however, the circuit court apparently favors
the Johnson factors outside of the antitrust context. See, e.g., Harneed v. Ornamental Iron
Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 523 (8th Cir. 1980); Brown v. Bathke, 588 F.2d 634, 637
(8th Cir. 1978).
317 Historically, the Ninth Circuit has applied the Johnson factors. See, e.g., Fountila v.
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sions have gone so far as to permit "a post-Lindy discretionary adjustment," so as to further the "important substantive purposes"
of the particular statutory provision under consideration. 1

IV. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES AND OFFICERS:

THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINES

The discretionary nature of fee awards demonstrates that a
party who prevails in an action is not necessarily entitled to recover attorney's fees. Even when fees are otherwise recoverable,
however, an award may be denied when the adverse party is a governmental body or officer. Such is the nature of the various immunity doctrines which have developed under the common law and
through constitutional amendment. The central inquiry in cases
involving the government, therefore, is whether there has been a
waiver of the immunity doctrine precluding fee recovery. This section of the Note first will describe the Equal Access to Justice Act,
a broad waiver of the federal government's immunity from fee
shifting. The Note then will discuss the question whether fees are
recoverable from state governments despite the immunity accorded
them by the eleventh amendment. Finally, the Note will consider
the extent to which the common law insulates legislators and officers of the judiciary from fee shifting.
Carter, 571 F.2d 487, 496 (9th Cir. 1978); Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). Nevertheless, while the circuit court has
not adopted definitively the Lindy standard, a panel of the court in Brandenburger v.
Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 890 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974), suggested in dictum that the district court,
on remand, might consider the factors listed in Lindy L Accordingly, a number of lower
courts in the Ninth Circuit have employed the lodestar approach. See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1270-71 & n.11 (N.D. Cal. 1979); In re Equity Funding
Corp. of Am. See., 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1326-27 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Lockheed Minority Solidarity Coalition v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 406 F. Supp. 828, 831 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
311 Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 890-94 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc); Davis v.
Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 61, 65-66 (D.D.C. 1981); see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
311 Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 492 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J., concurring); See, e.g.,
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 491 F. Supp. 958, 966 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (30% increase in
lodestar figure because of the "tangible benefits flowing directly to the citizenry" in response
to plaintiff's civil rights desegregation cause of action); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 1263, 1270, 1278-79 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (25% decrease in lodestar figure because nominal nature of damages recovered outweighed plaintiff's establishment of novel and potentially significant principle of law); National Ass'n of Regional Medical Programs, Inc. v.
Weinberger, 396 F. Supp. 842, 851 (D.D.C. 1975) (100% incentive bonus in accordance with
considerable public benefit of the litigation), rev'd, 551 F.2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). See also Mary & Crystal v. Ramsden, 635 F.2d 590, 601-03 (7th
Cir. 1980) (40% reduction in fee award by trial judge to bring total compensation into more
reasonable relation with nominal monetary recovery not an abuse of discretion).
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Fee Awards Against the United States

The doctrine of sovereign immunity 2 0 consistently has been
construed to prohibit the assessment of costs or attorney's fees
against the United States absent explicit congressional authorization. 21 In 1948, Congress partially waived this immunity by pro320 The precise origin of the sovereign immunity of the federal government has not been
established. One theory is that the doctrine originated in the English common-law belief
that "the King can do no wrong." See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950);
cf. Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) (federal immunity
may be derived from the Crown's immunities). One interpretation of this phrase was that
the sovereign was incapable of committing a wrong. See I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
239, 241-42. See also 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.01, at 436 (1958).
Other authorities, however, have contended that the phrase was an exhortation to the monarch "as the foundation of justice and equity ... not [to] refuse to redress wrongs when
petitioned to do so by his subjects." 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 8 (3d
ed. 1944); see Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1963). The other theory concerning federal immunity originally was espoused
by Justice Holmes, who stated that "there can be no legal right as against the authority on
which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). In
Kawananakoa, Justice Holmes considered this a "logical and practical" ground for upholding a sovereign's immunity. 205 U.S. at 353.
Commentators have asserted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an unwarranted
extension of English principles, see, e.g., Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in
Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747, 748 (1934), and is ill-suited to the
American democratic system, see, e.g., Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Jaffe, supra, at 4. In Great Northern,Justice Frankfurter declared that sovereign immunity "undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic
notions of the moral responsibility of the State." 322 U.S. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
It has been asserted that since the concept of sovereign immunity was based upon the
King's status as a "unitary sovereign," the doctrine is inapposite in the United States since
the American political system does not confer unitary sovereignty upon any of the three
branches of government. Jaffe, supra, at 45. See generally Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory"JudicialReview: Sovereign Immunity, IndispensableParties,Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1484-93 (1962); Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of FederalAdministrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject
Matter Jurisdiction,and PartiesDefendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 396-435 (1970).
Notwithstanding scholarly criticism of the principle of sovereign immunity, the proposition that the United States may not be sued without its consent remains deeply embedded
in American jurisprudence. See Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451
(1883); 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 20.07 [3], at 20-62 (2d ed. 1948); Armstrong &
Cockrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 327, 331 (1942). In Cunningham, the Supreme Court declared:
It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither a State nor
the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without
their consent, except in the limited class of cases in which a State may be made a
party in the Supreme Court of the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on this court by the Constitution.
109 U.S. at 451.
21 See, e.g., EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (7th
Cir. 1980); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 968-70 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444
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viding for the taxing of costs and various nominal legal fees against
the United States. 22 These provisions have been strictly interpreted to insulate the federal government from all other fee
awards, even in the equitable "bad faith" ' and "common fund or
benefit"3 24 situations. This limitation on fee shifting, coupled with
the expense of appellate practice, often deterred individuals and
small businesses from seeking review of adverse and unreasonable
U.S. 991 (1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1332 (1st
Cir. 1973); Walling v. Norfolk S. Ry., 162 F.2d 95, 96 (4th Cir. 1947). The courts have held,
with respect to the Fees Awards Act, that the federal government is immune from fee
awards. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1002 (1978). It has been suggested that the courts' reluctance to award money judgments
against the United States originates from the principle that "public moneys cannot be paid
out except under an appropriation by Congress." 162 F.2d at 96. But cf. Red School House,
Inc. v. Office of Economic Opportunity, 386 F. Supp. 1177, 1196-98 (D. Minn. 1974) (court
awarded attorney's fees against federal agency upon finding implicit congressional authorization for such fee award).
322 See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); id. § 2412 (1976), amended by Pub. L.
No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980) and 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2412(a) (West Supp. 1981)). Section 2412 provides in part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in
his official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such action.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West Supp. 1981). Section 1920 provides for the recovery of various
nominal legal costs. Id. § 1920 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
223 See, e.g., Gibson v. Davis, 587 F.2d 280, 281 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
905 (1979); Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. General Serv. Admin., 561 F.2d 397, 405 (1st
Cir. 1977); Glover Constr. Co. v. Andrus, 451 F. Supp. 1102, 1110 (E.D. Okla. 1978), af'd,
591 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 446 U.S. 608 (1980). See generally notes 14-22 and
accompanying text supra.
324 See, e.g., American Ass'n of Marriage and Family Counselors, Inc. v. Brown, 593
F.2d 1365, 1369 & n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (dictum); Pealo v. Farmers Home Admin., 562 F.2d
744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally notes 6-13 and accompanying text supra. Courts
have awarded attorney's fees against the government in some common fund situations by
reasoning that when the government is a mere stakeholder of the funds, fee awards do not
deplete the public treasury. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d 82, 84-85 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 869 (1957). In recent cases, however, the "stakeholder" fiction has
been closely scrutinized and frequently discarded. See National Ass'n of Regional Medical
Programs v. Mathews, 551 F.2d 340, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977);
National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Mathews, 546 F.2d 1003,
1007-08 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 954 (1977). The NationalAssociation court,
for example, noted that since the funds involved were "part of ... [a] congressional appropriation" and eventually would lapse back into the federal treasury, they belonged to the
government. 551 F.2d at 343. In National Council, the court viewed the "disposition of...
unexpended funds" as conclusively establishing federal ownership, concluding therefore that
they were insulated from a fee award. 546 F.2d at 1007.
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governmental actions.2 5 Attempting to correct this inequity, Congress enacted the Equal Access to Justice Act (the Act). 2 6
1.

Equal Access to Justice Act

Despite assertions that the Act lacks a solid foundation in
public policy, 32 7 its legislative history clearly indicates that the goal
of the statute is to encourage litigation by private citizens against
the United States.2 s Congress found that if it subjected federal
authorities to judicial scrutiny, private litigants would engage in
the public function of "refining and formulating public policy. '329
The Act was intended to foster such activity by ameliorating the
deterrent effect of burdensome legal fees.33 0 Moreover, by exposing
governmental authorities to liability for fee awards, Congress
endeavored to elicit bureaucratic accountability and to curtail unreasonable regulation and enforcement procedures.3 Two mecha325 E.g.,

CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprintedin [1980] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 5003, 5010 [hereinafter cited as CONF. REP. No. 96-1434]; H.R. REP. No.
96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1980] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4984,
4984 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 96-1418]; 125 CONG. REC. S10,920 (daily ed. July
31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S10,917 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); id. at
S10,915 (remarks of Sen. Dole); id. at S10,914 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
32 Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified in 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980)
and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412 (West Supp. 1981)).
227 See, e.g., Hearings on the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1979, S. 265 Before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judiciary Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Hearings] (statement of Raymond
S. Calamaro).
228 See CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 21; H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra
note 325, at 5-6; S. REP. No. 96-253, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 96-253].
-11 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 10; S.REP. No. 96-253, supra note
328, at 5-6.
332 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 5-6; 125 CONG. REC. S10,916 (daily
ed. July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Domenici); 125 CONG. REC. S10,922 (daily ed. July 31,
1979) (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
-" 125 CONG. REc. S10,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini). Significantly, a proposal to create a system of mandatory minimum fee awards was contemplated as a means of deterring unreasonable agency action and of encouraging suits against
the United States. See 1979 Hearings,supra note 327, at 19 (statement of Jim Zwerg); id. at
43 (comment of Sen. DeConcini); id. at 89 (statement of Jay Dushoff). The suggestion was
rejected, however, for fear that it would have a potentially chilling effect upon legitimate
regulation and enforcement efforts. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 13-14. Another program which had been considered was the funding of citizen participation in agency
proceedings. See 1979 Hearings, supra note 327, at 47-48 (statement of Raymond S.
Calamaro). See generally Lenny, The Case for Funding Citizen Participationin the AdministrativeProcess,28 AD.L. REV. 483, 484-90 (1976); Mogel, Award of Attorneys' Fees in
AdministrativeProceedings-IsIt In The Public Interest?,49 Miss. L.J. 271, 271-84 (1978);
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nisms are employed by the Act in furtherance of the aforementioned objectives. First, the Act partially abrogates federal
immunity from fee shifting by subjecting the United States to all
"common law and statutory exceptions to the American rule." ' 2
Thus, the bad faith 33 and common fund s " doctrines apply in litigation against the United States "to the same extent" that they
apply to private parties.3 3 5 Second, the Act provides that the federal government shall be liable for "fees and other expenses" 3 6
awarded by a court 337 or an adjudicative officer at an adversarial
upon application 3 9 by a prevailing
administrative hearing s
Comment, FundingPublic Participationin Agency Proceedings,27 AM. U.L. REV. 981, 9881010 (1978). For other proposed reforms, see Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
332 Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 202(c)(2), 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
113 See notes 14-22 and accompanying text supra.
3, See notes 6-13 and accompanying text supra.
335 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(b) (West Supp. 1981). The House Committee on the Judiciary
noted that the Act would permit fee awards against the federal government pursuant to all
statutory exceptions to the American rule. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 17.
The Act, therefore, appears to supercede those decisions holding that fee-shifting statutes
do not apply to the United States. See, e.g., NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 518-19 (D.C.
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); cf. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andr6, 622
F.2d 342, 348 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980) (treating the issue as an open question).
'3
Recoverable fees include costs incurred in preparing studies or projects for purposes
of the litigation and the reasonable expenses of expert witnesses, 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A)
(Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1981), although the compensation
of expert witnesses may not exceed the rate paid by the government for its most highly paid
expert. Id. In order to ensure that "each agency [is] accountable for its actions," H.R. REP.
No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 16, and to deter unreasonable governmental action, see, e.g.,
1979 Hearings,supra note 327, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("the most persuasive way to make an agency assume a more reasonable posture is to affect its pocketbook"); 125 CONG. REC. S10,920 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at
S10,923 (remarks of Sen. Bayh), a fee award may be paid out of the budget of the federal
agency involved in the litigation. 5 U.S.C. § 504(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. §
2412(d)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
37 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1981).
...5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The requirement of an adversarial administrative hearing is designed to ensure that the Act will benefit those litigants with "a concrete
interest at stake," but who nevertheless are deterred by the considerable time and expense
involved in pursuing administrative remedies. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 14.
The hearing will be sufficiently adversarial within the meaning of the Act if the administrative agency declares a position, see CoNF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 23, and if the
United States is "represented by counsel or otherwise." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV
1980). Although the statute expressly excludes governmental actions concerning rate fixing
and the granting or renewal of licenses, see id., proceedings which deal with the suspension
or modification of licenses fall within the ambit of the act. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra
note 325, at 15.
'39 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1981).
A party must apply for fees within 30 days of a final disposition. Id. The application must
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party. 3 40 The magnitude of fee recovery in these cases is based
upon prevailing market rates and the nature of the litigation, although the maximum hourly rate is seventy-five dollars,"4 1 subject
show that the applicant is the prevailing party, see note 340 infra, demonstrate that the
financial eligibility requirements for an award are met, see id., and itemize the expenses
sought to be reimbursed. Id. The party must also allege that the government's position was
"not substantially justified." Id. If the government does not oppose the petition, "an award
should generally be made." H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 13, 16.
30 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). The section of the Act permitting awards to
prevailing parties applies to all cases pending on October 1, 1981, or commenced between
that date and October 1, 1984. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, §
204(c), 94 Stat. 2329 (1980). This section is experimental and will be evaluated after its
automatic repealer in 1984. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 16; S. REP'. No. 96253, supra note 328, at 8. The provisions subjecting the United States to fee shifting according to common-law or statutory rules, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1981), are
not subject to the 1984 repealer. See Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(c), 94 Stat. 2329 (1980).
Notably, Congress intended the scope of the prevailing party concept under the Act to
be consistent with judicial interpretations of the phrase under existing fee-shifting statutes.
E.g., CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 21; H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325,
at 11; S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 7. Indeed, congressional committees have specifically adopted many of the theories under which a party may be considered to have prevailed, including favorable settlements, see, e.g., CoNF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at
21; H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 345, at 11 S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 7,
voluntary dismissals, see, e.g., CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 21-22, substantial
victory, see, e.g., id. at 22, and interim awards. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note
325, at 11. For a discussion of these theories in the context of other fee-shifting statutes, see
notes 38-52 & 93-124 and accompanying text supra. Notably, the catalyst approach, see
notes 53-72 and accompanying text supra, has not received express legislative approval in
the context of the Equal Access to Justice Act. It remains to be seen whether this theory
will be adopted in this context through judicial construction.
Regardless of the theory under which victory is claimed, a party seeking to qualify for a
fee award must be (1) an individual whose net worth is not in excess of $1,000,000, (2) a
corporation, partnership, association or sole owner of an unincorporated business whose net
worth is not in excess of $5,000,000, or (3) the sole owner of an unincorporated business, or a
corporation, partnership, association or organization with 500 employees or less. 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). The above criteria must have been met either when the
action was initiated or when the adverse determination occurred. Id.
Interestingly, several spokesmen from both the government and the private sector have
asserted that the net worth figures are inappropriate. See 1979 Hearings,supra note 327, at
53; Equal Access to Justice Act, Hearings on S.265, H.R. 6429 and H.R. 7208 by the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
341 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1981). In determining whether an award exceeds the hourly maximum, only amounts going
toward actual compensation of the attorney are considered. Overhead and incidental expenses are excluded from the calculation. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 15.
Moreover, since prevailing market rates are used to assess the fee, agreements between the
attorney and his client are not considered. Id.; 125 CONG. REc. S10,923 (daily ed. July 31,
1979) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Notably, an argument has been made that the $75 hourly
maximum is prejudicial to lawyers located in major cities. 1979 Hearings,supranote 327, at
88 (statement of Jay Dushoff). Thus, it has been suggested that the prevailing rates within
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to adjustment for special considerations. 42 Fees may not be
awarded, however, upon a governmental showing of substantial
justification for its position, 43 or upon proof of special circum44
stances which would render an award unjust.
each community should be the basis for computing awards under the Act. Id. at 16 (statement of Ed Bolding). Others have proposed the use of multipliers to encourage attorneys to
agree to represent litigants suing under the Act. See id. at 20 (statement of Prof. Winston
D. Woods). See generally notes 289-291 and accompanying text supra.
312 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1981). An award may exceed the $75 hourly maximum when a court finds special justification, such as an "increase in the cost of living" or a "limited availability of qualified attorneys." 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (West Supp.
1981).
113 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp.
1981). The burden of proving substantial justification was placed upon the government primarily because of the "tendency to place the burden of proof on the party who has readier
access to and knowledge of the facts in question." S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 6.
Indeed, the legislators deemed it appropriate to place this burden upon the United States
because it is much easier for the government to demonstrate its own reasonableness than for
a private party to prove arbitrariness. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 10-11.
Although some individuals have interpreted the Act as requiring that substantial justification be presumed to be lacking, see, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. S10,915 (daily ed. July 31, 1979)
(remarks of Sen. Dole); 1979 Hearings, supra note 327, at 49 (statement of Raymond S.
Calamaro), the consensus of opinion is to the contrary, see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 96-1418,
supra note 325, at 11; S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 7; 125 CONG. REc. S10,918
(daily ed. July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Ford).
The "substantial justification" inquiry focuses upon governmental positions and actions
during the course of the proceedings. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 11. In Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 50 U.S.L.W. 2383 (D. Md. Nov. 27, 1981), the
court attempted to discern what is meant by a government's "position." The Alspach petitioners had sought to enjoin the IRS from collecting a tax assessment upon the ground that
the statutory notice requirements were not observed. Id. Shortly thereafter, upon learning
the relevant facts, the government consented to dismissal of the action, and the petitioners
sought attorney's fees. Id. After acknowledging that the Act's legislative history rendered
little assistance, the court determined that Congress' intention "was to extend application of
existing common law and statutory exceptions to the American rule on attorneys' fees to the
Government." Id. Significantly, after noting the similarity between the statute's terminology
and Federal Rule 37(a)(4), the court interpreted the term "position" to mean "the Government's actions or positions in prosecuting or defending litigation, not . . . [the] actions
upon which suit is based." Id. (emphasis added).
34 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (West Supp.
1981). Congress created the special circumstances exception as a "safety valve" to preclude
fee awards when the government has "advanc[ed] in good faith the novel but credible extensions and interpretations of the law that often underlie vigorous enforcement efforts." S.
REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 7; see 125 CONG. REC. S10,923 (daily ed. July 31, 1979)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Another circumstance which may lead to the denial or reduction
of an award is the prevailing party's dilatory conduct. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980);
28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1981).
When an administrative officer determines that fees should he awarded, a party seeking
review of the decision may petition the federal court to which an appeal ordinarily would lie.
5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). Congress provided that such review is discretionary,
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Although the Act's standard of "substantial justification" has
been praised for its susceptibility to judicial interpretation, 3 5 it
also has been denounced as a vague concept which is difficult to
apply. 4 6 It appears both characterizations are accurate. The term

"substantial justification" originated in Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure3 47 as the standard for determining
whether sanctions should be imposed upon parties who have
abused the discovery process.34 8 Thus, numerous courts have ap-

plied and construed the phrase. 49 Judicial interpretation in this
context, however, primarily is based upon the specific facts of
given cases, and a few general rules have been articulated. 50
The legislative history of the Equal Access to Justice Act
is
states that "[t]he test of whether or not a [g]overnment action
3 51
substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness.

It

however, in order "to protect the inundation of the federal courts by routine appeals from
fee determinations." H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 16. Similar concerns motivated Congress to preclude review of a court's denial of leave to appeal. Id. An agency's
decision will be reversed or modified only upon a showing that the adjudicative officer
abused his discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
315 125 CONG. REc. S10,914 (daily ed. July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini).
34'See, e.g., 1979 Hearings,supra note 327, at 10-11 (statement of Michael Hawkins);
id. at 45 (statement of Raymond S. Calamaro); id. at 162 (statement of Federal Maritime
Commission); id. at 165 (statement of the National Labor Relations Board).
347H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 13; 125 CONG. REc. S10,914 (daily ed. July
31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); see FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
"4 FED. R. Civ. P. 37; see, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 90 F.R.D. 613, 620 (N.D. Ill.
1981); White v. Beloginis, 53 F.R.D. 480, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Diminico
& Pallotta, Inc., 23 F.R.D. 143, 144 (D. Mass. 1959).
349The Senate Judiciary Committee's reliance upon judicial construction of the phrase
"substantially justified" in the discovery context is underscored by its rejection of an
amendment which would have substituted the language "reasonably justified." See S. REP.
No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 8.
310 See, e.g., Whitehouse Inv., Ltd. v. Bernstein, 51 F.R.D. 163, 165-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Palma v. Lake Waukomis Dev.Co., 48 F.R.D. 366, 369 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Brunswick Corp. v.
Chrysler Corp., 291 F. Supp. 118, 122 (E.D. Wis. 1968). Although some courts construing
rule 37 have equated substantial justification with "reasonable" justification, see, e.g., SCM
Societa Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112
n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1976), other courts have applied the rule without elaborating upon its meaning. See, e.g., Surg-O-Flex of America, Inc. v. Bergen Brunswig Co., 76 F.R.D. 654, 655 (D.
Conn. 1977); Humphreys Exterminating Co. v. Poulter, 62 F.R.D. 392, 394 (D. Md. 1974);
1973).
Technitrol, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 62 F.R.D. 91, 93 (N.D. Ill.
31 H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 10; accord, CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra
note 325, at 22; S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 348, at 6; 125 CONG. REc. S10,914 (daily ed.
July 31, 1979) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 125 CONG. REc. at S10,918 (remarks of Sen.
Ford); 125 CoNG. REC. at S10,923 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy). Several of the legislators used
the term "reasonableness" synonymously with the phrase "substantial justification." See,
e.g., 125 CONG. REc. at S10,915 (remarks of Sen. Culver); Id. at S10,922 (remarks of Sen.
Bayh); id. at S10,924 (remarks of Sen. Warner).
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seems that a mere absence of bad faith"5 2 will not suffice to demonstrate that the government's position "had a reasonable basis both
in law and fact.

' 35

1

Conversely, a presumption of nonjustification

will not arise from the mere fact that the government lost its
case.354 The legislative history of the Act, however, indicates that a
judgment on the pleadings, a directed verdict, a dismissal of a similar claim in a prior suit,355 or a settlement which materially differs

from the character of the pleadings in nature or amount, 356 may
evince a lack of substantial justification.
It is submitted that all doubts as to the sufficiency of the government's justification for its position should be resolved in favor
of a prevailing plaintiff. Such an approach not only would comport
with Congress' intention that the government have the burden of
proof in this regard,357 but would be in furtherance of the underlying purposes of the Act. 58 In this regard, the courts should not be
overly accommodating of proffered justifications, since such an approach could thwart the Act's goal of encouraging private litigation
against the government. Moreover, a lenient construction of the
substantial justification standard would frustrate the congressional
objective of curtailing unreasonable governmental activities.
B. Fee Awards Against the States
In 1793, the Supreme Court interpreted article III of the Constitution to permit the federal courts to entertain suits between a
state of the union and a citizen of another state. 59 Fearing that
36'

During the hearing preceding passsage of the Act, it was recognized that under the

rule 37 standard of substantial justification, "more than the mere absence of bad motive"
must be shown before sanctions for violating discovery rules can be imposed. See 1979
Hearings, supra note 327, at 49 (statement of Raymond S. Calamaro). At least one individual has likened the Act's requirement of substantial justification to the showing of good
faith necessary to trigger the qualified immunity of government officials. See id. at 22 (statement of Prof. Winston D. Woods). See generally Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975).
353 H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note 325, at 10.
364 Id. at 11; S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 7.
366 CoNF. REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 22; H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, supra note
325, at 11; S. REP. No. 96-253, supra note 328, at 6-7.
356 CONF.

REP. No. 96-1434, supra note 325, at 22.

357See note 343 supra.

11 See notes 329-331 and accompanying text supra.
369 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793). The Chisholm Court felt that
the plain language of article III contemplated the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the
states. Id. at 466-67. Justice Iredell dissented, asserting that the states enjoyed a commonlaw sovereign immunity derived from England, id. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting), and the
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this decision would lead to a compromise of their sovereignty, 8 0
the states proposed and ratified the eleventh amendment, which
provides that the federal judicial power does not extend to suits
against the states.3 1 This century has borne witness to a gradual
erosion of this state immunity. Since it is obvious that an entity
must be subject to suit before the federal courts can award fees,
each limitation of this immunity doctrine bears great significance
to those who seek to recover their legal costs from a state

defendant.
In Ex Parte Young,3 62 the first decision to assail the citadel of
eleventh amendment immunity, the Supreme Court held that suits
involving alleged unconstitutional actions of state officials could be
heard by the federal judiciary.3 3 The Court based its holding upon
people of the state. Id. at 448 (Iredell, J., dissenting). He concluded, therefore, that a state is
not subject to suit absent its consent or a specific congressional provision to the contrary.
Id. at 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Commentators have noted that it is uncertain whether the
framers of the Constitution really intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
Comment, Suits Against State Officials: Attorney's Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 53
TEx. L. REV. 85, 86 & n.7 (1974) [hereinafter cited as State Officials]. Although Hamilton
declared that "[t]he power of determining causes. . . between one State and the citizens of
another" is essential to peace among the states, THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 501 (A. Hamilton), he also maintained that "[iut is inherent in the nature of [a state's] sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . . Unless, therefore, there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States
" Id. No. 81, at 511 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
60OProfessor Tribe has noted that the states vehemently opposed the Chisholm decision in part because they feared the prospect of suits based upon Revolutionary War debts.
See Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Power Issues in Controversies about Federalism,89 HARv. L. REV. 682, 683 (1976).
"I The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XI. Having been proposed 2 days after the Court announced its decision in Chisholm, the eleventh amendment was ratified within 5 years. See C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMiENDMENT

AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

64-67 (1972). Notably, although the

Chisholm opinion indicated that it was doubtful whether the article HI power of the federal
judiciary extended to suits against a state by its own citizens, see Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 469 (1793), the eleventh amendment has been construed to preclude such
actions. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890).
209 U.S. 123 (1907).
'e' See id. at 159. The significant issue in Young was whether the federal courts had
jurisdiction to enjoin the attorney general of Minnesota from enforcing an unconstitutional
state statute. Id. at 149. Holding that the federal judiciary has such authority, the Court
reasoned that "the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act" strips
the official of his governmental status and subjects him to liability in his individual capacity
since "[t]he State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the
supreme authority of the United States." Id. at 159-60. See also United States v. Lee, 106
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the fiction that "the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity" was not a party to the proceeding.-" Although it limited the
impact of the eleventh amendment, this fiction was not extended
to suits for pecuniary relief. Indeed, the courts in such cases abandoned the Young fiction and prohibited monetary relief upon the
ground that the state was the real party in interests 6 5 and therefore, could not be sued absent a waiver of immunity.3 6
The traditional practice of precluding even nominal cost
awards without express consent3 6 7 was thrust into uncertainty after
the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a fee award against a
state.36 8 The lower courts interpreted this action as a signal that
awards of costs could be made incident to the federal judiciary's
power under Ex Parte Young to grant injunctive relief against
370
state officials.e In Edelman v. Jordan,
however, the Supreme
Court held that when a judgment requires the payment of funds
from a state treasury, mere characterization of the remedy as "injunctive" or "equitable" will not suffice to preclude application of
the eleventh amendment. 7 1 Rather, the Court stated, the important inquiry is whether a money judgment "is in practical effect
U.S. 196 (1882); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
3" 209 U.S. at 159.
85 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577 (1946);
Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944). Noting that the "nature of a suit as one against the state is
to be determined by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding," the Ford Court held
that in an action for money damages, "the State is the real, substantial party in interest,"
and accordingly, is protected by the eleventh amendment. 323 U.S. at 464; see 327 U.S. at
577; 322 U.S. at 53.
"' See, e.g., Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 24 (1933); Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line
R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). In order to waive
its immunity under the eleventh amendment, a state must clearly demonstrate an intention
to become subject to suit in federal courts. See, e.g., Ruman v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't
of Revenue, 462 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 964 (1980). The courts will not find such an intention by implication
absent convincing evidence. E.g., Riggle v. State, 577 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1978); Zentgraf
v. Texas A & M Univ., 492 F. Supp. 265, 272 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Guyton,
443 F. Supp. 10, 12 (C.D. Cal. 1978); see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 & n.19
(1974).
"I See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 73-74 (1927) (dictum) (citing
United States v. Boyd, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 29, 51 (1847)); United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S.
(4 How.) 286, 288 (1846); The Antelope, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 546, 550 (1827).
a Amos v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), afl'g mem., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (per curiam).
30 See, e.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974).
87 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
371 Id. at 666.
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indistinguishable in many aspects from an award of damages
against the State."'7 2 The Court concluded that since prospective
relief requiring the expenditure of funds has a mere "ancillary effect on the state treasury"3 7 it is permissible. Conversely, retroactive equitable relief, which requires the state to pay money to the
plaintiff "as a form of compensation," was held to be barred by the
eleventh amendment.3 74 This distinction left courts divided concerning the proper characterization of fee awards. 3 "
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,376 a more definitive articulation concerning the propriety of a fee award against a state emerged, although the Court did not decide whether fee awards fall within the
"ancillary effect" doctrine of Edelman.3 7 In Fitzpatrick,the plaintiffs sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for retroactive retirement benefits and for prospective equitable relief and
attorney's fees.37 8 The Supreme Court permitted all three types of
relief despite its interpretation of the scope of the eleventh amendment in Edelman.3 79 In support of its decision, the Court emphasized that Title VII contains explicit congressional authorization
for the federal judiciary to entertain suits against the states and to
provide all of the relief sought by the plaintiffs. 380 Moreover, the
Court found that the eleventh amendment did not circumscribe
Congress' power in this regard because Title VII was enacted pursuant to the authority granted by the fourteenth amendment to
enforce its provisions "'by appropriate legislation.' "381 The Court
Id. at 668.
Id.
374 Id. The Court observed that when prospective relief is granted under Ex Parte
Young, it is inevitable that the state will suffer some "fiscal consequences." Id. at 667-68.
When a state incurs costs "not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the future...
but as a form of compensation," however, it is indistinguishable from awards of money damages. Id. at 668.
-71 Compare Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 7-8 (4th Cir. 1975) (Edelman decision permits recovery of attorney's fees) with Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975) (Edelman holding did not remove eleventh amendment
bar to fee recovery).
376 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
377 Id. at 456-57.
378 Id. at 449-450.
379 Id. at 447-48. The Court noted that all parties to the action conceded that the relief
sought was "in fact indistinguishable from that sought. . . in Edelnan." Id. at 452. Nevertheless, the Court observed that because Fitzpatrick involved congressional authorization
for the monetary relief sought, Edelman did not control. Id.
-o Id. at 447-48, 452.
31 Id. at 453 & n.9.
372
373
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concluded that since the "principle of state sovereignty" embodied
in the eleventh amendment is "necessarily limited" by the powers
granted to Congress in the fourteenth amendment, the state could
not claim immunity from the relief sought.8 2
In Hutto v. Finney,83 the Supreme Court answered two questions left unanswered by its Edelman and Fitzpatrick decisions.
First, the Court held that express statutory language is not a prerequisite to a finding that Congress had abrogated the States' eleventh amendment immunity.38 4 Examining the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, the Hutto Court divined an adequate
implied waiver of immunity both from the broad language of the
Act and from its legislative history.38 5 Comparing the inherent
power of the federal courts to assign costs among litigants"8 " with
the power of Congress to include attorney's fees "as part of the
costs,

38

7

the Court noted that "it would be absurd to require

[Congress to make] an express reference to state litigants whenever
38
' 8
a new item.

.

is added to the category of taxable costs.

The second significant aspect of the Hutto decision was its holding
that fee awards may be considered ancillary to a court's injunctive
power, within the meaning of the Edelman opinion, when they are
Id. at 456. The Court noted:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment], not only is it
exercising [legislative] authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional
Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state
authority. We think that Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provide for private suits against States or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts.
427 U.S. at 456 (citations and footnote omitted).
383 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
3" Id. at 697-98.
" Id. at 693-94. The Court noted that the Fees Awards Act, by its own terms "applies
to 'any' action brought to enforce certain civil rights laws." Id. at 694; see 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), as amended by Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2330. Moreover, the
Court observed that the legislative history accompanying the Act expressly stated that Congress intended attorney's fees to be obtainable from state and local governments. 437 U.S. at
694 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5).
588 437 U.S. at 696. The Court noted that it is well settled that the federal judiciary can
assess costs against the states. Id. (citing Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70,
74 (1927)).
287 437 U.S. at 695-96. The Hutto Court referred to numerous statutes which allow
for
recovery of attorney's fees as part of costs. Id. at 697 n.28 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260 n.33 (1975)).
388 437 U.S. at 696-97.
311

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

imposed pursuant to the traditional bad faith exception to the
American rule against fee awards." 9
The Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning congressional circumscription of the eleventh amendment assume added
importance in light of the recent Maine v. Thiboutot3 90 opinion.
Although Thiboutot did not directly involve the eleventh amendment," 1 the Court's holding considerably expanded the availability
of fee awards against states. In Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held
that Congress intended section 1983 of Title 42, which provides for
the redress of rights "secured by the Constitution and laws" of the
United States, 9 2 to encompass purely statutory violations of fed39 3
eral law as well as violations of constitutional and civil rights.
Moreover, the Court construed the Fees Awards Act to permit fee
shifting in all section 1983 suits, regardless of whether the underly39 4
ing claim was predicated upon a constitutional violation.
In a vigorous dissent to the Thiboutot decision, Justice Powell
389 Id. at 690-92. The Hutto Court upheld the district court's authority to assess fees
against the state for failing to comply with various orders. Id. at 689. The Court stated that
in exercising their authority under Edelman, "federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for compliance." Id. at 690. When a state official
does not obey a judicial order, the Court noted, contempt sanctions may issue, including
incarceration and remedial fines. Id. at 690-91. The Court observed that the power to award
fees for bad faith, like the imposition of fines, "is properly treated as ancillary to the federal
court's power to impose injunctive relief." Id. at 691.
390 448 U.S. 1 (1980).

391 Id. at 9 n.7. Because the plaintiffs in Thiboutot brought suit in the judicial system
of the state of Maine, no eleventh amendment issues were presented. Id.
392 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. 11
1979). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
393 448 U.S. at 4. The plaintiffs in Thiboutot had alleged that the state of Maine violated their rights under federal law by enforcing a restrictive interpretation of the Social
Security Act. Id. at 3. The Supreme Court noted that the central issue in the case was
whether Congress intended to provide a remedy for such a claim under section 1983. Id. at
4. Observing that Congress did not qualify the phrase "and laws" when it enacted section
1983, the Court stated that the "plain language of the statute" demonstrated that the claim
should be cognizable. Id. Moreover, the Court focused upon several of its prior decisions
which had interpreted section 1983 as providing a remedy for both constitutional and statutory violations. Id.
"I Id. at 8-10. In construing the Fees Awards Act, the Court again relied upon the plain
meaning of the statutory language. Id. at 9. The Court also noted that "[t]he legislative
history is entirely consistent with the plain language" of the Act. Id.
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contended that the majority had placed insufficient emphasis upon
the historic backdrop of civil rights legislation and, consequently,
had extended section 1983 well beyond its original functions.3"
Justice Powell stated that the Court's interpretation of both section 1983 and the Fees Awards Act constituted a drastic expansion
of state governmental liability which could "virtually eliminate the
'American Rule' in suits against [state and local] officials."' 9 6 Indeed, the Justice noted, the Court's holding would permit a section
1983 suit to be maintained whenever any of a multitude of social
welfare provisions were implicated, except in the rare instance

where the7 federal statute in issue provided for an exclusive
39

remedy.

There is little doubt that the Thiboutot Court's expansive interpretation of section 1983 will have a significant impact upon the

availability of fee awards against state officials. Cases involving alleged deprivations of rights created by federal and state cooperative programs, for which no express private right of action exists,

may now yield recovery of legal fees if the pleadings assume a civil
rights posture.39 e Notwithstanding its broad scope, however, it

must be recognized that Thiboutot involved only statutory interpretation and congressional intent. Indeed, it remains to be seen

whether such an expansive interpretation of legislative power runs
afoul of the eleventh amendment.
In Maher v. Gagne,9 9 the Supreme Court partially resolved

the constitutional tension created by Thiboutot. In Maher, the
plaintiff sued under section 1983, alleging that Connecticut's im"I Id. at 14-19 (Powell, J., dissenting). Observing that the phrase "and laws" arose out
of an 1874 revision of the civil rights laws, Justice Powell noted that it was the intention of
the revisers to maintain the substantive law existing prior to the revision. Id. at 16-19. Justice Powell further posited that since the Civil Rights Act previously had been held to be
coextensive with its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976), see 448 U.S. at
19-20 (Powell, J., dissenting), the scope of section 1983 should be limited to causes of action
arising under the Constitution or civil rights statutes as set forth in the jurisdictional provision. Id. at 20-22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
I" Id. at 12 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 22 & n.11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
'9'
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). In the
wake of Thiboutot, alert plaintiffs' attorneys have been filing amended complaints to complement statutory allegations with civil rights claims. See, e.g., Davis v. HUD, 627 F.2d 942,
946 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (alleged violation of Housing and Urban Development Act of 1974
supplemented by section 1983 action); Yapaater v. Bates, 494 F. Supp. 1349, 1354
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (section 1983 action added to claim of violation of Title XIX of the Social
Security Act), aff'd per curiam, 644 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1981).
'- 448 U.S. 122 (1980).
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plementation of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program violated the Social Security Act as well as the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. 0 0 The parties
entered into a consent decree which, although not purporting to
adjudicate the merits of the claim, did afford the plaintiff most of
the relief sought. 40 1 After concluding, on the authority of
Thiboutot, that Congress intended fees to be awarded in this type
of case, the Court held that the enforcement power of the fourteenth amendment permits Congress to award fees when a "plaintiff prevails on a wholly statutory, noncivil rights claim pendent to
a substantial constitutional claim.14 0 The fact that the constitutional claim remained unadjudicated did not persuade the Court
that the fee award was barred by the eleventh amendment. Indeed,
the Court stated that in passing appropriate legislation to enforce
the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, Congress "clearly
*. . [is] not limited to awarding fees only when a constitutional or
' 403
civil rights claim is actually decided.
Notably, the Maher Court did not resolve the issue of whether
the Fees Awards Act would apply to a purely statutory noncivil
rights claim against a state.4 0' Nevertheless, it is submitted that
even if Congress intended the Fees Awards Act to apply to all federal statutes, 4 5 the.analyses enunciated in Thiboutot and Maher
are limited to situations in which awards are granted for statutory
deprivations of civil rights. Indeed, it is suggested that the Court
cannot rely upon the fourteenth amendment's enforcement authority in noncivil rights cases and must, in such cases, find an alternative source of congressional power sufficient to circumvent eleventh
400

401
402

Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 126 & n.8.
Id. at 132; see, e.g., Lund v. Affieck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Seals v.

Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390, 393-94 (6th Cir. 1977); Keith v. Volpe, 501 F. Supp.
403, 406-07 (C.D. Cal. 1980). See also Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
403 448 U.S. at 132-33. The Maher Court held that an award of attorney's fees may be
based upon an undecided substantial constitutional claim only when the dispositive statutory claim and the unresolved constitutional issue have "a common nucleus of operative
fact." Id. at 132 n.15 (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)); see
H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 38, at 4 n.7. See also Anderson v. Redman, 474 F. Supp.
511, 515 (D. Del. 1979).
"1 448 U.S. at 130.
1o See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 34, at 5. The Judiciary Committee observed
that fee awards are essential to the effective enforcement of those statutes to which the Fees
Awards Act applies. Id. The report also referred to parties who "vindicate... fundamental
rights" but it did not define those rights as constitutional or statutory. See id.
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amendment immunity. 40 6

Although the eleventh amendment remains a formidable obstacle to litigants suing for violations of those federal laws which
do not implicate civil rights, Thiboutot and Maher undeniably present major inroads into a state's constitutional insulation from liability for fee awards in all other section 1983 cases. In order to
avoid fee shifting under the rules announced in these cases a state
may advance a number of arguments. First, counsel may urge the
court to decide all constitutional issues squarely against the litigant seeking fees, thereby precluding an award. 07 This approach
may not meet with success in many cases, however, because of the
well-settled principle that cases should be resolved in such a way
as to avoid unnecessary constitutional rulings. 40 8 A state might also

argue that a contested statute is outside the ambit of section 1983.
The Supreme Court noted the availability of such an approach in
the recent case of PennhurstState School and Hospital v. Halderman.40 9 In Pennhurst, the Court declared that the Developmen406 Several cases, which have explored Congress' authority to abrogate a state's eleventh

amendment immunity, have indicated that such power extends well beyond the enforcement
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the
Court engaged in a two-pronged analysis in finding that the state of Alabama had waived its
immunity from suit under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. See id. at 196-97. The
Court first found that Congress intended to subject the states to suit under the Act, and
then concluded that Alabama consented to this incursion upon its sovereignty by continuing
to operate a railroad after the effective date of the statute. Id. at 191-93. Although the
Parden case was decided upon the ground that the state had consented to suit by its conduct, the Court's opinion also suggested that since "the States surrendered a portion of their
sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to regulate commerce," the doctrine of
immunity could not "stand in the way of regulation" undertaken pursuant to that authority.
Id. at 191-92.
After Parden was decided, the courts evolved a hybrid analysis for determining whether
the eleventh amendment precluded the assertion of federal jurisdiction in a given situation.
Pursuant to this approach, the courts first determined whether the statute permitting suit
was enacted through a valid exercise of congressional power, and then decided whether
there was sufficient evidence of a legislative intention to subject the states to suit. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454-56 (1976). Following this lead, recent decisions have
found support for limitations of state immunity in various constitutional grants of power
and parallel statutory schemes. See, e.g., Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070,
1081 (5th Cir. 1979) (act involving veteran's rights authorizing suit against state was within
legitimate scope of war power and validly abrogated eleventh amendment immunity); Mills
Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1979) (state cannot assert immunity
to "nullify the rights reserved and protected by Congress, acting pursuant to the Copyright
and Patent Clause").
40I See, e.g., Meriwether v. Sherwood, 514 F. Supp. 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also
Haywood v. Ball, 634 F.2d 740, 743 (4th Cir. 1980).
'0" See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 547 (1974).
401 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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tally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975410 does not
create a private right of action,411 reasoning that since the provision was merely a congressional encouragement for states to adopt
programs benefitting the disabled, it did not create legal responsibility for noncompliance.,12 Significantly, the Court stated that it
was "at least an open question" whether a state participating in a
disability program would be subject to liability under section 1983
for its failure to "assure" compliance with the conditions of the
Act.413 A third, and perhaps the most effective method of alleviating the impact of Thiboutot is to assert that the underlying statute
provides an exclusive remedy, thus foreclosing a fee award based
upon a civil rights statute. This option, first suggested by Justice
Powell in his dissent in Thiboutot,4 14 was mentioned by the Penn-

hurst majority415 and has been considered by the lower courts.416
Notwithstanding the availability of the foregoing methods to
avoid liability for fees, it is suggested that the courts should strive
to adhere to the principles enunciated in Thiboutot and Maher. It
is conceded that strict application of the holdings of these cases
will result in an expansion of state liability for attorney's fees. 17
Nevertheless, it is submitted that, in so doing, the federal judiciary
Congress contemplated when it
will be performing the role that
418
enacted the Fees Awards Act.

C. Legislative and JudicialImmunity
The doctrines of legislative41 9 and judicial immunity420 have
410

42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6080 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).

411

451 U.S. at 18-27.

Id.
413 Id. at 28.
414 See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 22 & n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
416 451 U.S. at 28.
41, See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 981-85 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
417 See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 12 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
418 See note 385 and accompanying text supra.
419 The doctrine of legislative immunity, as it exists today in the United States, is
firmly rooted in the English common law. Although Sir Thomas More could make only a
tentative claim of immunity in 1523, Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951), the
doctrine gained full legal recognition when it was incorporated into the English Bill of
Rights, which provides "[t]hat the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parlyament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parlyament." 1
W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. II. The privilege apparently had its origins in a desire "to prevent
intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966).
In this country, the importance of the common-law tradition was sustained by the fram412
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existed at common law for centuries. The concept of insulating
members of these branches of government from liability arose from
the belief that it is unjust to hold an official liable for using discretion which he is legally bound to exercise, and from the fear that
the imposition of liability would intimidate officers of government,
preventing them from exercising "the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good. '421 While the doctrine of legislative immunity shields legislators from civil liability, 22 the scope of
ers of the United States Constitution, who provided that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl.1. Two interrelated rationales have been identified as underlying
the Speech or Debate Clause. One rationale is that the separation of powers established by
the Founders is fostered by preventing the intrusion of the executive or judicial branches of
government into the protected affairs of the legislature. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360, 369 (1980); see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178-79 (1966). A second rationale involves the protection of legislative independence. United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S.
360 (1980); see Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975).
The first of these rationales clearly is unique to the American legal system, and has led the
Supreme Court to comment that "[a]lthough the Speech or Debate Clause's historic roots
are in English history, it must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the
context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary system." United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
420 The doctrine of judicial immunity originated in the English common law. See generally Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of JudicialImmunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879,
881-96; Feinman & Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. Rav. 201 (1980).
See also Note, Immunity of Federal and State Judges from Civil Suit-Time for a Qualified Immunity?, 27 CASE W. RES. 727, 727-29, 743-46 (1977); Note, Liability of Judicial
Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L. J. 322, 323-26 (1969). The policy underlying judicial immunity was articulated in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), wherein
the Supreme Court observed that it was "a general principle of the highest importance to
the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested
in him [should] be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself." Id. at 347.
421 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209, 223 (1963). In Scheuer, the Supreme
Court held that in a section 1983 suit, as in any other suit, a qualified immunity, rather than
an absolute immunity, attached to officers of the executive branch of government. 416 U.S.
at 247. The extent of such qualified immunity, the court stated, depends upon "the scope of
discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based." Id.
422 See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975).
The parameters of the legislative privilege are now fairly clear. The privilege has been construed broadly by the Supreme Court to encompass not merely "words spoken in debate,"
but anything "generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to
the business before it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881). In addition, the
Court has held that if a legislator's actions fall within the "sphere of legitimate legislative
activity," Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312 (1973) (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 624 (1972)), the absolute prohibitions of the speech or debate clause are deemed to
be invoked. E.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1973); United States v. Brewster,

1982]

ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FEDERAL COURTS

the judicial immunity doctrine remains uncertain. It is clear that
judicial officers are immune from actions for damages, 23 but there
408 U.S. 501, 515-16 (1972); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 (1959). Moreover, the broad
construction accorded the clause by the Court has shielded legislators "not only from the
consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves."
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) (per curiam). In the federal sphere, congressmen have been held to be immune not only from actions for damages or prospective
relief, see, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1975),
but also from criminal prosecution, see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1966)
(prosecution may not draw into question the legislative acts of congressman or his motives
for performing them).
Many states have granted immunity to state legislators through constitutional provisions
which parallel the United States Constitution in purpose and construction. See Tenney v.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1951). In the state realm, legislators also have been accorded immunity from civil actions carried out in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at 376 (state legislator's common-law absolute immunity from civil suit was not abrogated by passage of Civil Rights Act of 1871). Significantly, however, in the criminal field,
the Supreme Court has held that a state's speech or debate clause is "a limit only on the
prosecutorial powers of that State." United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (1980). Since
Congress has not seen fit to accord a state legislator who is prosecuted under federal law the
same evidentiary privileges available to a member of Congress, the Court has held that a
state legislator's legislative immunity may not be invoked in a federal criminal prosecution.
Id.
42 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 55354 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 351 (1872). In Bradley, the Supreme Court held that judges are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, "even
when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Id. at 351. This principle was later held to be applicable in section
1983 suits, since the legislative history offered no indicia of a contradictory congressional
intention. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1978). The Bradley Court drew a vital distinction between an "excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
subject-matter." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351. Only in the latter type of case will a judge be
subject to liability. Id. at 351-52. A judge will not lose his right to invoke judicial immunity
merely because his action was "in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). The Stump case provided an
interesting analysis of the appropriate scope of judicial immunity. See generally Block,
supra note 420, at 910-25; Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of JudicialImpunity, 64 VA. L. REv. 833 (1978); Note, A Judge Can Do No Wrong: Immunity is Extended
for Lack of Specific Jurisdiction--Stumpv. Sparkman, 27 DEPAuL L. RPv. 1219 (1978). In
Stump, a judge approved the involuntary sterilization of a 15-year-old girl. 435 U.S. at 35153. The Supreme Court applied the principle articulated in Bradley, and concluded that
because the judge had not acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, he was immune from
an action for damages. Id. at 359. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that the
existing statutory authority for the sterilization of institutionalized persons did not "warrant the inference that a court of general jurisdiction has no power to act on a petition for
sterilization of a minor in the custody of her parents." Id. at 358. The Court placed great
significance upon the fact that there was no statute or case law prohibiting the judge from
granting a petition for sterilization. Id. The Court also rejected the argument that the judge
should be subject to suit because of his commission of serious procedural errors, reasoning
that any attempt to overcome the judge's immunity by pointing to the erroneous exercise of
his authority was foreclosed by Bradley. Id. at 359.
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is disagreement among the federal circuits as to whether judges
can be subject to injunctive or declarative actions.2 4 The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc.4"s demonstrated that these
distinctions and unsettled questions are significant in the context
of the Fees Awards Act.
In Consumers Union, the plaintiffs alleged that the Virginia
Supreme Court violated their civil rights by promulgating a rule in
the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibited
advertising by attorneys.4 2 6 A three-judge district court ultimately

enjoined the rule's enforcement427 and awarded attorney's fees
against the Virginia court pursuant to the Fees Awards Act.42 8 On

appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the award, hold424 Many circuits impose injunctive and declarative liability upon judicial officers. Ciudadanos Unidos De San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807, 813
n.16 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 335
n.7 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980); Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597
F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir.
1975); Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada, 490 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (D. Nev. 1980). Without
actually deciding this issue, some circuits have indicated that they agree with the general
trend imposing prospective liability upon judges. See, e.g., Kelsey v. Fitzgerald, 574 F.2d
443, 444 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 15 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904
(1978). Several lower courts, however, have granted judges absolute immunity from all liability. See, e.g., Town of Hopkins v. Cobb, 466 F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (D.S.C. 1979); Atchley v.
Greenhill, 373 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (S.D. Tex. 1974), aff'd, 517 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); Mackay v. Nesbett, 285 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D. Alaska
1968), aff'd on other grounds, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969).
In addressing this issue, the courts generally have looked to the policy considerations
underlying the judicial immunity doctrine. In Town of Hopkins, for example, the court
granted immunity from all forms of liability, declaring that "[t]o create an artificial distinction between injunctive and monetary relief against the judiciary would be preposterous and
utterly defeat the purpose for which the rule of immunity was created." 466 F. Supp. at
1218. Conversely, in Adams v. Supreme Court of Pa., 502 F. Supp. 1282 (M.D. Pa. 1980), the
court ruled that an expansion of judicial immunity to bar prospective relief was inappropriate because it would not further the doctrine's purpose of encouraging judicial activity by
allaying fear of "personal consequences." Id. at 1286. The court reasoned that injunctive
and declarative relief do not entail such consequences. Id. Similarly, in United States v.
Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965), the court held that there is no sound policy to
justify the immunization of judicial officials when mere injunctive relief is sought since it
"will only prevent the doing of what there is no right to do." Id. at 728 (citation omitted).
425 446 U.S. 719 (1980), vacating and remanding Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979).
426

446 U.S. at 724-26.

427 Id. at 726-27. While the original district court case was pending, the Supreme Court,

in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), ruled that prohibitions on attorney advertising
are violative of the first amendment. Id. at 384.
428 446 U.S. at 728.
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ing, inter alia, that the district court erred by predicating the
award upon acts which fell within the scope of legislative immunity.429 Upon noting that legislators enjoy absolute immunity from

suits for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief,430 the Court
reasoned that because the Virginia court had acted in its rulemaking capacity, it should be accorded an equal measure of immu-

nity.431 The Court observed, moreover, that Congress did not in-

tend to abrogate absolute legislative immunity in enacting the Fees
Awards Act,4 32 but rather, that the statute was designed to permit
fee shifting against officials subject to prospective equitable relief.433 Because officials who enforce the law fall squarely within
this description, the Court noted that the Virginia judiciary could
be held liable for a fee award based upon its enforcement function,
despite its legislative immunity.4 " Thus, the Court remanded the

case for a fee award predicated on this ground. 3 5
Notably, the Consumers Union Court did not decide whether
prospective equitable relief is barred under the judicial immunity
doctrine. 438 Nevertheless, citing the Consumers Union Court's view

that Congress intended the Fees Awards Act to authorize fee
awards against officials who are subject to such relief,'37 the Third
Circuit, in Morrison v. Ayoob,458 held that the statute does permit
fee awards against judicial officers who had acted in their official
capacities.439 Irrespective of the Seventh Circuit's stance, it is suggested that the practitioner should act cautiously in relying upon
" Id. at 738.
410 Id. at 732; see notes 441 & 444 infra.
43' 446 U.S. at 738. The Consumers Union Court agreed with the lower court's dissent-

ing opinion, which had stated that the challenged activity of the Virginia court was legislative in nature because it did "not arise out of a controversy which must be adjudicated, but
instead out of a need to regulate conduct for the protection of all citizens." Id. at 731 (quoting 470 F. Supp. at 1064 (dissenting opinion)).
432 446 U.S. at 738-39.
433 Id.

41, Id. at 736. The Court observed that although prosecutors and other law enforcement
officials enjoy absolute immunity from damage awards, id. (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 427 (1976)), they are subject to suits for injunctive relief. 446 U.S. at 736 (citing
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1975)).
431 446 U.S. at 739.
'" The Court noted that although it had never addressed the question of whether judicial immunity bars prospective equitable and declaratory relief, the courts of appeals apparently were divided on the issue. Id. at 735; see note 424 and accompanying text supra.
137 446 U.S. at 738-39.
,39 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981).
'11 627 F.2d at 672 & n.2.
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the Morrison decision, for although Morrison comports with the
Consumers Union opinion, its holding necessarily is contingent
upon Supreme Court ratification of the principle that judicial immunity does not bar awards of equitable relief. Until this issue definitively is resolved, the concomitant question of fee shifting
against justicial officers will remain unsettled.
V.

CONCLUSION

The historic American rule against awards of attorney's fees
largely has been eliminated by legislative fiat. Indeed, fee awards
presently are sanctioned by many statutes and, perhaps unavoidably, judicial interpretations of the operation of such statutes vary
considerably. Hence, the practitioner litigating a fees issue faces a
formidable task in determining, inter alia, the necessary preconditions to a fee award, the size of such an award, and the persons
and entities against whom such an award may be assessed. It is
hoped that this Note affords some insight into these issues and will
be of assistance to the practitioner engaged in their resolution.
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